Is the account being settled in Syria?

Let's say it upfront: it won't be settled easily!

In fact, the writing was on the wall.

Following the attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023, we asked, "Will the gates of hell open?" and predicted that Israel's retaliation could trigger a regional war.

About 14 months have passed!

The chaos that has gripped the Middle East has once again reared its head. Last week, jihadist groups under the umbrella of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, located in Idlib in northwestern Syria, launched a major offensive.

As of Saturday, they have taken control of a significant portion of Aleppo, the country's second-largest city.

Although they had not given many signs until now that they would reignite the conflict in Syria on a large scale or challenge Assad's dominance around Aleppo, this was a development expected by those who read global politics with a rational perspective and follow the region closely.

Since America knows that Israel cannot ensure its security unless it cuts off Iran's leg extending from Syria to Lebanon, it was not difficult to predict that it would unleash the jihadist terrorists it had left fallow in the Pentagon's backyard against Assad once again.

With the dust and smoke settling over Aleppo and its surroundings before the ink had even dried on the ceasefire agreement Israel made with Lebanon, a new phase has begun, one that does not seem likely to end well for Syria.

Reports indicate that the Syrian Army has not been able to put up much resistance, and the Russians, having diverted a significant portion of their military force to Ukraine, are unable to respond as effectively as they used to, even when they deploy their limited number of aircraft!

The developments of the last week have shown that the civil war that began in Syria in 2011 has not ended, and the accounts have not been settled.

We do not know if Assad has realized that holding Damascus and Aleppo and controlling the highways stretching from major cities to the coastline is not enough to emerge victorious from the civil war, but in terms of political and military strategy, the probability of him falling further behind compared to 13 years ago is very high.

It is difficult to say anything for now about how the new equation will be established from here on out.

There is too much uncertainty and too many question marks.

Even if Hezbollah's leg is cut off as Israel desires, the de facto situation shows that Syria will not be able to easily maintain its unitary structure and territorial integrity in its current form from now on.

At best, it could turn into a federative structure.

If Putin receives a guarantee from America that his own military and strategic interests in Syria will not be harmed, will he withdraw his support from Assad?

For instance, could he say, "Give me Ukraine, take Syria"?

If Iran makes a secret deal with America and recalls Hezbollah, will the Syria-Lebanon line collapse?

Will Assad settle for a small piece of land with a Mediterranean coastline where he can maintain his own regime and consent to the fragmentation of his country?

Can Hayat Tahrir al-Sham establish and govern a Salafi emirate with the dominance it has achieved in and around Aleppo?

Will the Ikhwanists (Muslim Brotherhood), whom Tayyip has carefully nurtured and raised, settle for a moderate share of the pie instead of possessing the whole of Syria?

On the other hand, it is no secret that Putin has begun to see Assad as a burden on his back. It is known that calculations in the Kremlin are based on Russia not expanding its front any further. For Russia, the Syrian issue is divided into two: before Ukraine and after Ukraine.

Now, let's get to the crux of the matter for us!

Can the PYD/PKK take advantage of this chaotic environment to open a corridor from northern Syria to the Mediterranean? Will this corridor later unite with the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government to form the nucleus of the Greater Kurdistan Project?

If this happens, what will Tayyip do?

He needs the DEM Party for the constitutional amendment he is considering to maintain his power.

Will he dangle the carrot of "we are expanding our borders" to the people of our country for this? Will he risk transitioning to a federal administration to incorporate this nucleus into Turkey?

We know that they have begun to test the waters for this with demagogic speeches.

We will learn the answers to these questions in time.

Although he is in great trouble, it is too early to write Assad off.

A significant portion of the public still supports him.

However, it is clear that the process will be finalized through strategic negotiations between global powers.

The village in sight needs no guide.

Let us conclude our article by saying that as long as the public in the Middle East gives credit to medieval mentalities, they will continue to produce useful material for those across the Atlantic.