Imia stories

My old friend Barış Doster recently wrote a very beautiful and informative article about the Imia crisis.

Everyone, but especially those interested in Turkey's recent history, and those who ponder Turkish-Greek relations, Aegean issues, and maritime law, should definitely read this article.

Let us underline it with a thick pen.

At that time, I had also witnessed the developments closely as a diplomatic correspondent. Let me add a couple of small notes to the notebook of the white-bearded father of history!

But first, it is useful to outline the political, legal, and strategic framework.

In fact, the Imia crisis was a turning point in Turkish-Greek relations. The whole issue here was Greece's desire to possess all geographical formations remaining in areas beyond 3 miles from Anatolia, beyond the islands and rights transferred to it by international treaties.

This brought another new and perhaps very important problem in the Aegean to the agenda.

So much so that, without resolving this, it became almost impossible to solve the long-standing issues regarding maritime jurisdiction areas and the airspace over them.

From that date on, this critical topic would be included in official documents as the issue of "islands, islets, and rocks in the Aegean whose sovereignty was not transferred to Greece by treaties."

For the first time since the 1974 Peace Operation, the risk of a hot conflict had emerged between Turkey and Greece.

An all-out war was at the door.

Now let's rewind the tape a bit.

It was the last days of 1995. On December 25, the Turkish-flagged cargo ship Figen Akat ran aground on the Imia rocks off the coast of Gümüşlük, Bodrum. Greek authorities immediately intervened and offered rescue. The ship's captain rejected the offers on the grounds that these rocks belonged to Turkey and were therefore in Turkish territorial waters.

Turkey also intervened and took action to rescue the ship.

The crisis was coming loudly.

At that time, since the internet and especially social media had not yet appeared in our lives, Turkey learned about the event from a few lines of news from the Anadolu Agency.

I had no idea what was going on until I arrived at the newspaper the next morning.

I had finished the night at the Mülkiyeliler Association. With that fatigue, I came to the office and was trying to soothe my headache with the bitter coffee Hüsamettin made, without even reading the newspapers in front of me properly.

Our News Editor, Ahmet Baydar, was a manager who took all the news that came before him very seriously, no matter what.

Of course, this was what it should have been.

At the meeting, he had briefly summarized the Anadolu Agency's news, and as the diplomatic correspondent of the Ankara Bureau, he asked, "Bahadır, how serious is this, where will it go from here?"

Instead of saying "I don't know," I gave a dismissive answer.

- Nothing will come of that.

Ahmet Baydar did not insist, he was content with saying "okay."

He was a journalist of many years; he might not have calculated that the issue would evolve into a major crisis, but looking back now, I guess he must have thought it should not be underestimated.

Ultimately, my dismissal of it did not eliminate the seriousness of the situation.

Within a month, the crisis brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of a hot conflict.

Let me remember Ahmet Baydar with mercy; he never once threw this grave mistake of mine in my face, he didn't scold me by saying, "So, nothing would come of it." If there had been another news editor in his place, it would have gone as far as the termination of my employment contract.

He only insisted that I write more detailed news about the behind-the-scenes constantly.

That's all.

From that day on, I learned with this embarrassment I experienced that no matter what development occurs regarding foreign policy, I must follow it with seriousness until the end.

When I was teaching "Foreign Policy Reporting" to journalist candidates at the Uğur Mumcu Investigative Journalism Foundation, I emphasized this example with sensitivity and insisted that they should not underestimate any development that comes their way.

Let's continue...

The crisis deepened within a day or two; a maritime accident had turned into a sovereignty dispute between two countries. In other words, the issue was not the "two pieces of rock" off the coast of Bodrum, but the maritime jurisdiction areas and sovereignty borders in the Aegean.

Neither side had any intention of taking a step back.

A month later, on January 27, when the Mayor of Greece's Kalymnos Island, Dimitris Diakomihalis, planted a Greek flag on the rocks, public opinion in Turkey began to stir.

Of course, this situation was an unmissable opportunity for Hürriyet Newspaper, which at that time considered itself worthy of the title of the flagship of the Turkish press. Journalists from Hürriyet went up to the rock, took down the Greek flag, and planted a Turkish flag in its place.

Upon this, Greek military elements went on alert.

The press blew the event out of proportion. Both countries sent warships to the region.

When Greece landed troops on the rocks, the crisis reached a point of no return in this form. Busy hours began at the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In consecutive meetings, it was being discussed how to overcome the crisis.

But in the end, whatever was to be done, the political will had to approve it.

These were the hottest hours of the crisis.

High-level diplomats and high-ranking soldiers had come to the office of Tansu Çiller, who was sitting in the Prime Minister's chair at the time, to present the situation.

Before that, Çiller had spoken at her party's parliamentary group and, pushed by her advisors, had blustered at Greece, saying, "That flag will come down, that soldier will leave." In fact, she had no such concern at all. All she was thinking about was the possibility of her relationship with America deteriorating due to this crisis. She didn't want to fall out with Clinton "for no reason."

She left the Parliament and came straight to the Prime Ministry. The result of the meeting here would determine the fate of the relations between the two countries.

Turkey would either go to war to protect its rights and laws, or it would make a major concession to Greece in the Aegean.

After a high-ranking officer, who had been authorized by his commanders and was extremely knowledgeable about the issue, gave a detailed briefing and concluded by saying, "This is the view of the military side, it is waiting for the order of the political will," breaths were held in the hall where the Cabinet meetings of the Prime Ministry were held.

However, Çiller could not fully grasp what these words meant.

She turned to her bureaucrats next to her and asked, "What do they mean?" They translated the officer's sentences in a way that Çiller could understand.

Çiller had not been able to grasp the seriousness of the issue.

"Oh my dear," she said, "are we going to go to war for two small rocks? Even crows would laugh at this. I cannot explain this to the Americans."

The soldiers and then the diplomats took the floor again, trying to explain that the issue was not two small rocks, but a matter of sovereignty.

But in vain...

Çiller didn't even listen properly.

Then, she took off her glasses, turned to the diplomats, and with an expression on her face that gave the impression that she was extremely knowledgeable about these issues, she blurted out, "Find me an island in the Black Sea now, let its status be just like Imia. Whatever our policy is regarding that, let's solve Imia the same way."

An atmosphere of astonishment blew in the hall.

One of the experienced Ambassadors took the floor, "Mr. Prime Minister, as you know, we have no islands in the Black Sea at all; we have a small island three miles off the coast of Giresun, but it is not in the status of Imia," he was trying to say, but Çiller interrupted him.

- Oh my, how can we not have an island in such a huge sea!

Those in the hall had realized that this crisis could not be solved with Çiller.

It was a good thing that Demirel was at the Çankaya Mansion and Baykal was at the helm of diplomacy. Both were experienced statesmen.

After the meeting, Çiller went home and went to bed. She also gave instructions to her Chief of Staff that she should absolutely not be woken up.

That night, with the planning made upon the suggestion of one of Turkey's legendary diplomats, Deputy Undersecretary İnal Batu, Turkish SAT commandos secretly infiltrated through the Greek warships after midnight, climbed onto the other rock, and planted the Turkish flag.

There was great astonishment among the Greek soldiers. The most critical hours were being experienced. A hot conflict that would break out here could trigger an all-out war.

Journalists in Ankara had spent the night at the door of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Balgat that day.

As the day dawned, Spokesperson Ömer Akbel came out in front of Gate A. With teary eyes, he said, "At this moment, our country has entered into an actual war with Greece. May God be the helper of our country and our nation."

An incredible flood of emotion covered the place.

Greece had not yet withdrawn its soldiers from the other rocks. Fingers were on triggers; the weapons of our ships were locked onto theirs, and the weapons of their ships were locked onto ours.

Seconds and minutes were not passing.

Baykal had followed all developments moment by moment until the morning.

Çiller, on the other hand, was sleeping at home. She learned what happened after the Greek soldiers withdrew. She was just preparing to declare herself the hero of Imia when, after receiving a good adjustment from Demirel, she had to sit back down.

If a step back had been taken at that time, the meeting minutes dated December 28, 1932, which is a very critical document on this issue, could have become legally binding; Turkey would have implicitly accepted Greece's sovereignty claims over many geographical formations in the Dodecanese region with a status similar to Imia.

This was exactly where the crux of the matter lay.

This would mean Greece expanding its territorial waters; it would mean international waters in the Aegean narrowing to Turkey's disadvantage, which could have forced the Turkish navy to request the "right of innocent passage" from Greek territorial waters while sailing into the Mediterranean after leaving the Dardanelles.

In 1996, Turkey said "stop."

However, this picture has completely changed in the thirty years that have passed.

Unfortunately, the government that has been at the head of Turkey since 2002 has not really intended to handle these issues in line with the supreme interests of the country.

It tied foreign policy to rhetoric. When it built its strategy entirely on the approach of converting it to domestic politics, Turkey rapidly lost the ground it had gained.

Let us put a period to our article by saying that from that day on, Turkey's political, military, and strategic interests in the Aegean became open to debate.