The Crossroads

We saw this movie during the era of the Ergenekon and Balyoz frame-ups.

Back then, the operation apparatuses of the CIA, the newspapers Taraf and Zaman, would first emerge with nonsensical, baseless accusations, and then the button would be pressed.

Arrests would begin, and thousands of pages of indictments—copy-paste style, with no clear author—would be prepared.

Now, we are experiencing more or less the same thing.

Yeni Şafak, pro-government trolls, Cem Küçük and the like have replaced the media outlets of the Gülen movement, and Akın Gürlek has replaced Zekeriya Öz.

Let us give credit where it is due; he is aware of the power he holds. He distributed the İmamoğlu indictment to members of the press before even submitting it to the court.

Suddenly, we saw that everything was in chaos.

For two days, CHP members have been, so to speak, crying and wailing. As if a legally sound, more reasonable, and logical version of the indictment was going to be released but wasn't...

Let's not beat around the bush; the scenario that has been discussed in Ankara's political circles for some time is now taking shape.

The İmamoğlu indictment is not just a file prepared against a mayor. This is an operation to reshape the CHP and its identity, to mold the main opposition into the form the government desires.

It is political engineering carried out through the judiciary!

Everyone already knows that the issue has nothing to do with corruption or anything of the sort.

The mechanism working behind the scenes is much deeper.

We can call this plan a way to keep the CHP occupied, limit its opposition capacity, direct its energy inward, and put it into a kind of "controlled liquidation" process.

From the potential arrest of İmamoğlu after March 19 to operations targeting CHP-run municipalities, and from the transfer of municipalities held by the opposition to the AKP through threats and blackmail to issues of "absolute nullity," all of these were parts of this plan.

Let us stop here and ask.

Is the İmamoğlu indictment the "golden shot"?

It does not appear to be so.

It is not a direct liquidation; it would be more accurate to call it a more sophisticated method, a move to bring it to a certain state over time.

It is about trapping all of İmamoğlu's energy in defense texts and court calendars; creating a politician profile that struggles to defend himself in the courtroom instead of producing campaigns, public meetings, and national rhetoric.

The timing of the file's emergence is extremely significant.

Let's rewind the tape a bit.

It emerged at a moment when the balance in the municipality had settled after the local elections and the CHP had captured the moral high ground.

Of course, it is not a coincidence.

Because the goal was to break the party's momentum and disrupt the psychology that had emerged among the people of this country as an "alternative to the government." They are not proceeding through classic political bans, at least for now. They are trying to restrain İmamoğlu through judicial processes.

Tayyip Erdoğan, one way or another, is calculating to completely deflate the CHP's sails before an early election to be held in 2028 or sooner. So far, things have gone smoothly for him.

But the calculations are not just about an early election.

Because it is being discussed in Ankara's political circles that the government has a new plan for 2026. A "revision" of the presidential system is on the table.

This means new alliance models and searches for a new political architecture. That is why a "compliant" opposition party in the current scenario is worth its weight in gold for Tayyip Erdoğan.

This is exactly what the current transformation of the CHP is preparing for.

Let's come to the crux of the matter.

Because at this point, the Özgür Özel factor emerges.

He shouts and screams here and there until his throat is sore, he is here one moment and behind closed doors the next, constantly rushing from one rally to another, but honestly, he is a rival exactly to Tayyip Erdoğan's liking.

Moreover, he doesn't have the Black Sea clique behind him. In other words, it doesn't get better than this.

In short, there is a leader profile that keeps the tension controlled while remaining within the system, and that vents the frustration of the people of this country with songs, folk tunes, and slogans.

In fact, while İmamoğlu is being kept busy, the way is being quietly paved for Özgür Özel. This is not a coincidence; it is a conscious political design. The government is re-establishing the power balance within the CHP by trapping İmamoğlu in a judicial agenda. It is pushing Özgür Özel to the forefront, but at the same time, it is drawing his boundaries.

Naturally, having a predictable leader at the head of the CHP is a preference for the government. Unpredictable figures like İmamoğlu carry the risk of disrupting the game they have constructed.

So, the issue is not just İmamoğlu; it is what kind of opposition party the CHP will be in the coming period.

We know from 23 years of governing practice that Tayyip Erdoğan prefers to pull the opposition into his own boundaries rather than destroying it directly. This method is less costly and more permanent.

Looking at the current state of the CHP, the picture is clear:

The "search for balance" of the Kılıçdaroğlu era has been replaced by the "new normal" of the Özgür Özel era.

This new normal is actually a continuation of the old game: The opposition exists but is ineffective; it is critical but remains within the system.

The İmamoğlu file was opened precisely to maintain this line. Judicial files, media campaigns, bureaucratic obstacles, and the like are all parts of a single strategy:

To keep the CHP within political brackets.

The government predetermines how much the party can grow and how much it can oppose within these brackets. Let's call it "soft liquidation." In other words, you don't shut down the party, but you don't allow it to exceed its own boundaries either.

This process will determine not only the future of the CHP but also the future of the idea of opposition in Turkey.

As we conclude this piece, let's underline it with a thick pen. The CHP has reached a crossroads. Will it surrender to the government's political engineering and bow to the liquidation process, or will it undergo a transformation as a real alternative to the government?

The difference between liquidation and transformation will be determined by the CHP's own reflexes. If İmamoğlu reads this process as a political issue rather than a personal one, and if Özgür Özel positions the CHP not within the status quo but within the framework of the Republic's founding paradigm, this indictment could be a document of a new beginning rather than a judicial coup—let us end our article with this note.