The plum branches have turned green again

As March 31 approaches, all the buttons have started to be pressed at the same time.

It knows that the local election is not just a local election.

Depending on the outcome, Turkey could enter an early election process as of April 1, or it could step into a period where the single-man regime becomes permanent through constitutional amendments, and the country's very foundations are shaken in every respect.

It is aware that it cannot achieve the success it wants without the direct or indirect support of the Kurdish voter…

On the election horizon, they first established back-channel contact to ensure the picture did not manifest in an unfavorable manner for them. Afterward, quiet negotiations began.

For now, the issue seems limited to Istanbul and Diyarbakır.

Istanbul is of critical importance for the financing of political Islamist politics, and Diyarbakır is of critical importance for the financing of Kurdish-nationalist politics!

As long as it does not hold Istanbul, it cannot feed the sects and communities, nor can it consolidate its own base and easily align them behind it. Istanbul's resources are important both for preventing the dissolution of the masses it has turned into a vote bank—half-hungry and half-full—through a charity economy, and for satisfying the nouveau riche, unbridled minority around it.

There is also a psychological aspect to the matter.

As long as it does not hold Istanbul, it feels incomplete. It could never warm up to the capital of the Republic. It still sees Istanbul as Dersaadet, the Payitaht (the Seat of the Empire).

What Istanbul is for him, Diyarbakır is more or less the same for the Kurds.

Kurdish-nationalist politics is dependent on the resources of the Diyarbakır municipality to keep its base together and to distribute rent to its own businessmen.

Otherwise, votes could shift to the AKP.

They know that the Governor, who has been acting as a trustee since 2019, has been very effectively scratching the Islamist vein of the Kurds. They are aware that if the base starts to shift, they will not be able to prevent it easily, and that AKP's pan-Islamism is eroding the Islamist wing of Kurdish nationalism.

With the situation as it is, the critical threshold for the AKP has been crossed with DEM nominating Meral Danış Beştaş and Murat Çepni in Istanbul.

Although Party Spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan said, "From the beginning of the process, without any wavering, all options that would benefit the peoples of Turkey were evaluated. We are not making our decisions as a gesture or a snub to anyone," one would have to be blind not to see the AKP members dancing with joy.

We do not yet know whether DEM received a guarantee that a trustee would not be appointed to Diyarbakır after the local elections, or what kind of guarantee it might have received.

Attention has naturally turned to the period after April 1.

The subtext of the statements made points to a new and comprehensive opening process beyond the Istanbul and Diyarbakır consensus.

For instance, AKP's Ali İhsan Yavuz came out and said, "The AKP is not a Turkish party; the AKP is a party of Turkey."

Thus, he fired the signal flare by referring to the word "Türkiyeli" (of Turkey), which is much loved by the soft-brained left/liberal crowd, ethnicists, sectarians, and religious zealots.

DEM's Ahmet Türk also sent a beautiful bouquet of flowers to Beştepe by saying, "The CHP does not have the capacity to solve the Kurdish issue; Erdoğan can solve it if he wants to, because he is a leader."

He must have forgotten who gave the order to kick him out when he was the Mayor of Mardin and who had a trustee appointed in his place, as he felt the need to offer such praise.

Another praise came from AKP's Galip Ensarioğlu. He sang a tune for Selahaddin Demirtaş in Edirne Prison with the words, "He is a good politician, someone who is articulate, witty, and sympathetic, who sings songs." Yet, three days ago, his masters were railing against him, calling him a terrorist.

Selahaddin Demirtaş did not fall behind in this political flirtation. He forgot that he was put in prison because he once said, "We will not let you be President," swallowed those words, and blurted out, "I don't know if there is a traffic of negotiations between the DEM Party and the AKP. But if there isn't, this is a great deficiency for both parties."

He could not have been unaware that these words would carry water to the mill of the person who put him in prison.

Efkan Ala, who was the Minister of Interior during the solution process, also joined the fray.

At a meeting where the AKP introduced its District Mayoral candidates in Diyarbakır, he called on DEM, saying, "Didn't we achieve silent revolutions together here that were unimaginable before? This cadre, which does things others cannot imagine, can now do things they cannot imagine. What we say to them is, come, don't be an obstacle. Give your support."

Let us underline that the person who uttered these sentences is the Deputy Chairman of the AKP!

But what was really important were the statements of Leyla Zana. Leyla Zana did not beat around the bush like the others and clearly said,

"The President says, 'I put the process in the freezer.' Well, its expiration date is almost up; I think it needs to be taken out of the freezer and this matter needs to be handled fundamentally."

She also recalled his words from October 8, 2015, "I did not say the solution process has been abolished; I said it has been put in the refrigerator at this stage. If things go well, the process will come back to the agenda," and launched the missile with the fashionable term of the recent period.

"There is no longer any tolerance for delaying or postponing the time, do you understand?"

There is no need to say too much about these sentences.

It is clear that the plum branches have started to turn green.

It seems that the negotiations conducted through Istanbul and Diyarbakır until the local elections will become more comprehensive after April 1.

Could collective rights for Kurds be a subject of negotiation in exchange for support for a constitutional amendment that would guarantee his presidency for life, hand the country over unconditionally to the political Islamist mentality, and abolish secularism?

Even beyond that, autonomy or, for example, a federation...

In other words, can it be a "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" situation?

Or, after taking Istanbul in the local elections, will he pull a U-turn as he did with the Dolmabahçe consensus?

The conditions are not like they were back then.

This time, there is a terrorist structure that is growing stronger east of the Euphrates and under the de facto protection of America. He cannot ignore this in the steps he will take after April 1.

Kurds no longer want the issue to be deferred to time.

Although the opposition may not be fully aware of it, Turkey is unfortunately struggling with the most severe economic crisis in its history on one hand, and standing at the door of a new era that will threaten its existence on the other.

No matter how much we try to maintain our optimism, let us put a period to our article by saying that it looks like there will be a deluge in almost every respect after April 1.