50+1 and beyond...

Things got complicated when Erdoğan, responding to journalists' questions upon his return from Germany, said that the 50+1 requirement for the presidential election needs to change.

While the political position of MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, with whom he has shared a common destiny since July 15, regarding 50+1 is clear, he suddenly changed the agenda with a move that is bound to cause friction.

We all know that under the AKP government, journalists cannot just stand up and say, "I am a member of the press, I can ask whatever question I want."

Who would dare to ask a question without the approval of His Excellency!

Whenever Erdoğan is going to bring a sensitive issue to the agenda, a suitable question is handed to one of the journalists following him—someone who is articulate and has a rough idea about the topic—so that a novice doesn't end up saying something completely off-base.

If he hadn't wanted to bring the 50+1 issue to the agenda, none of the journalists there would have dared to ask such a question on their own.

So, why the sudden move?

In other words, why did Erdoğan feel the need to stir up this issue out of the blue, contrary to his previous words and stance, and why did he want it to be discussed by the public?

There are various rumors.

Some claim he just wants to get rid of the MHP, while others suggest he is trying to secure the election conditions for his successor.

Those who link the issue to constitutional change generally argue that Erdoğan wants such an arrangement to be able to remain president for life.

There is also no shortage of those who claim he wants to sit at the table with HEDEP and form a coalition without the MHP.

Let no one doubt that all of these, and perhaps even more, have been left to mature in a corner of Erdoğan's mind!

Those who have followed Erdoğan since 2002 know very well that after every move he makes, he aims to kill several birds with one stone; he has alternative strategies to win under any political condition.

It is common knowledge that he leaves what he said yesterday in the past. Like every authoritarian political figure, Erdoğan's only agenda is to maintain his power.

However, it is possible to say that he made this latest move with long-term consequences in mind, but primarily aimed at the local elections.

His goal is to take Istanbul, no matter what.

His bringing up 50+1 should be read in conjunction with his earlier remarks about a new constitution, where he winked at HEDEP by saying, "We are aiming for a constitution that reflects the diversity and richness of the nation, one that adds dynamism to society rather than lagging behind it."

Erdoğan knows very well that he cannot take Istanbul without the direct or indirect support of Kurdish voters. If he can persuade HEDEP to field a candidate in the local elections, the votes will be split, and the AKP could take Istanbul without difficulty.

So, would HEDEP say "yes" to this?

It depends on the commitments the AKP will make.

If they receive a guarantee that a trustee will not be appointed to the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality after the local elections, HEDEP might field a candidate in Istanbul.

This would mean Ekrem İmamoğlu, deprived of the Kurdish vote, losing his seat, and the AKP taking Istanbul. The mathematics of politics says so.

It turned out that in the last election, the power of the Kandil-linked Kurdish politics had significantly diminished. Their vote share fell to 8.8 percent. If the votes of those who stand close to them but are not part of the dynamics of Kurdish politics—estimated at around 1.5-2 percent—are excluded, there is a risk that HEDEP could fall below 7 percent.

Naturally, the danger of getting stuck at the election threshold arises.

That is why the resources of the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, where HEDEP is considered certain to win in the local elections, are very important. The rent to be distributed from here will fortify their base, which has begun to dissolve. It will provide strong moral motivation for their voters.

On the other hand, if a constitutional amendment is made regarding the election of the candidate who receives the most votes as president, Erdoğan will not be dependent on the MHP to maintain his power.

When he is freed from the weight of the MHP, he will find a much wider room for political maneuver.

Thus, he will be able to cooperate, perhaps even partner, with HEDEP much more easily. If HEDEP, having given Istanbul to the AKP in the local elections, takes Diyarbakır and also gets what it wants through a new constitution, politics in Turkey will have moved into a different lane.

So, why is Istanbul of such great importance that it would cause the AKP to make a 180-degree turn in politics?

The main reason for this is that with its votes falling to around 34 percent in the election, the AKP desperately needs the resources of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality to prevent the dissolution of its own base. Just as HEDEP needs the resources of the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality to finance its politics and rally its voters.

After losing the 2019 election, the AKP was deprived of the rich resources of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and could no longer feed its base.

On the other hand, as long as Istanbul is in the hands of the CHP, the 2028 elections are not a sure thing for Erdoğan. This time, there are two names in the CHP who are very articulate: Özgür Özel and Ekrem İmamoğlu.

Moreover, in the May 14-28 elections, Erdoğan remained behind Kılıçdaroğlu in Istanbul. That is why Erdoğan is now spending all his energy on Istanbul.

Can the way be paved for Erdoğan to be president for life with a new constitution?

It is obvious that his health condition will not allow him to carry out this duty for a very long time.

In other words, his desire for a lifetime presidency does not have much practical meaning.

After taking Istanbul—if he does—it seems the turn will come to determine the name who will sit in the presidential chair after him.

We can expect this person, whoever it may be, to start a warming-up tour for politics after the local elections.

It is rumored that the family wants Selçuk Bayraktar for the post-Erdoğan era, and that Hakan Fidan is also being prepared for this duty.

Bilal or Berat are not really on the agenda.

However, considering that both lack Erdoğan's experience and charisma, it does not seem very possible for them to get 50+1 in the first election under the current system.

Therefore, we can say that the regulation regarding the election of the candidate who receives the most votes for the presidency is of critical importance for the continuation of the one-man regime after him.

Let us ask whether Erdoğan will be able to kill several birds with one stone this time with the political theater he has staged during such a troubled period, when the country is struggling with a major economic crisis, foreign resources have practically dried up, the public is getting poorer by the day, and Turkey is practically surrounded by a ring of fire, and leave the answer to the reader as we conclude our article.