Committing political hara-kiri

It is clear that they have learned absolutely no lessons from Turkey's recent political history.

Those who pinned their hopes on a right-wing party that would position itself against the AKP, occupy the center, produce rational politics, be at peace with the country's founding values, and have no issues with secularism, thinking it would ensure Turkey's normalization, have been sorely mistaken.

Yet, given their age, experience, and the political environment in which they were raised, they should have known very well what mistakes center-right parties made before them, why they were buried in the dustbin of history, and how short-sighted politicians paved the way for the AKP.

They had even served as Minister of the Interior, albeit briefly.

Moreover, they were a doctor of history.

They had enough knowledge and background to understand and interpret what has happened in recent history.

Even those who view life from the left—ignoring their political past—wanted to hold out hope in the name of democracy.

It all came to nothing.

Unfortunately, this has been a major disappointment not just for those who wanted to see center-right politics strengthened, but for all of Turkey.

They never analyzed the mistakes of leaders like Tansu Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz in the recent past, and they did not take inspiration from the Demirel of the 90s, perhaps not even the 70s.

Recent developments have shown that they have not developed, nor felt the need to develop, a tactical political mind for the present day.

They merely hoodwinked their voters with empty rhetoric.

They had a major advantage at the start. The AKP, which had sat in the middle of center politics until then, had put on its ideological glasses, especially after 2007, and gradually shifted toward a religious foundation, creating a vacuum in politics.

This was an unmissable opportunity. They could have capitalized on this to position their party in the center, demand power from there, and march toward government.

But they did not.

During their time in the chair of the party leadership, their words were inconsistent, and they drifted aimlessly with their political mistakes.

For whatever reason, it is unknown, but after the May 14-28 elections, they practically reduced their party to dust!

The successive resignations, expulsions, and departures actually showed that the party's institutional structure was extremely weak and that it was not built on a strong ideological foundation as marketed to the voters; in addition to this, it also revealed a very serious leadership problem!

All those who have resigned recently left or were expelled from the party for different reasons.

As for today, what stands out is that those who want cooperation with the CHP are being purged by the direct instruction of the party leader.

They cannot manage their party, and they do not want to be held accountable.

They blamed Kılıçdaroğlu for the May 14-28 results, but they ignore the fact that the salvos they fired after leaving the table raised question marks in the minds of voters who specifically wanted to escape the AKP, and that this played a significant role in the election defeat.

No matter how much they turn their back on the facts, this is not a sustainable process for them.

How will they explain to their voters their intention to field candidates against Mansur Yavaş and Ekrem İmamoğlu, whom they yesterday called "winnable candidates" and insisted upon?

Or will they even feel the need to explain!?

One does not need to be a prophet to see or predict that they will suffer a major defeat in the local elections.

In an election they enter "free and independent," being buried at the ballot box is inevitable...

In addition to their party melting away like a candle, the CHP is in a more advantageous position due to the unique nature of local elections and the large number of municipalities it holds. The IYI Party is barely even a factor.

If their calculation is to write off the local elections and prepare for 2028, how will they achieve that!?

If their party's vote hits rock bottom in March, how will they ask for support from voters for 2028?

It is clear that there is no rationally planned political contingency.

They are constantly playing the ball as it comes, regardless of whether it results in a goal or not. The issue is just to get through the day.

Let's say Yavaş and İmamoğlu are re-elected despite them fielding candidates in Istanbul and Ankara. This will mean that a significant portion of the electorate did not take the party leader's political stance and attitude into account and voted for the CHP, not for their own candidate.

What will they do then?

If the opposition does not fall behind in March, or even gains political ground against the AKP, it will force an early election before 2028. Anyone with political literacy can make this calculation. A possible early election would be a hope for Turkey to get rid of this government, which is dragging the country toward medieval darkness with each passing day.

Therefore, the 2024 local election has emerged not just as a local election for Turkey, but also as an unmissable opportunity to get rid of the AKP mentality.

And unfortunately, they do not see this, do not want to see it, or are acting based on a calculation that no one else knows.

Or they are committing political hara-kiri.

However, the opposition and the public should no longer waste their energy debating the IYI Party.

Local elections could be a breaking point in politics. Erdoğan is also aware of this; he has not yet been able to determine his Istanbul candidate, nor his Ankara one.

He is truly struggling this time. He knows very well that if he cannot take Istanbul, an early election will inevitably come to the agenda, and he cannot hold on until 2028 with an economy on the verge of collapse.

Moving toward a reasonable, logical, and results-oriented rational cooperation stands before the opposition as a historical responsibility.

Before concluding the article, let's share a small piece of inside information.

Erdoğan is reportedly complaining that the Gaza issue is not being stirred up enough domestically. It is clear that he has not been able to catch a strong wind through Gaza that he could use in the local elections to consolidate voters through religious and nationalist rhetoric.

In the public opinion polls that the Palace conducts almost daily, the Gaza issue only ranked in the top three on the agenda for one week following October 7. Then it gradually fell to the lower ranks. As the economic crisis, price hikes, pensions, cost of living, and corruption have surged far ahead, the Palace's advisory staff is desperately trying to create an "agenda" to align voters behind Erdoğan in the process leading up to the local elections, and with that, we conclude our article.