If the Greek Cypriots pull the trigger...

It was 1997; the European Union, with its "Agenda 2000," had excluded Turkey and, to put it colloquially, was busy trying to please the Greek Cypriots, with whom it was "hand in glove."

Turkey was not on the expansion list.

The Greek Cypriots had been included among the countries to be part of the expansion in the first stage as the "Republic of Cyprus."

Two years earlier, we had paved the way for them in exchange for the Customs Union Agreement.

The wind was blowing in their favor.

When those in Ankara saw the Council's decision, everyone was in deep mourning.

Not many had taken Çiller's claim that "we will be full members of the European Union in 1998" very seriously, but still, no one expected to concede a goal so early.

While the Greek Cypriots were setting off happily, we were being treated like outsiders.

In Balgat, the lights stayed on until morning, and the Foreign Ministry was working feverishly to save the situation.

The Greek Cypriots becoming a member of the European Union alone and representing the "Republic of Cyprus" was, for Turkey, a nightmare scenario in the truest sense of the word.

Even listening to the technical analysis of the potential problems this would create and the contingency planning for what would follow caused the blood pressure of government members to skyrocket.

In fact, even the diplomats, who were usually quite skilled at juggling forty foxes in their heads without letting their tails touch, were so disheartened that the Prime Minister of the time, Mesut Yılmaz, finished three packs of Marlboro cigarettes, chain-smoking them one after another, while listening to the picture presented in his briefing.

In other words, the circumstances were manifesting in such an unfavorable manner.

Those whose morale was shattered were not just those in Ankara. Denktaş in Cyprus was also deeply distressed.

While the diplomacy pot was boiling in Ankara, I found a way to go to Nicosia to see him. He was truly very discouraged.

I was thinking about how to start the conversation when Denktaş began by saying, "I said it many times, the Customs Union is one thing, the Cyprus issue is another, but they wouldn't listen."

The warnings he gave to Çiller and Karayalçın were no secret.

Then he spoke at length about how the situation was pregnant with major troubles. After emphasizing that both Turkey and the TRNC would be cornered, he said, "If the Greek Cypriot secures his back, he will not hesitate at all to turn his weapon on us."

I was very surprised and asked, "Would they dare?"

He replied, "Have no doubt. As long as whoever they have behind them has the power to prevent Turkey's intervention."

At that time, the European Union had neither the intention to provide military guarantees to the Greek Cypriots nor the courage to openly confront Turkey.

Moreover, Turkey was one of the most powerful countries in NATO, to which the old continent entrusted its defense. Furthermore, security and guarantee agreements were in effect in Cyprus, and Turkey had de facto protection over the TRNC.

But the one Denktaş meant was not the European Union, but the USA. I would understand this in later years.

He hadn't pointed to the USA openly back then, but I had a rapid enlightenment with a sentence he uttered five years later.

After the September 11 attacks, international balances had shifted; the US had first occupied Afghanistan and then Iraq.

With the Greater Middle East Project (BOP), it had begun to reshape the region.

While the pot was boiling in the Middle East, Cyprus had become the center of diplomacy at the beginning of 2004. During the Annan Plan negotiations, things were, so to speak, bloody. Both the political Islamist government in Turkey, the European Union, and the USA were applying pressure, but Denktaş was fighting against all three fronts with great resistance.

One evening, while pacing in front of the Presidential Palace gate, I saw Denktaş in the courtyard. I ran over to him and asked a couple of questions about current events.

One thing led to another, and then he blurted out, "If the US stops standing at an equal distance to the parties in Cyprus and starts cooperating with the Greek Cypriots, our job will be very difficult."

Denktaş was aware that the balances had changed after the Iraq occupation and that the importance of Cyprus had increased much more. He knew that the US intended to show its power in the Eastern Mediterranean excessively. He didn't see it as very possible for it to enter into a strategic rapprochement with the Greek Cypriots "despite Turkey," but it was clear that such a possibility was in the back of his mind.

20 years have passed, and the tide has turned.

On September 10, the Greek Cypriots and the US signed an agreement determining a roadmap based on bilateral defense cooperation. When I read the Pentagon's statement, I thought, "Could it be?" Is what Denktaş feared back then happening to us now!

One does not need to wear reading glasses to see that the step taken will turn the balances in the Eastern Mediterranean upside down.

It is clear that the US will now openly take sides in the Cyprus issue.

The roadmap also includes the issue of "advancing interoperability" between the military forces of the two sides. All of this means that the Greek Cypriots are effectively being taken under the US security umbrella.

Let us leave the answer to the question of why the know-it-alls in Washington are giving such support to the Greek side, risking all the dangers, for another article, but let us underline that the situation is extremely serious when we read the issue together with the military cooperation Greece has made with the US.

In short, it seems that in a short while, the US will virtually squeeze Turkey in the Mediterranean and the Aegean.

The agreement supposedly covers elements of cooperation that can be made between the two sides regarding basic security concerns.

What the "security concern" of the Greek Cypriots is, is already well known. For them, the whole issue is the Turkish soldier on the Island.

As Denktaş said, "If the Greek Cypriot leans his back on the US and pulls the trigger relying on this," what will happen; this is actually where the rubber meets the road. That is when Turkey will come face to face with the US, and considering today's conditions, what follows will not be easy for us at all.

The Turkish Cypriots, whom their beloved Abdülhamit left to the mercy of the British in 1878, were saved from extinction thanks to Ecevit's determined stance in 1974.

Can those who govern Turkey today show the courage to confront the US, which they see as the guarantor of their power, when the survival of the Turkish Cypriot is at stake? Can they bear the consequences of this?

Or, let us ask if the current neo-Hamidian regime, if it gets into trouble, will sacrifice Cyprus like their masters, and leave the answer to the reader's discernment and put a period to our article.