Their concern is not the ceiling, but the base!

It would be a mistake to think that the decision of absolute nullity is merely an operation directed at Özgür Özel.

The crisis that has erupted in the CHP is by no means a "party congress fight," a "leadership race," or an "old-versus-new struggle."

There is a major scheme at play!

The government's real concern is to make the CHP unmanageable.

Along with this, it aims to divide and fragment the electorate and prevent it from acting as a unified body...

The entire strategy is based on this.

Thus, it wants to eliminate the potential threat to the regime—that is, the opposition voters who have the potential to consolidate their power within the CHP!

Let us now put on our reading glasses.

Özgür Özel taking the helm of the CHP was initially welcomed by the government. We do not know if they said, "Nothing could be better than this," but they certainly liked his attempts to get under Tayyip Erdoğan's wings—his talk of "normalizing, softening, and mellowing out."

Even though he constantly ranted and raved, and never let a day go by without taking a jab at Tayyip Erdoğan, he did not have a sharp profile at his core. He had even worn the checkered jacket that is the hallmark of political Islamists.

What more could they want!

He would shout and scream here and there, but as soon as he saw Tayyip Erdoğan, he would immediately lower his sails.

This was more or less the picture the Palace wanted to see: a main opposition party whose ties to the street had weakened, which did not produce reactions, and which worked "in harmony" with the regime instead of fighting it.

However, over time, it became clear that the plans made at home would not match the reality of the marketplace.

Özgür Özel might have walked a line that did not completely burn bridges with the government, but he lacked the political weight to convince his own base regarding the betrayal projects that would be placed before Turkey.

He did not have the power to suppress the reflexes of CHP voters, especially during processes that would change the backbone of the regime, such as a new constitution.

According to the government, Özgür Özel was controllable, but he was not "guaranteed" enough. He could hit the brakes at some point when he saw the pressure from his own base. Despite everything, the CHP electorate still possessed a sociology that reacted at certain thresholds.

In short, the real issue for the government was that Özgür Özel would not be able to produce a "blanket yes" when needed, especially on critical topics.

What Tayyip Erdoğan needed was not just a "compliant" opposition.

He needed a more advanced model;

A leadership profile that could manage resistance, absorb the reaction coming from the base, calm its voters when necessary; and most importantly, one that could make its masses accept historical transformations under the packaging of "reconciliation," "democracy," and "reconciliation/making amends"...

A main opposition that appears to be opposing but, in the final analysis, provides the legitimacy the government needs...

That is why they brought Kılıçdaroğlu back into the game.

His political character had been shaped on the same axis for years; that is, a profile that softens the historical hardness of the CHP, dulls its reflexes, and constantly pulls the base toward a line of "reasonableness."

Kılıçdaroğlu had the ability to soften social dissent and quietly gloss over major ruptures.

The fact that he kept his seat despite losing 13 elections during his time as Chairman...

Had he bewitched the CHP base?

He was able to slowly leave the electorate in a state of learned helplessness.

If the government had wanted to, it could have blocked Kılıçdaroğlu and appointed a trustee to head the CHP, but it did not.

It specifically wanted the party base to be divided in two.

They calculated that this would be the natural result of Kılıçdaroğlu sitting in the chairman's seat.

If the government had appointed a trustee to the CHP, the voters would have consolidated in a much harsher manner.

That would not have served their interests.

This is exactly the essence of the absolute nullity operation.

Let us continue...

When the pot boiled over, we understood that Özgür Özel and his cronies had tried to bargain with the government, even ignoring the principles of the CHP, to prevent the absolute nullity decision from being issued.

We learned this when Ali Mahir Başarır revealed it.

He said, or implied: "We will provide members to the commission, and you keep Kılıçdaroğlu away from the CHP."

It did not happen that way.

We do not know if Bahçeli lacked the power or if he intentionally led the CHP into a trap, but the CHP both provided members to the "betrayal commission" and suffered the blow of absolute nullity.

So, despite this, why is the CHP still in the commission?

That remains a mystery!

In short, the government is battering the CHP severely. On the other hand, it also fears the emergence of a CHP base that has regained its reflexes despite Kılıçdaroğlu, has become tougher, and is beginning to act as a unified body.

No matter what anyone says, the real fight of those in Beştepe was never with the CHP management. The real fight was with that Republican vein of the country that could rise up in the millions when necessary.

That is why the target of the operations is not the "ceiling," but directly the "base."

In short, the goal of the political engineering carried out in Turkey is not to win over the opposition, but to make the opposition voters hopeless...

To turn CHP voters against each other, to fragment them, to demoralize them, and finally to drag them to the point of "nothing will change anyway."

If the CHP does not regain a republican backbone, what is happening today will not just remain the transformation of a party; it will go down in history as the most critical threshold in the process of de-oppositioning the regime in Turkey.

Turkey is truly at a very dangerous crossroads. Let us ask who is aware of this, and put a period to our article.