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Lessons to be learned from recent history: How Barzani blindsided Saddam!

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While Tayyip was engaged in delicate negotiations with the Kurds to keep his seat, we suddenly realized that Barzani was involved in the process as well.

And not just a little!

It is even said that when Apo requested that Ahmet Türk be included in the delegation coming to Imralı, our side asked Barzani, "Does your excellency approve?" and he replied, "It is appropriate!"

Is that all? We also know that, again at the request of our side, he received Mazlum Kobani, the head of the PKK's terror statelet in Syria. What they discussed, what instructions were given, and so on, remain unknown for now, but it is clear that they are conducting this process together with the government.

Working with a veteran fox of a politician is not that easy. Let no one be deceived by thinking he is just an old tribal leader unaware of the world!

How so? Let us try to explain with small anecdotes from recent history.

24 years ago;

The September 11 attacks had occurred.

The whole world was in horror.

As soon as the Ecevit government overcame the initial shock, it made this issue a priority agenda item.

At that time, since social media had not yet appeared in our lives, comments were being made in newspapers and news channels that America was targeting Saddam, would intervene in Iraq, and would establish an independent Kurdish state.

America had long since decided to target Iraq to consolidate its presence in the Middle East. Moreover, Iraqi Kurds occupied the most critical point in their planning.

The Ecevit government was extremely uncomfortable.

Two years had passed since Apo was captured and imprisoned, and terrorism had almost reached the point of ending. America was concerned with establishing a new order in the Middle East that prioritized its own supreme interests through the Kurds.

This was the crux of the matter for us.

Separatist politics could be revived, and terrorism could resurface.

We were going through critical days.

At that time, Barzani, who did not find much favor in Turkey, began to struggle to convince the Foreign Ministry that they had no such project. He did not want to enter into a direct confrontation with Turkey. If he could soothe and lull our side, he could gain time.

When he sent his nephew Nechirvan to Europe on October 2, 2001, he instructed him, "Stop by Ankara as well, do not return without convincing the Turks."

Upon his uncle's instruction, he told Undersecretary Uğur Ziyal, "We have no plan to establish a Kurdish state."

He made a statement to journalists: "A campaign is being conducted, especially in the media, that we aim to establish an independent Kurdish state in the region. There is no change in our situation and position. We want a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue within the integrity of Iraq."

It was not very convincing. Nevertheless, the next day, newspapers came out with headlines like "Assurance to Ankara from Iraqi Kurds."

16 years after this date, Barzani would see no harm in holding an independence referendum.

Contrary to what Nechirvan said, it was obvious that they did not want to solve the issue within the territorial integrity of Iraq.

In other words, there was always a situation of "waiting for the right time." The day would come, the tide would turn, and the old ways would be gone.

These are not secret or hidden; anyone who looks at the newspapers of that time can see them.

Let us continue...

Saddam also shared similar concerns with Turkey.

In the summer of the same year, he had called for dialogue with Barzani and Talabani to escape the grip of the UN embargo. He was calculating that the contact to be established between the Kurds and Baghdad, even if it did not stop America completely, would eliminate one of the excuses it had, and that this would benefit him in preventing war.

By the time he realized that this calculation he made at home did not match the reality of the marketplace, he would have already lost his power.

The fact that ties between the central government and the Kurds had been completely severed after the uprising that began following the 1991 Gulf War made the Americans' job easier.

Saddam wanted to bring Talabani and Barzani back into Baghdad's orbit by taking advantage of the disagreements among the Kurds themselves.

Thinking this way, he invited Barzani to Baghdad.

They sat at the table on November 13, 2001. The Kurds were trying to kick the ball into touch and drag the issue out. America was going to come and sit on top of Saddam anyway. They mumbled about how problems could be solved through dialogue, work, and mutual persuasion.

The sentences constructed with diplomatic style did not have much meaning.

Saddam listened to them all and then said clearly:

"Instead of establishing a dialogue with us, you are establishing a dialogue with America and the Zionists. Our goal is to establish a dialogue with the Kurdish people. We expect the faith and loyalty of the Kurdish people in the northern region to foreign agents to be shaken."

The time had come for the second act of the theater peculiar to the Middle East.

After listening to Saddam, the Barzani entourage gifted him a sword and shield symbolizing (!) the unity and integrity of Iraq.

However, the fact that they themselves were the greatest threat to the unity and integrity of Iraq was as obvious then as it is today.

At the end of the same month, Saddam repeated his call for dialogue to the Kurdish groups. He could see that the American danger was approaching. He had to hurry.

Shortly after, he told Fuad Arif, one of the Kurdish notables, "The important thing is dialogue. The Kurdish people are our people, and those who try to sow seeds of discord among Iraqis should be criticized," and a positive response came from Barzani on November 29:

"We accept dialogue with Baghdad to solve the Kurdish issue. We are in favor of peace. We do not want war. We want problems to be solved through peace and dialogue. We are not in favor of establishing a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq."

How familiar those sentences sound, don't they!

It was as if there was a spring atmosphere, a honeymoon conversation!

Of course, the Americans who noticed this moved quickly; Ryan Crocker, one of the sharpest diplomats of the Foreign Ministry, went to northern Iraq in a hurry and pulled the ears of the Kurds by saying, "Don't you dare!"

After that, they sat down and talked about how to overthrow Saddam, and revised their plans and projects.

Yet, Barzani never had any intention of reaching an agreement with the central government from the beginning. He wanted to give the appearance of rapprochement with Baghdad and slow things down to ensure the Americans, who were dragging their feet, would hurry up.

And he succeeded.

The Americans, with their pants on fire, thinking "Oh no, they might be reaching an agreement," had rushed to Erbil.

But what was most remarkable was that all of this happened within a month after the Kurds gifted Saddam the sword and shield symbolizing the unity and integrity of Iraq.

Barzani had hosted the American officials who came to the region to overthrow the regime and saw no harm in making occupation plans with them. Moreover, one month after accepting the call for dialogue, he had ordered the establishment of a commission to "prevent the Arabization policy of the Ba'ath regime" and subsequently began making hateful statements against Baghdad.

This was the Middle East; promises made did not have much value, and everyone had a hidden agenda in their pocket.

We all know what happened next. America, with the support of the collaborative Kurds, occupied Iraq and overthrew the Ba'ath regime. Saddam ended his life on the gallows.

Barzani established the unofficially declared Kurdish state step by step. Moreover, while doing this, he also received the support of the political Islamists in Turkey.

Now, the second act of the same play is being performed.

This time, Barzani is not the supporting actor; it is as if he is in the lead role!

While the countdown continues for imperialism's "Greater Kurdistan Project," the people of my country are content to watch the developments while cracking sunflower seeds.

Before concluding the article, let us say that those who do not know yesterday cannot understand today, and those who do not understand today cannot see tomorrow, and put a period here.