Will Putin trust Tayyip from now on?

I don't know if they still do it, but there was a time when influential and authorized diplomats from the Foreign Ministry would gather journalists who wrote about foreign policy to hold “background” briefing meetings, sometimes “off the record” and often in a way that could be written by citing diplomatic sources.

For fresh diplomacy reporters, this was a kind of in-service training, and for senior reporters, it was an opportunity to “update” themselves, that is, to refresh their knowledge.

Today, they try to feed the things Bahçeli spouts to our people as “state wisdom,” but we had the chance to learn what the real “state wisdom” that protects and watches over the country's supreme interests actually was and what it was good for in those very meetings.

From across the Atlantic to the Middle East, from the European Union to the Asia-Pacific, from Cyprus to Turkish-Greek relations, we were able to hear firsthand from which historical perspective, within which principles, and under which conditions Turkey's foreign policy on both a regional and global scale was shaped.

When it came to the country's national interests, everything else took a backseat. Maximum effort was made to ensure that diplomacy did not become material or a side dish for domestic politics.

Whatever anyone says, compared to the last twenty years, the foundations upon which the old Turkey's foreign policy paradigm rested were extremely strong.

In one of these meetings, the Undersecretary of the time, Korkmaz Haktanır, made a statement to the effect of, “If you have not established mutual trust, you cannot achieve results from the diplomacy you conduct,” and later added, “We inspire trust in our foreign policy. This is a source of pride for us; we are a country that enjoys the trust of the parties even in the Middle East.”

In other words, Turkey's word was valuable back then.

But what about now...

As the background of the developments in Syria from last week to today becomes clearer, we understand that with the AKP government, we have gradually moved away from being reliable in foreign policy, becoming a country whose word almost no one believes and where everyone feels the need to watch their back when it comes to Turkey.

On news channels and social media, it is being debated how the jihadists captured Aleppo so quickly, and why the Syrian army and the Russians did not or could not resist.

Let's leave aside those who are dancing with joy, saying Assad has been defeated, but it has emerged that neither the Syrian Army nor the Russians had strongly fortified Aleppo and its surroundings.

Clearly, they were not expecting such a strong attack from Idlib.

According to what is being discussed in the deep corridors of Ankara, the Russians thought Aleppo was safe because they believed Turkey held the leash of the jihadists in Idlib.

For this reason, they did not object to the Syrian army moving its center of gravity to the Lebanon and Israel border, calculating that the real threat would come from the south, that is, from Israel.

They left only a small force here.

However, they did notice some activity in Idlib in recent months and asked their counterparts in Ankara about it several times.

Each time, they received the answer, “Don't worry, there is no problem.”

Trusting that the agreement regarding the disarmament of the jihadists had been reached at the highest level, that is, personally between Tayyip and Putin, they said, “No threat will come from here.”

Let's refresh our memory a bit.

In September 2018, a critical Idlib meeting was held between Tayyip and Putin in the Russian city of Sochi, and an important agreement was reached there. According to this, a 15-20 kilometer zone separating the Syrian army from armed groups would be created around Idlib; heavy weapons such as tanks, rocket launchers, artillery, and mortars would be withdrawn from this zone; and Turkey would collect the weapons in the hands of all radical groups and remove them from the region. By the end of 2018, the security of the Aleppo-Latakia and Aleppo-Hama highways would be ensured and they would be opened to traffic.

The Russians had passed the ball to Turkey for this and had received a promise from Tayyip.

Not only with the Sochi agreement but also in accordance with the Astana Process between Turkey, Russia, and Iran, Turkey had undertaken this responsibility.

In other words, there was no reason for the Russians not to be at ease.

Not only because they were bound by an official agreement, but the fact that Tayyip was in need of Putin's support on almost every issue strengthened their hands.

At that time, I asked a diplomat from the Russian Embassy in Ankara, “How is it that Putin trusts Tayyip so much?”

“There is no reason for him not to trust him. Because Tayyip needs Putin more than Putin needs Tayyip,” he replied, adding, “You saw what the response would be to every step you took against us after you shot down our plane.”

The message he gave was clear.

With Russia's retaliation, 36 of our soldiers were martyred on the Syrian border, Tayyip had to wait at the doors in Moscow where he went to “solve the crisis,” and things were smoothed over only after he backtracked on his bluster in Ankara.

They had become certain that he would not harm Russia's interests again.

But we understood from the developments in Syria that Tayyip has once again pulled a fast one on Putin!

The government had neither disarmed the jihadists in Idlib as promised in Sochi and Astana, nor had it warned Moscow in recent weeks that “jihadists will launch an attack towards Aleppo.”

On the contrary, since not a bird flies in the region without Turkey's knowledge, it even turned a blind eye to the terrorist groups acquiring heavy weapons during this time.

The Russians, who were sure that northwestern Syria was a de-escalation zone, were badly mistaken.

Now let's get to the crux of the matter!

It is said that Putin is furious. He is reportedly seething with rage; will he present a bill to Turkey for this, or what kind of bill will he present!

You will find out soon. But it is noteworthy that Tayyip grabbed the phone and called Putin a week after the clashes began.

We do not know what was discussed in the meeting, but the fact that the Ankara Embassy later provided information on its social media account that “such a contact took place at Turkey's initiative” shows that they feel the atmosphere of panic in Ankara.

But what is certain is that Ankara-Moscow relations have once again come to the brink of a troubled period.

Before concluding our article, let us ask whether Putin will trust Tayyip from now on, and leave the answer to the reader's discernment as we put a period to our piece.