Ballot box security

Elections are an inseparable element and prerequisite of democracy. For centuries, humanity has strived to achieve a form of government where they determine their own leaders. Elections do not represent a static system in the lives of societies; they represent an active one. 

Equal access to information regarding elections for every voter without discrimination, the ability to cast a vote with free will, and equal opportunities for all parties and candidates participating in the elections are the most important criteria for a legitimate election. 

It has long been known that elections in Turkey are not conducted according to the principle of democratic, free, fair, and honest elections. Reports published by organizations conducting independent election observation also confirm this situation.

Setting aside propaganda based on threats and blackmail where there is no equality of opportunity, the most important challenge in the upcoming election will be ensuring ballot box security.

Especially in rural areas, multiple (repeated) voting, and voting on behalf of soldiers who cannot vote, those who are convicts in penal institutions, and those who are restricted or banned from public service is common.

While it is a known fact that votes were cast on behalf of citizens who died or migrated after the February 6, 2023, earthquake, it is also indisputable that immigrants and asylum seekers pose a risk in terms of ballot box security. 

Furthermore, in villages, it is a common practice for a husband, father, or brother to vote on behalf of women. In the past, when I asked my mother who she voted for in an election, I was very surprised when she told me to ask my uncle.

While "election ink" was a method that would have at least partially eliminated these drawbacks or acted as a deterrent, this practice was abandoned. 

The Computer-Assisted Central Voter Registry System (SEÇSİS), which began to be implemented in our country after the 2007 general elections, is an information system where all kinds of data, information, and documents related to elections are collected, produced, stored, reported, and shared with stakeholders. 

The fact that the voting and vote-counting stages in SEÇSİS are human-centric creates a security risk in polling station operations.

District election boards will upload election results and scanned signed minutes to SEÇSİS, and political parties and candidates will be able to access this data via the Ballot Box Results Sharing System (SSPS). 

During my time serving at the Supreme Election Council, I remember an anecdote where I told an election delegation from Iraq that election results would be obtained in a very short time thanks to the election management system called SEÇSİS, and the members of the delegation started laughing and said, "Your system works slowly; in our country, election results are known a month before the election." 

For years, both the public and political parties and candidates assumed that fraud was being committed in computers and communication tools. However, it was only during the 2019 Local Administration elections that it was understood that the actual fraud was being committed at the ballot box and that operations affecting election results were being carried out during the uploading of election results and scanned signed minutes to SEÇSİS, and election results were obtained in a healthy manner as a result of ensuring ballot box security.

For this reason, it is essential that all polling station officials and party observers monitor the counting and tallying of votes in the local government elections to be held on March 31, 2024, and follow whether the ballot box results are accurately reflected in the general results. 

If ballot box security is not ensured and polling station operations are not conducted in a healthy manner, it will not be possible to speak of a fair and honest election having taken place.