Foreign policy, state capacity, and becoming a naval power

The month of July is remembered for two important events in the context of Republican history in general, and the Republic's foreign policy in particular. The first is the Treaty of Lausanne dated July 24, 1923, and the second is the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits dated July 20, 1936… 

Both are products of the genius of the great leader Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, his ability for timing, and his keen observation of power balances on a regional and global scale. When commenting on, writing about, or pondering the foreign policy of the Republic of Türkiye, which has passed its 102nd year since its founding, it is necessary to know this foreign policy experience and line very well, and to remain loyal to this foreign policy strategy. 

Why, you ask? For the following reason…

Because although foreign policy is a field where almost everyone comments, says whatever comes to their mind, and pontificates as they please—just like sports or domestic politics—there are objective units of measurement that show whether one is successful in foreign policy. Such as how effective the elements of economic power, political power, military power, and soft power are, to what extent they are used efficiently, how much the conjuncture is utilized, and how successful one is in alliance relations… 

There is more; foreign policy requires acting very realistically and rationally. It does not tolerate daydreaming or adventurism. It is known that moves aimed at domestic politics, intended to consolidate the voter base internally, are not effective abroad even if they work at home. When it comes to the scale, capacity, and power of the country, exaggerated approaches, big words, and ambitious goals may earn points in domestic politics, but they do not work in foreign policy. 

 For example; Türkiye is a typical middle-sized state. For a middle-sized power, for a middle-sized state, for a regional power, increasing scale in foreign policy is not that easy. Because it is not enough for us to just do our part, to consolidate the internal front, and to act with a sense of national mobilization. Regional and global conditions, and the conjuncture, must also be appropriate. Even if rivals, neighbors, adversaries, and allies do not support our scaling up, they must at least not object. Moreover, scaling up is impossible in a short time. It requires very good planning, preparation, coordination, and action in the medium and long term.  

One must also decide on this in foreign policy: Is it more important to be an element of balance or an element of stability? 

Because when we look at the geography we live in, in terms of the impact of regional and global developments, the following is seen: The Middle East is always problematic. It harbors significant risks, threats, and dangers for our country's security. Conflicts and tensions in the Balkans and the Caucasus also affect Türkiye immediately and directly. 

It is natural for Türkiye, due to its geographical location, geopolitical importance, and strategic characteristics, to be among the top 10 countries in the world with the busiest foreign policy agendas. However, one must not forget this: Türkiye's economic ties and diplomatic ties, its commercial relations and alliance relations are naturally different from each other. Its largest foreign trade partner is Germany. It is followed by Russia and China. Nevertheless, Türkiye is either a member of the West's political, diplomatic, security, and economic institutions, or a candidate member, as in the case of the European Union. 

Türkiye's relations with the East, on this plane, are not seen as an alternative to its relations with the West, and they do not replace its relations with the West. Turkish political elites, mainstream parties, civil-military bureaucracy, academia, and the world of culture and art ultimately prefer the West over the East. Loyalty to NATO is established. In terms of the economy, external resources, foreign investors, debt, and credit coming from the West are important. Furthermore, Europe's share in total foreign trade is over 50 percent. It is not possible for this economic picture to change in the short term.  

For example, when looking at Türkiye-US relations, even though so many definitions such as strategic alliance, strong partnership, strategic partnership, strategic relationship, and model partnership have been made, this fact does not change: The US needs Türkiye due to its army, regional weight, Muslim identity, and geopolitical position. Türkiye also observes being compatible with the US at all times, even if it causes a stir every now and then. It never gives up its NATO membership. While the US takes many steps against Türkiye, including supporting terrorist organizations, Türkiye does not retaliate against the US on that scale. 

Türkiye must also know well what its bargaining power and trump cards are. Because in diplomacy, negotiation and bargaining are essential. Parties extract concessions and give concessions. Therefore, Türkiye must know very well what it will concede to gain what. 

For example, after having objected to Sweden's NATO membership at a high level and having given binding promises, what concessions did Türkiye extract before changing its mind and saying yes to Sweden's NATO membership? What concessions did it extract from the US, which insisted on Sweden's NATO membership and provided the greatest support to terrorist organizations? What concessions did it receive from the European members of NATO, who fervently supported Sweden's NATO membership? 

We can also ask the question in reverse: While the US was giving important promises regarding the delivery of F-35 aircraft to Türkiye and the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, what concessions did it ask from Türkiye? 

Türkiye must also correctly analyze global competition, regional competition, and the reflections of global competition on regional competition. Because as both a peninsula country surrounded by seas on three sides and a regional actor, it is immediately, directly, and excessively affected by developments in its surroundings. Türkiye is the field and the interlocutor of the competition between the East and the West, Eurasia and the Atlantic. 

For example, how can the decrease in Türkiye's influence and the steps taken back regarding the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) in recent years be explained? 

Is this situation related to Türkiye's state capacity, its means, and capabilities? Is it because we want to normalize with Greece that we no longer have our old insistence on the Blue Homeland? Or has the great support the US has given to Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, the investments it has made, the bases it has established, and the weapons it has sold been effective? Have the pressures of the US and the EU on Türkiye yielded results? Or were steps taken back to soften relations with the EU a little bit? Is there a decrease in Türkiye's power? Or were the steps back taken for the financial resources, credit, debt, and investment desired to come from the West for the continuation of the economic program? 

Undoubtedly, these questions can be multiplied. However, without a comprehensive, consistent, holistic, and programmed Blue Homeland and naval power strategy, it is not possible to be effective at sea. And without being effective at sea, it is impossible to increase state capacity and scale up.