Balance of power in foreign policy and global polarization

In Turkey, recent debates and polarization regarding foreign policy have also highlighted attitudes toward imperialism. Some argue that U.S. imperialism maintains its power, while others contend that it is in decline. This debate undoubtedly reflects an ideological confrontation as well. 

To conduct the discussion on a sounder basis, we have political economy, history, and geopolitics in our toolkit. Let us discuss it then… 

Historically, the balance of power in the world changes every 100 to 150 years. This ebb and flow, this pendulum, this seesaw, shifts between the West and the East. Geographically, the three continents that stand out in these shifts are Asia, Europe, and America. Looking more closely, when examined on a country-by-country basis, the number of prominent states is not high. In the West, the UK, France, and the U.S. stand out; in the East, China and Russia. 

In contrast, Germany—one of the world's 5 largest economies, which immediately comes to mind when discussing industrial society, industrial culture, and industrial discipline, and which draws attention with its technological infrastructure—is not among the dominant states on this list. Germany, which participated in both world wars and lost both, yet recovered and developed rapidly after each defeat, could not stand out on a global scale like the UK or France in the past because it completed its unification late, lagged in the race for colonies, and could not become an effective naval power. Today, because it is not a military power and does not possess nuclear weapons, it is not a political or diplomatic power commensurate with its economic, technological, scientific, and industrial strength. It is striving to become one, taking steps in this direction, and using the European Union for this purpose. However, it has not achieved its goal. Moreover, with the war in Ukraine, a pause and regression have been observed in its thinking in this regard. Likewise, this war has clearly shown that the U.S.'s capacity for hegemony has weakened.

Countries such as the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, which were quite successful at sea in the past, prominent in trade, and notable in the race for colonies, have also fallen far behind in today's sharp competition. For example, Turkey and Iran, which have high imperial experience, civilizational accumulation, and state-building capacity, are not counted among the leading powers of the East today. Although states like Brazil in Latin America and India in Asia attract attention, it is impossible for them to be contenders on a global scale for now. In the East, India is an ambitious country with its population (having surpassed China to take the top spot), growth rate, technological breakthrough, military, nuclear capacity, and close relations with the U.S., the UK, and Russia. It is an actor that can change global balances in favor of the side it supports. In this context, it needs to be examined under a separate heading.  

In summary, it is impossible to become a regional actor and a global power in a short time in foreign policy. It has its time, its ground, and its conditions. Moreover, the historical experience and leadership capacity to evaluate these conditions well are very important. Rationality and realism are mandatory. It is essential to be balanced, to observe the conjuncture, and to follow a stable, predictable, and reliable policy. Being a deterrent is a must. Being able to form alliances when necessary and to lead alliances is also directly related to prestige.