China’s digital rise and digital independence-2

Today, the digital network structure and digital infrastructure of countries indicate where they are positioned in the digital economy. In China, state-backed platforms stand out in the protected market known as the “Great Firewall.” Once viewed merely as “copycats of the West,” Chinese technology companies have now become global game-changers, ranging from artificial intelligence to social media, and from e-commerce to telecommunications. In China, digital independence is legitimized on the surface and internally through concepts such as “national security” and “autonomy.” However, in the background, there is an accumulation strategy aimed at increasing the competitive power of state-backed digital technology monopolies (Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei, ByteDance) in global capitalism.

China’s “digital independence” and digital platform monopolies are changing the world’s media consumption habits, expanding their economic, cultural, and political influence on a global scale. To make sense of China’s digital technology strategies, it is important to examine the political economy and cultural reflections in digital media, as well as the platforms themselves. For example, the rise of TikTok is the most visible and popular face of this story. This is because TikTok’s success with the short-video format has influenced global social media behavior. It has accelerated the production and consumption of short-video content worldwide. In fact, the secret of TikTok lies in its discovery algorithms, which combine news/entertainment and shopping into a video-first, single interface. As a result, Instagram Reels and YouTube Shorts were developed based on TikTok’s global success. This format offered users the ability to share short videos, and it is expected that the share of digital video advertising will surpass television to reach 58% in 2025 (amazonaws.com). According to eMarketer data, 60% of time spent on social media in the US is devoted to videos. Growth in streaming platforms, news apps, and social networks has now turned into a competition for time spent on screen per user rather than just “more users.” Meanwhile, short-video consumption negatively affects users by increasing attention spans and cognitive load. The dopamine-loop design in the attention economy triggers anxiety/focus issues, especially in young people.

Live broadcasts, which have gained great importance in China, are also widely used in e-commerce. The widespread use of product promotion and sales by brands through live streams on “live shopping” platforms stands out as a different approach in e-commerce. Meanwhile, in Turkey, TikTok has turned into an important medium for businesses. There are currently 10,500 businesses on the platform, and 96% of them consist of SMEs (Newsroom | TikTok).

As of 2025, the fact that most social usage time is spent on video has also changed the advertising pie. This means it has become somewhat mandatory for publishers to shift their product-market fit to video. Another video-sharing site in China, Bilibili, is interaction and community-focused, with 1.07 billion followers and tens of millions of paid users. While the platform reduced production costs by using large language models and artificial intelligence in short-video ads by 30%, it increased its eCPM—the revenue a publisher earns for every 1,000 ad impressions—by double digits (ainvest.com). In this way, as short video becomes the “default interface” and the use of artificial intelligence in visuals increases, all content consumption, from news to entertainment, is being transformed. News, political debates, or cultural productions now circulate as micro-clips detached from their context. This makes both journalism and cultural production fragmented and dependent on algorithms.

TikTok’s global success has also encouraged new content trends among young people based on dance, music, and humor trends. For example, a song or dance trend that becomes popular on TikTok can quickly spread all over the world. This dynamic has also influenced young content creators on Western platforms, leading them to use similar trends in their own content. All these socio-cultural developments can be evaluated as part of the soft power influence brought about by China’s technological rise. It is necessary to read why TikTok is so debated in the US and Europe partly from this framework. The issue is no longer just about teenagers’ dance videos; it is a war of data, advertising revenue, and cultural influence.

Super-apps and the content ecosystem in China also stand out with their differences. Unlike in the West, super-apps like WeChat and Douyin offer many services—from messaging to e-commerce, from payments to watching videos—including content, community, and commerce, all on a single platform. These platforms are very powerful among Chinese users. For example, WeChat has ~1.38 billion monthly users (demandsage.com). Other international platforms are blocked in China. Live broadcasts and short-video content in super-apps play an important role in increasing brands’ sales. On the other hand, the Chinese state uses the power of “influencers” to create a positive image on social media. According to research, at least 200 social media content creators linked to the Chinese government or its affiliates publish propaganda or PR videos in 38 different languages (apnews.com). It was revealed that Chinese “influencers” who opened accounts disguised as “bloggers” by promoting Chinese travel and culture were actually reporters for official organizations such as CGTN, China Radio International, or Xinhua. The AP News Agency identified dozens of accounts that reached hundreds of millions of followers and reported that most of these accounts published advertisements aimed at foreign audiences with content highlighting China with positive rhetoric (apnews.com). This situation shows how China circulates narratives and discourse worldwide through cultural content and daily life visuals on platforms, and how all messages function as a tool of foreign policy and public diplomacy.

In short, China’s digital rise affects the world in content presentation, distribution, advertising, marketing, and e-commerce formats through the spread of short-video trends, live-stream sales and advertising, super-apps and social commerce, and media and influencer strategies as soft power. At the point we have reached today, China’s rising technology companies are creating a major economic, cultural, and political sphere of influence in the world. The digital silk road is the new phase of China’s digital imperialism. Digital technology AI applications and social media platforms, submarine cables, 5G base stations, and surveillance technologies are the new export goods of Chinese capital. Capital export is realized through the control of data flows, data infrastructures, platforms, and surveillance technologies. Thus, China is spreading not only its economic influence but also its political-ideological control. It is no coincidence that Western centers accuse China of “digital colonialism” from this perspective. However, these criticisms stem from the West’s anxiety about losing its own historical digital hegemony. While technology companies in the West are told through “garage stories,” in the story in China, the state is a direct partner of platform monopolies. The main question is: For whom should digital independence be? For the state, for capital, or for the users?