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Damn the lack of alternatives!

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Iran is burning!

The streets are hotter than the fires of hell, and a terrifying explosion of rage is scorching everything in its path!

Setting aside the hype on social media, the cold, hard "truth" for today is exactly this: people in Iran have finally broken through their walls of fear.

No one is looking back; it is clear they have burned their bridges.

Women in the squares are unveiled, and young people are targeting the regime's sacred values without hesitation. The entire country is ablaze...

It is not just the youth or women; everyone hit by the economic crisis is out on the streets, saying, "The time has come."

For the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the regime finds itself in the midst of such widespread social rejection.

But what is interesting is that this uprising, which is so massive and directly concerns the country's fate, has no leader to encompass, shelter, mobilize, or direct everyone on the street.

Let us turn the page slowly. What is happening in Iran today is not a revolution, but the explosion of a great anger that has been building for 47 years.

Let us say the straw that broke the camel's back has finally snapped.

This needs to be underlined with a thick pen.

Those with even a slight interest in history know very well that while anger on the streets can shake regimes, power cannot be toppled without strong organization and strong political leadership.

There are dozens of examples of this in recent history.

The streets of Iran are angry, determined, and brave, but they are headless!

Let us pause here and take a breath.

While the situation was manifesting in such an unfavorable manner, we suddenly saw some people trying to put Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran's deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who lives in America, back into circulation.

We are familiar with this. Whenever the squares and streets in his country become active, attention turns to him.

In other words, we are no strangers to this effort, but we also know that in every instance, he has ended up in disappointment, subsequently retreating to his corner by saying, "Maybe another spring."

Could it be different this time?

There are some remarkable details in the images coming from Iran. For instance, people are carrying portraits of Reza Pahlavi in the streets, chanting slogans in his favor, and walking with placards and banners.

Moreover, these are not the work of small groups. We are talking about hundreds, perhaps thousands of people.

Social media is already in a frenzy. Wherever you look, you see professional "post-production" videos praising Reza Pahlavi to the skies and composing odes to the Shah era.

So, when the Iranian people cannot produce a "leader" from within, are they latching onto Reza Pahlavi, saying, "Damn the lack of alternatives"?

For now, we do not know.

Let us look through our magnifying glass; instead of rejecting it outright by saying, "No way, that cannot happen," let us lay out the pros and cons one by one.

Reza Pahlavi's greatest advantage is that he has no organic ties to the current regime in Iran. He has neither a past tainted by the mullahs nor is he a party to bloody internal reckonings.

On paper, this is a major plus.

But it is not enough.

Most importantly, he does not actually live in Iran, he is not involved in underground organization, he has no contact with the security apparatus, and his ties to the bureaucracy are limited.

We do not know the extent of his organic relationship with the street.

In other words, there is more of a symbolic figure here than a leader.

To speak plainly, in a country like Iran—which is harsh, paranoid, and has a strong tradition of statehood—symbols alone are not enough to topple regimes.

Even if it looks like they might topple it, it ends up serving someone else's interests.

So, why hasn't the public embraced Reza Pahlavi until now?

I asked this to an Iranian friend who fled to Turkey after the Islamic Revolution and later settled in Istanbul.

"It is not that the Iranian people do not like Pahlavi; they do not know him..."

This answer surprised me. But a large portion of the young people on the streets today did not live through the Shah's regime. For them, Pahlavi is either a figure left in history books or a ghost demonized on the regime's propaganda posters.

Furthermore, the Pahlavi surname still triggers two different emotions in Iran; for one segment, it means modernization and opening up to the West, but for a large segment, it means oppression, SAVAK, and elitist rule...

Reza Pahlavi has not been able to shed this historical baggage.

Moreover, he has not fully succeeded in coming to terms with this baggage himself. He has neither been able to openly condemn his father nor has he made a clear break from the Shah era.

It is possible to say that this ambiguity makes the Iranian people uneasy.

Now, let us get to the ten-point expert question!

Why did Trump, who is closely interested in what is happening in Iran, not give the time of day to Reza Pahlavi? Yet, it was he himself who said he could take over the administration in the country immediately.

The answer to this question is of critical importance.

If Washington truly saw Reza Pahlavi as a transition figure in Iran, they would have polished him long ago, granted him international legitimacy, and marketed him as the "future of Iran."

But they did not.

Trump always kept his distance from Pahlavi.

Biden was the same.

They know very well that Reza Pahlavi is not a political actor capable of governing Iran.

For political planners in Washington, Pahlavi is, at most, a figure who carries anti-regime rhetoric, a symbol that reinforces the diaspora, and a name that can be used in the media; but beyond that, he is not a leader who will set the game on the field.

It is no secret that they have adopted a strategy of "not supporting popular movements you cannot control" in Iran so far. They believe Reza Pahlavi has no traction on the ground.

So, why can't the people in Iran produce a leader?

This is where the crux of the matter lies.

For 40 years, the regime has not only suppressed the opposition; it has also destroyed the potential to produce leaders. It has either killed, imprisoned, exiled, or discredited those who intended to emerge.

Today, there is no charismatic figure in the country, no common political program, and no clear roadmap for the transition process...

This situation will cause the anger on the street to tire out after a while. The regime knows this and is playing for time.

Can Reza Pahlavi fill this void?

The short answer is: it is not very likely. However, he could play a very limited and temporary role. Because he is neither a natural leader nor a genuine representative. At best, he could be considered a symbol of a transition period.

But even symbols of transition must be on the ground at the end of the day. We do not know if Pahlavi has the will to return to Iran, and even if he did, it is unclear whether he could survive. Let us be honest: if a leader does not take the same risks as their people, they are not a leader.

Since this issue cannot go on forever...

Leaderless revolutions are either suppressed by the army, tamed by other security apparatuses, or fall under the influence of external actors.

In a country like Iran, where ethnic, sectarian, and class fault lines are extremely fragile, this risk multiplies. If there is no leader today, let no one doubt that tomorrow, too many leaders will suddenly pop up like weeds.

This will naturally open the door to internal conflict in the country.

What Iran needs is a genuine political mind that will emerge from within, ready to pay the price.

And that is not yet in sight.

As for Turkey, let us conclude our article by emphasizing that what is happening in Iran should not be romanticized. A weakening of the regime does not automatically mean a better Iran; on the contrary, an uncontrolled disintegration will directly affect border security, the Kurdish issue, the sectarian issue, and energy pipelines.