Did Pashinyan really win?

On the surface, it seems so...

But there are dozens of question marks.

The polls have closed in Armenia, the results have been announced, and Nikol Pashinyan has managed to extend his political life once again.

The Civil Contract Party secured a majority in parliament by receiving approximately 50 percent of the vote. At first glance, this result could be interpreted as the Armenian people endorsing Pashinyan's pro-Western stance.

Indeed, the congratulatory messages arriving from many capitals, from Brussels to Washington, seem to justify this reading.

However, in a geography like the Caucasus, where no stone stays in place and no equation is as simple as it appears, it would be a mistake to look at election results solely through the numbers that came out of the ballot box.

Because this election was not just about the approval of Pashinyan's policies. This election also served as a referendum in which Russia's influence in the South Caucasus was tested, the West attempted to establish a new geopolitical line through Armenia, and the regional impact of the Turkey-Azerbaijan axis was measured.

The results showed that the Armenian voter chose to act by considering the necessities of the future rather than being significantly driven by the traumas of the past.

Of course, it is not that simple.

Did the Armenian people really choose the West, or did they reflect their disappointment with Russia at the ballot box?

This is where the crux of the matter lies...

Let us place a big question mark here.

Now, let us put on our reading glasses again.

Developments, especially during and after the 2020 Karabakh War, fundamentally changed Armenia's perception of security. Yerevan, which had thought it was under Moscow's protection for decades, saw that the Kremlin did not provide the expected support during and after the war. More importantly, the fact that Karabakh effectively passed under Azerbaijani control strengthened the belief in Armenian public opinion that "Russia sold us out."

It is worth being frank; a significant portion of the support Pashinyan received today was fueled not by the Armenian people's love for the West, but by their distrust of Russia.

For this reason, reading the election results as "Armenia has moved to the Western camp" would be an premature assessment.

When viewed from Russia's perspective, there is a contradictory picture. At first glance, it seems the Kremlin has lost. The political actors thought to be supported by Moscow did not achieve the expected success. Throughout the election process, Russia tried to ensure the results would not favor Pashinyan, but it did not get the desired outcome.

However, it is still too early to say that Russia has completely lost the Caucasus.

Because Russian capital is still present in critical sectors of the Armenian economy. A significant portion of the energy infrastructure is under Russian influence. A significant part of the Armenian diaspora lives in Russia. Moreover, Armenia is still a member of the Eurasian Economic Union. Pashinyan also specifically emphasized in his statements after the election that he would not completely sever relations with Russia.

Therefore, it might be more accurate to say that Putin has not lost the game, but is preparing to change the rules of the game.

We know that the fundamental reflex of Russian foreign policy is not to completely abandon a lost area, but to increase the costs for its rivals by making that area unmanageable. Let us look at examples from recent history; for instance, it did this in Georgia. It did it in Moldova. It did it much more harshly in Ukraine.

In other words, a similar strategy is not out of the question in Armenia.

Therefore, it would not be surprising if Moscow increases economic pressure on Yerevan in the coming period, makes the fault lines in domestic politics more visible, and tries to make the Armenian people feel the costs of the transformation promised by the West.

So, what does the West want?

The West's interest in Armenia is not based on romantic democratic rhetoric. On the contrary, there are hard geopolitical calculations. For the European Union, Armenia means a new sphere of influence on Russia's southern flank. For the US, it is a strategic country located at the intersection of the Iran, Russia, and China axis.

However, let us draw attention to the problem here.

The West can provide political support to Armenia. It can provide financial aid. It can prepare reform packages.

But will it be able to meet Armenia's security needs?

The answer to this question is not clear.

A Western security umbrella to replace Russia is not yet in sight. NATO membership is not very realistic under today's circumstances. European Union membership is a process that could take many years. Therefore, although Pashinyan's strategy of turning to the West is largely a political preference at this stage, it carries significant risks in terms of security.

Let us come to our own country; the picture is different for Turkey.

Ankara has been trying to conduct the normalization process with Armenia cautiously for many years. Pashinyan, unlike past Armenian leaders, does not follow a line that completely rejects this process. The language he has used regarding relations with Turkey in the recent period is also an indicator of this.

However, it would be a mistake to get overly optimistic here.

Because nationalist reflexes in Armenia are still strong. Pashinyan's room for political maneuver is not unlimited. Winning the election does not mean he has the support of all segments of society. Moreover, the peace process being conducted with Azerbaijan remains fragile. Any crisis could lead the normalization process back into a deadlock.

For this reason, Pashinyan's victory may be opening a window of opportunity for Turkey, but there is no guarantee that this will turn into a permanent transformation.

As a result, Pashinyan won the election, but his real test is just beginning.

The Armenian voter took their distrust of Moscow to the ballot box. The West is trying to claim this result as its own success. Russia, although it appears to be retreating, has not completely left the stage. Turkey and Azerbaijan are watching the new picture that has emerged with caution.

To see that no victory in the Caucasus is definitive, it is enough to leaf through the pages of history.

If we play devil's advocate, let us ask: could the election that Pashinyan appears to have won today be the opening move of a new game that Russia will set up tomorrow?

Election results are important. However, the geopolitical balance of power is also standing right there.

Perhaps the real question is this:

Are the election results truly a victory for Pashinyan, or have the doors to a new period of uncertainty opened for Armenia?

The result from the ballot box does not provide a guarantee for the future promised by the West, nor is it proof that Russia's influence in the region has completely ended.

No vacuum in the Caucasus remains empty for long. Today, Yerevan's face is turned toward the West. But we do not yet know what move Moscow will make tomorrow, to what point Washington will provide support, and how regional actors will respond to this new picture.

For this reason, let us conclude our article by saying that it is useful to read Pashinyan's victory not as a result, but as the first act of a newly started and extremely risky game.