Bilal the boy

Of course, our subject is not the Bilal from the famous Istanbul folk song that begins, "The window opened, Bilal the boy, the pistol fired."

We are talking about the esteemed son of the President.

The state of affairs in the country is manifesting in an extremely unfavorable manner. Developments are so rapid that when we try to follow them properly, we get dizzy and nauseous. Let's assume we hit turbulence while flying from Esenboğa to Sabiha Gökçen on AJet.

We are at a loss as to where to turn our heads or how to look at which issue.

Amidst all this dust and smoke, they threw out a "backstage rumor" that "Tayyip Erdoğan is preparing Bilal for the period after him."

Frankly, this information was not new to me.

Around this time last year, a friend of mine who knows the AKP closely and whom I consider to be extremely well-versed in these matters had said, "Contrary to what everyone expects, Tayyip Erdoğan wants his son Bilal, not one of his sons-in-law, to succeed him."

I didn't give it much credence. I thought to myself, "No way..."

What else, I said to myself; especially after becoming the subject of the proverb invented by the people of my country for those who have trouble understanding and grasping things...

It is already known to everyone that he has been treated like a prince by the sycophants and bootlickers since his father began governing Turkey, but that is all. I had thought that if things got serious, Tayyip Erdoğan would not be able to take such a risk.

Still, it had remained in a corner of my mind.

It seems that now some people—whoever they may be—are heating up this issue, putting Bilal back into circulation, that is, preparing to put his son on the throne after Tayyip Erdoğan.

A few days ago, I had the opportunity to ask one or two people who follow developments closely and have their ears to the ground.

It wasn't as I thought.

Such a decision was made not by "some people," but with the consensus of all the family members themselves. Moreover, it is not even new. It is said that Emine Hanım is highly influential in this. Even if not the first circle in the Palace, even the second circle only found out about it later.

It was somehow communicated to them in a polite manner.

It is said that there are a dozen formulas, with the least amount of work done on them.

Primarily, it is being considered for Bilal to become the "AKP Chairman."

They call this the "stepping stone formula."

However, the problem is that Bilal is not a member of parliament. They are thinking that if he takes over the party without entering Parliament—that is, without receiving the approval of "possessing representative capacity" from the people of my country—it might cause reactions.

But for this, if the elections are not moved forward, he will wait for 2028. Let's hit the brakes a little there. Even though he currently has the wind blowing from the outside at his back, the Presidential seat is not a sure thing for his father. Things are not going exactly as he wants internally. Therefore, the full implementation of this formula depends on Tayyip Erdoğan running again and winning the election through a constitutional amendment.

The second issue is timing!

That is, will Bilal sit in that seat while his father is still alive? Or after he passes away?

Things get a bit complicated here. Because since he is not going to step aside while he is still fit and say, "here is the seat for you," it is possible that he might leave the Presidency after a mechanism is established to keep Bilal under control.

What do I mean by a control mechanism?

Let's do some brainstorming.

If the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) transfers the Caliphate, which is under its authority, to Tayyip Erdoğan through a constitutional amendment, the path for Bilal to the Presidency will also be opened. The issue here would be the division of power between the Caliphate office and the Palace, which would be overcome through a legal arrangement—that is, through laws enacted in a way that Tayyip Erdoğan would completely control Bilal.

Don't say, "Oh no, that wouldn't happen"; this system works like clockwork in one aspect in Iran and in another in Azerbaijan.

Moreover, no one would object, neither the US, nor Europe, nor the AKP's core base, as long as their handouts don't decrease.

Whether Tayyip Erdoğan sits in that seat or Bilal...

Would Özgür Özel say "no, it won't happen"? That is also doubtful. Since he is currently busy trying to curry favor with the Kurdish nationalists, he probably isn't thinking much about these issues. But it is also within the realm of possibility that he won't speak up so as not to offend the pious segment. We already know that he doesn't have any significant sensitivity toward secularism.

The process seems a bit moderately wavy and partly cloudy from here, but it is no secret that those who know this business have been rolling up their sleeves for a while to create a "name perception."

They are trying to create a "leadership."

Bilal's work related to civil society, his relationship with youth and culture, etc., are being emphasized. This candidate profile is being prepared as a "person who is not political but has a strong social perception."

For example, he recently mumbled something like, "I devote most of my time to educational work... I support young people in achieving their goals."

In other words, he is already being marketed as a "new face connected to the social base" rather than a "candidate directly extracted from a political post."

His statements like "I have no political goal" are a "strategy of not declaring candidacy for now."

We know that US politicians apply this frequently.

While giving the appearance of "I am not in it" on one hand, he is making preparations behind the scenes on the other. Such rhetoric both manages expectations and prepares the ground for a "surprise move when the time comes." Let's call it part of a likely long-term scenario.

Of course, conditions such as the necessary intra-party approval for his candidacy, voter support, and alliance balances are currently shrouded in fog.

In short, this rice will take a lot more water.

Let's come to the ten-point expert question: Can Turkey digest such a regime, that is, a system that allows power to pass from father to son?

Before answering this question, let's make a note in history with a small anecdote.

Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev had transferred his office to his son Ilham Aliyev shortly before he passed away in the US on December 12, 2003. His son had won the election on October 15, 2003, by receiving around 76 percent of the votes, and had officially taken office by taking the oath on October 31, 2003.

I had asked Selim Sermet Atacanlı, who served as the Chief Advisor and Spokesperson for the President of the time, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, at the weekly press conference at the Çankaya Mansion, how do you evaluate the power passing from father to son in Azerbaijan?

He didn't beat around the bush, he said, "What is important for us is the stability of Azerbaijan. Mr. Ilham Aliyev came to power through elections." In other words, the Republic of Turkey, founded by Atatürk, who had taken sovereignty from the dynasty and given it to the people in 1923, was putting "stability" and so-called "elections" ahead of the people's right to sovereignty and democracy.

At that time, the political will in Turkey had chosen not to speak out against the power passing from father to son in Azerbaijan—through elections that even the deaf sultan in Baghdad heard were dubious.

I was surprised, but I didn't want to push it too much.

Just as we have digested the suspension of democracy, the consideration of terrorists and their supporters as legitimate, acceptable, and reputable, the country anchoring itself in the Middle Ages, and the neo-Hamidian regime that political Islamists have established by force, by distracting ourselves from 2003 to today by saying "no, they can't do that much, they wouldn't dare to do this," let us end our article by saying that it is possible for us to digest the father being the Caliph and the son being the President.