The Diyanet's sermon is the state's religion

When the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs) was established, there was a sultanate regime left behind and the dominant power of the sovereign religious structure that gave that regime its color. Has religion not always been one of the tools of political intervention for the sovereigns? The pages of the Quran attached to the tips of spears at the Battle of Siffin are one of the most striking scenes of this reality; just think, Muawiyah confronts Ali with the Quran. Is there anything left to be said beyond this?

Let us return to the Diyanet. We know that such an institution was able to find a place in the field of existence for many reasons under the conditions of that day. However, the issue that would give the state its main backbone in the coming years would make itself felt clearly: that is secularism. First, in 1928, the provision "The religion of the State of Turkey is Islam" was removed from the Constitution. In the following years, the principle of secularism was added to the Constitution. Secularism is one of the principles in today's Constitution that cannot even be proposed to be changed.

So, is the Diyanet contrary to secularism? I think we can say at first glance that it is contrary in its current form. Because secularism is roughly the state being at an equal distance from all religions. At the stage we have reached, let alone distance, we are faced with a reality where the state has sermons read.

The state has no religion, but it has a sermon! Moreover, in those sermons, we can hear words to the effect of "do not oppose the laws of God." Well, if the Diyanet did not say this, would Muslims not know that this is the case? Then why does the Diyanet express a situation that is already known at the level of a sermon? I think there must be an answer to these questions.

Bülent Arınç, in his latest statement regarding the Diyanet, says that if the Diyanet had said, "The inheritance system I am describing is much better than the inheritance system in today's Civil Code. This system should be abandoned and the system I am describing should be mandatory for everyone," then the Diyanet would have harmed secularism. Then the much-discussed sermon would have been contrary to secularism. Now, for heaven's sake, for an institution that claims to represent religion, "Which is superior: the Civil Code or Divine laws!?" Moreover, if such a comparative question were asked to the Diyanet, wouldn't its preference already be clear? Then we can say that the Diyanet openly embraces and defends this. I am not even opening the subject of the implementation of the "Divine system"; that is another matter entirely.

Then, the voicing, making visible, and even opening to discussion of such thorny issues will, by the necessity of a natural flow, cause conflicts in the political sphere, and it is precisely at this point that the principle of secularism will be opened to discussion. Turkey's near future is full of painful examples of this problem. If the Diyanet publishes a sermon with this "ease" despite knowing this reality and where its words will lead, the emergence of debates will of course be inevitable.

However, here too, some immediately take it upon themselves to cling to third-rate rhetoric such as "The Diyanet is saying this to Muslims, there is no situation that concerns you." First of all, like all institutions of the state, the discourse and actions regarding the work and operations of the Diyanet concern the entire society. And if those actions and discourses are to affect the course, structure, and future of society, society will directly become a part of this process. What is decisive here is not faith, but social identity and the sense of rights it creates. People feel the need to take a stance against such statements with this sense of rights we are talking about. And they will.

Secondly, there is no Muslim mass that accepts or approves of the Diyanet or religious discourses in a monolithic way. Let alone today, such a mass has almost never existed throughout history. Religion was written, but the way people read and interpret it has always been different. A series of factors, from cultural processes to power relations, from socio-economic conditions to sociological dynamics, created this result. Once upon a time, the streets of Baghdad were practically impassable due to sectarian wars. Moreover, I am not talking about a late period. These were always issues of disagreement regarding "religion." Furthermore, the words claimed to belong to the Prophet were also a part of this war. Now, when the Diyanet issues a ruling on a subject, naturally not everyone draws the exact same conclusion from that ruling; they do not think like the Diyanet. As such, the ranks of those intervening in the statement also increase. You cannot close the subject by saying, "The Diyanet is telling Muslims, what is it to you?" Which Muslim, which religion, which ruling? Its translation is interpreted separately, its commentary separately, its history separately. In fact, the Diyanet knows all this, but it publishes such sermons at the expense of knowing it.

The point we have reached? In summary, it is as follows: Secularism is clearly being violated here, "theocratic laws" are implicitly brought to the fore, and propaganda for this is being made. Moreover, all this is supposedly done in the name of "Islam." Yet, we are not facing a monolithic Islam. Of course, all this is being recorded under the shadow of political power while it is being done. A sermon is already the religious voice, symbol, and operational tool of political power. Thinking of it as independent of that is contrary to the nature of things. Then we cannot think of the Diyanet alone, nor the responsibility for what is being experienced.