What if Assad says, 'Let Davutoğlu be tried for war crimes'...

We don't know yet if he will say it or not, but it seems Assad will not allow Tayyip to leave the table without paying the bill.

On Thursday, we had set an appointment for today to seek an answer to the question of whether relations between Turkey and Syria can easily normalize.

His Excellency, upon returning from Germany, had said, "We were not enemies with Syria yesterday. We were meeting with Assad as families. We will extend our invitation. Hopefully, with this invitation, we want to bring Turkey-Syria relations to the same point as they were in the past. Our invitation could happen at any moment," and a few days later, he made the statement, "We want to end this resentment and start a new process."

It is understood from these consecutive calls and the rush of Özgür Özel, who took it upon himself to act as a sidekick to the AKP by going to Damascus to meet with Assad, that Tayyip is in a hurry.

Let us underline with a thick pen that His Majesty, as always, is trying to kill at least a dozen birds with one stone.

He both thinks that getting closer to Assad will give him a trump card against the West, especially the USA, and he is looking for a way to have a say at the table by re-entering the Syrian equation from which he was completely excluded.

His concern is to use this trump card in his hand to ensure that the West supports the extension of his own rule.

Just as he blackmails Europe over refugees, he is seeking to use relations with Assad in a similar way.

The diplomatic aspect of the matter is more or less like this!

But his real trouble is domestic.

He has realized that refugees are starting to become a threat to his government.

The fact that the people of our country have—finally—understood that there is a relationship between the severe economic crisis they are experiencing and the government's Syria policy has clearly caused alarm bells to ring for Tayyip.

It is as clear as day that he is afraid of an explosion of the ever-increasing anger.

He must have seen that even Özgür Özel following his lead will not be enough to save the situation.

In short, the country has reached a point where it can no longer bear the economic and social burden of Tayyip's Syria policy.

Let's move past the money poured like water into riff-raff groups like the SNA; just the fact that trade has stopped has caused Turkey hundreds of billions of dollars in losses over the past 13 years.

The list is very long.

But he has realized that he can no longer manage the situation.

Trusting that his 'ummah' has a goldfish memory, he pressed the button. He repeated his call one after another. Although the first response from Damascus was not very promising for him, the process has begun to work.

Let's come to the ten-point expert question.

Just because Tayyip wants it, can we expect Turkey-Syria relations to "normalize" in a short time, ignoring all the pain, destruction, and hundreds of thousands of people who lost their lives?

From the discussions held, the news leaked to the press, and the details that not many people on social media pay attention to, we understand that the Damascus administration has more than a dozen conditions.

Moreover, these are not the kind that Tayyip and his cronies will like very much.

The priority is the withdrawal of Turkish soldiers from Syria.

Assad seems to have tied starting "substantive" talks to this condition. That is, he is saying, withdraw your soldiers first, then we will sit at the table for other issues!

At the very least, it could be a matter of tying this to a schedule under the guarantee of a guarantor like Russia and within the framework of an official agreement to be made between the two countries.

Assad is aware that Tayyip does not want to put the matter on paper. If he U-turns tomorrow—which everyone knows very well he can do at any moment and under any circumstances—the Damascus administration wants its legal hand to be strong.

In other words, Assad is trying to play it safe this time.

It is known that the Russians are looking for a formula for this that neither side will say "no" to.

A diplomatic negotiation process could begin in which other issues are addressed simultaneously with the withdrawal of Turkish soldiers on a schedule, under Moscow's observation.

Even if we get this far without any accidents or trouble, let us say that it will be a matter of time before all hell breaks loose after this.

Because, if the first issue for Assad is the withdrawal of Turkish soldiers from Syria, the second issue is for Turkey to cut off its support for regime opponents.

We don't know yet what kind of consensus will be reached on this, but let us point out that it will not be easy.

Because there is UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which envisions the opposition joining the administration, the preparation of a new constitution, and holding elections within this framework. If Tayyip proceeds based on this resolution, it is almost impossible to reach an agreement. It would be naive to think that Assad, who did not take a step back in the Geneva and Astana processes, will now say, "Oh, we'll do something since you're in between."

Even if Tayyip says "okay," the jihadists, including organizations like the Ikhwan, ISIS, and al-Qaeda, will not lay down their arms happily.

The real trouble for Turkey seems to emerge after this point.

Either he will completely cut off his support and turn a blind eye to the comprehensive operations the Damascus administration will launch against these organizations, or he will allow them to come and settle in Turkey.

It is currently unknown what kind of formula they will proceed with.

Even if Tayyip shakes hands with Assad, whether he will suddenly cut off his support for the regime opponents and the SNA remains a serious question mark.

The government is afraid that the scorpion it has been feeding until today will one day come and sting it. The attacks on Turkish soldiers, the Turkish flag, and Turkish-plated vehicles in northern Syria following Tayyip's call to Assad should be evaluated as a flare.

A similar problem applies to Afrin as well.

A possible operation into Afrin, which has been a safe zone for jihadists until today, could trigger a new wave of migration to Turkey.

As for the return of refugees!

No one should expect a reverse migration movement from today to tomorrow. Anyway, the government has no concrete project in this direction. Again, by "pretending," it wants to market this domestically and lower the pressure of the gas building up in our people. If he takes this trump card out of the opposition's hands, he thinks his hand will be strengthened in the early elections to be held in 2028 or before.

Furthermore, the lands from which a significant portion of the refugees fled are now in the hands of the SDF, which is increasingly growing under the protection of the USA. It is impossible for refugees to return home without solving this issue and completely removing the SDF from these regions.

A similar situation applies to those coming from outside the regions where the SDF has settled.

Let's not skip the USA in this equation with many unknowns. Tayyip cannot normalize relations with Syria happily by ignoring the USA.

Since the 'know-it-alls' in Washington will not write off the SDF, we do not know what kind of formula the government will find and how it will convince the Damascus administration.

On the other hand, Assad is also aware that normalization will benefit Tayyip. He knows that he will benefit from its political and economic fruits to the fullest. That's why he is not in much of a hurry. He does not want him to leave the table without paying the bill.

The files that will come to the negotiation table are more or less clear, but let's not ignore that Assad may have surprise demands.

For example, what would Tayyip do if he came out and said, "It is Ahmet Davutoğlu who poured gasoline on the fire in my country. He is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of our people. Therefore, he must be tried as a war criminal"?

Let us leave the answer to this question to the discernment of our readers and put a period to our article.