Strategic errors cannot be corrected with tactical successes

I first heard this sentence at a meeting held at the War Academies on “Maritime Interests and Concerns” in the 90s.

In the 90s, military officers would invite journalists, especially those they knew were interested in foreign policy and national security issues, to such events.

In those meetings, we would see what the so-called “state mind”—which political Islamists now use as a catchphrase to trap Republican, nationalist, and patriotic segments—actually is. We would learn which topics regarding the country's survival were considered red lines and listen to the projections for the future from staff officer candidates, who were considered the apple of the Turkish Armed Forces' eye.

They were extremely productive meetings from a journalistic perspective.

One of the fundamental principles explained there was this: The greatest disaster for an army is not losing on the battlefield.

So, what is it?

It is choosing the wrong front.

Because a position established in the wrong place, no matter how heroically it is defended, will eventually collapse. A wrong strategy cannot be repaired even with the most brilliant tactical victories. When they explained this with examples from recent history, I always thought:

This is a law that applies not only to war but also to politics.

Let's come to the present day...

Without beating around the bush; the primary person responsible for the political tragedy the CHP is experiencing today is those who, after emerging from the local elections with a historic victory, could not transform this success into a result-oriented, firm, decisive strategy that puts pressure on the government.

In other words, it is Özgür Özel and the political mind around him.

The March 31 elections were not an ordinary municipal success. This was a heavy bill the public handed to the AKP. It was an answer given to economic destruction, inflation, and the high cost of living; it was an objection rising at the ballot box against poverty, injustice, and arbitrariness.

The CHP had gained the psychological advantage; this was a historical moment where politics could be rebuilt on the streets.

Unfortunately, Özgür Özel could not read this well, or perhaps he did not want to read it, we do not know. Maybe he naively thought that the government in Turkey could be changed through conventional politics.

Yet, everyone has learned over the past 23 years that this is not a democracy game with equal rules.

This is a regime where the referee, the field, and the ball are all in one hand. To not be able to foresee that “normal” politics cannot work against abnormal power in such a system...

Let's continue...

While the circumstances were manifesting in such an unfavorable manner, what the opposition needed to do was actually clear:

To capture the pulse rising on the streets, increase the pressure, grow social energy, and keep the government on the defensive...

But what was done?

Did they take to the squares? Was the anger of the millions who cannot make ends meet organized? Was a mass objection established against the government's economic policy?

No.

First, they went and knocked on the door of the Palace.

They called this “softening.”

Then, “normalization.”

Even the choice of words is exemplary. Because when there is nothing normal at all...

Was the economy normal?

Was the judiciary normal?

Was the pressure on the press normal?

Were the trustee appointments normal?

But Özgür Özel tried to engage in politics by accepting all this abnormality as normal.

With whom?

With a government that uses all the apparatuses of the state for its own political survival. With a mentality that bends and twists the law, with a mechanism that tries to suffocate its opponent not on legitimate ground, but on operational ground...

If they hadn't tried to approach the AKP back then to warm up, soften, and normalize; if they hadn't fallen into the desire to play “reasonable opposition” in the shadow of Tayyip Erdoğan; today, neither would the country be dragged into such a severe bottleneck, nor would the CHP be experiencing such a major internal crisis.

Because during that process, the government gained time, the anger created by the economic wreckage was cooled, the opposition's momentum was blunted, and the excitement of the base was dissipated. Most importantly, the government realized that its opponent would not strike back.

Let's write it more clearly; if your opponent in politics is not afraid of your punch, they will not take you seriously.

Today we see Özgür Özel is indeed making a superhuman effort; he is running, struggling, objecting, reacting, raising his voice, and so on...

But all these tactical moves do not yield the desired result because of that major strategic error made at the very beginning.

Because Özgür Özel either does not know at all what timing means in politics, or learning it has not been very convenient for him until now.

Let us say that the reaction shown today is actually a delayed projection of the reflexes that should have been shown yesterday; delayed politics is, most of the time, incomplete politics—let us underline this sentence with a thick pen.

What is even more dire is that the CHP is now dealing not only with the government but also with its own internal fault lines.

Ekrem İmamoğlu is in a separate equation, Mansur Yavaş is a separate center of gravity, the party convention calculations we will hear more about in the coming days, delegate wars, team fights, and so on...

All of this creates the picture the government wants most.

Because a divided opposition is a tired opposition. And a tired opposition extends the life of the government. The Palace is more than aware of this.

Yet the issue is very clear; the main agenda of this country is not the party convention, but hunger, poverty, corruption, lawlessness, social decay, and disintegration...

That is why it constantly pulls the opposition to the boundary it has drawn itself.

With the judiciary, operations, and artificial agendas... And the opposition falls into that trap every time.

Unfortunately, this also works in the government's favor far too much.

Say what you will, Tayyip Erdoğan's political strategy is yielding results. Take a look; the country is inside a massive political theater whose script was written long ago, whose actors were determined in advance, and whose decor is shaped in the hands of the government... This is not just an ordinary performance; this is a great illusion where truth is systematically buried and perception is produced on live broadcast.

Right in the middle of the stage, there is only the CHP.

You turn on the screen in the morning; talk of absolute nullity, at noon, convention scenarios, in the evening, clique wars... What Kılıçdaroğlu said, what he didn't say, how many times he said “I don't know,” and so on...

Even the screen faces who claim to be opposition repeat the same rote memorization:

“Why did Özgür Özel do this?”

“What move is Ekrem İmamoğlu planning?”

“When will Mansur Yavaş speak?”

As if this is the country's biggest problem, as if there is no fire in the kitchen, as if prices in the market are not exploding, as if young people are not packing their futures into suitcases and leaving.

My fellow citizens go to bed with the CHP and wake up with the CHP; but the reality that hits them in the face when they go to buy bread in the morning is very different; life is expensive, the future is dark, and hopelessness is knee-deep...

Now let us stop and ask:

From now on, can Özgür Özel put forward a correct and result-oriented strategy and defeat the ill-fated destiny of both the country and the CHP?

In theory, yes...

But it is not very easy. Because, unfortunately, there is no ideological clarity in him and his close circle. Try to find the historical accumulation, values, and principles of the CHP. They constantly think they are doing politics by just hitting the ball as it comes.

Let's come to the crux of the matter.

The new party they are thinking of establishing will be “Not Left, but Turkey Alliance.”

Staffers close to Özgür Özel spoke to Nefes newspaper and said that the new party would not be shaped by a “left-wing” view, but by a “Turkey Alliance” understanding.

They supposedly want to appeal to all of Turkey. The goal is for the candidate they put forward to win the presidential election.

It is clear they have learned no lessons from the six-party table disaster.

It seems they have also not been able to learn that the alternative to political Islamism is not the liberal center-right.

Let us write it by underlining it with a thick pen: Turkey's real need is a Republican, Kemalist, populist, secular, anti-imperialist “left” option. Otherwise, the neoliberal ANAP mentality resurrected from its grave will be of no use to either the country or my fellow citizens.

Let us make our note to history;

Any step taken with this mindset would be a much greater strategic error than the first, and after that, any potential victories won through positional battles would have no meaning at all, and with that, let us put a period to our article.