The Middle East theater

In August 2010, before the Arab Spring had even begun, I had traveled to Iraq. Elections had been held on March 7 of that same year, but a government could not be formed in Baghdad.

Following the 2003 invasion, the US's strategic game-makers had structured Iraq based on identity politics.

Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds had formed various coalitions along with the smaller groups they had brought on board.

The US had kept Iraqi Turkmens out of politics for fear that Turkey would engage in fifth-column activities.

Despite the seven years that had passed in the country, neither political, social, nor economic balances had been able to settle. The chaos dominating politics was also reflecting on the public.

Iraq was practically a powder keg.

In Baghdad, security could not be established outside the Green Zone, where the US Embassy was also located.

It was not just the Shiites and Sunnis who were in conflict; Shiite groups were also fighting among themselves.

There was constant tension between the Iranian-backed groups loyal to the Qom position and the Arab nationalist Shiites loyal to the Najaf position.

This tension frequently turned into armed conflict.

The Sunnis, who had suffered a major blow with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, were trying to regroup primarily under the umbrella of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the political representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in the country, and they had the material and moral support of the AKP government in Turkey.

The Foreign Minister of the time, Ahmet Davutoğlu, had dropped everything else and was working to make Tariq al-Hashimi, the leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Prime Minister.

The Kurds, with the unconditional support of the US, were experiencing a veritable explosion of self-confidence.

The veteran politician of many years, Jalal Talabani, was enjoying the pleasure of being a Kurdish President in an Arab country.

When the Cumhuriyet Newspaper, where I worked at the time, asked me to write on-site, detailed reports, observations, and interviews, I packed my bags and headed for Iraq.

On the plane that took me to Baghdad, Murat Özçelik was sitting two rows in front of me.

Murat Özçelik, who would later serve as the Undersecretary of Public Order and Security and design the AKP's "Kurdish Opening," was Turkey's Ambassador to Baghdad at that time.

As soon as I landed at the airport at the crack of dawn, I secured an appointment with Murat Özçelik and went to his office that same afternoon.

We talked at length.

Because he was extremely knowledgeable about Iraqi politics, every piece of information he provided was very important to me. I was trying to take notes on every sentence without skipping anything.

Murat Özçelik was working day and night for the Al-Iraqiya coalition, which Turkey supported, to form the government. It was not just Turkey; Saudi Arabia and Jordan were also supporting this.

Al-Iraqiya, led by the secular-leaning former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, had received 24.72 percent of the vote in the elections. It had managed to get ahead of the State of Law Coalition, headed by the Shiite Dawa Party.

Even though Shiites were the majority in the country, they were very fragmented politically. Seizing this opportunity, the coalition of "five unlike things" like Al-Iraqiya seemed as if it would take power in Iraq out of the hands of the Shiites.

Murat Özçelik kept explaining, but it just didn't sit right with me.

Ultimately, when the two major political structures of the Shiites, the State of Law Coalition and the Iraqi National Alliance, reached an agreement, the Shiites could easily take power.

The disagreements between them were not insurmountable.

When I looked a little more carefully, I realized that a play written with sectarian rhetoric was being performed.

Behind the curtain, however, were Iran and the US.

An incredible diplomacy, hidden from view, was being conducted between these two countries, which were supposedly each other's mortal enemies.

Iran was taking a risk and turning a blind eye to Turkey pushing Al-Iraqiya to the forefront; the US was trying to develop a formula against Tehran's political maneuvers so that the government in Baghdad would not escape its own control.

Both sides were making finely calculated political moves, and then attention would turn to the streets to see the results of these moves. No one cared about the blood being shed.

Tehran was escalating the situation to get a tighter grip on Iraq, while the US was making efforts to keep Tehran's influence limited.

In this diplomatic chess game, the AKP-backed Al-Iraqiya was just a pawn.

What was grave was that Ahmet Davutoğlu had believed he would bring the Sunnis back to power in Iraq through Al-Iraqiya.

To learn about the issue from the Americans' perspective as well, I asked Murat Özçelik to get me an appointment with James Jeffrey, who had only been on the job as Baghdad Ambassador for three days.

After all, when James Jeffrey was serving as the Special Envoy for Iraq in Ankara, he was also the US Ambassador to Ankara, and they had a special rapport.

He didn't turn me down; he called, and I secured the appointment.

We talked for about two hours at his residence in the Green Zone. Shortly after the interview began, I realized that the US had absolutely no intention of bringing Al-Iraqiya to power.

The US had the final say.

Washington and Tehran were arm-wrestling over who would get a bigger slice of the Iraqi pie.

That was all there was to it.

While the US wanted the Shiites to govern the country but for Tehran's influence to remain limited, Iran was making efforts to keep the reins in its hands more firmly.

It was supposedly opposing the US presence in the region but was also avoiding pushing too hard. Because the US presence in Iraq was a very good justification for Tehran to consolidate its Shiite politics in Iraq. The mullahs in Tehran were taking full advantage of this.

Even though officials from both countries spewed hatred in front of the cameras, they were trying not to step on each other's toes on the ground.

In the end, Iran and the US reached an agreement, and the government in Iraq was formed eight months after the election.

President Jalal Talabani and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki continued their duties.

The Parliament Speakership was given to the Sunnis.

Both Tehran and Washington were satisfied with this consensus reached.

A great disappointment fell to Ahmet Davutoğlu's share.

After Iran's "retaliation" against Israel, I was reminded of what happened in Iraqi politics 14 years ago.

The Tehran administration seems to have saved face for now.

But more importantly, it gave breathing room to Benjamin Netanyahu, who is increasingly losing support both at home and abroad.

It found a justification for him to consolidate his power.

It strengthened the hand of Western leaders who were having difficulty supporting him due to the slaughter he committed in Gaza.

Israel found the opportunity to show the world that the "Iranian threat" against it was not empty.

In short, Israel came out profitable from this business...

No one should have any doubt that Benjamin Netanyahu will use this advantage to the fullest.

Let us conclude our article by predicting that the coming months will be much more difficult for Gaza.