Global competition, the EU's position, and Turkey

It is customary, as we enter a new year, for words to be spoken, predictions to be voiced, and forecasts to be made regarding the future of the world, the economy, politics, and global diplomacy. This year was no different. Predictions were lined up regarding what will happen this year in the US, Russia, China, the Middle East, and Latin America.

While these predictions included many continents, regions, and countries, Europe was absent; the European Union was absent; European countries were absent.

It is necessary to dwell on and think about the reason for this.

It has long been known that the EU lacks global power. This situation is not new. It was seen most recently in the Ukraine-Russia War and in Israel's genocide in Gaza. There is no one who cares about, values, or listens to the EU. There is no one asking for the EU's opinion.

We see that US President Trump, at international summits, calls European leaders to his side one by one, mocks them, and practically throws in their faces how ineffective they are. The US did this most recently in the defense strategy document released in the final month of last year. It emphasized that it does not care about Europe and does not care about the principles and values that Europe holds dear. It practically humiliated the Europeans.

This attitude of the US, of course, cannot be explained solely by Trump's arrogance, personality disorder, ego, narcissistic personality traits, unreliable and unpredictable character, conceit, or lack of focus. It is primarily related to the EU's ineffectiveness in solving global problems and the problems within the union itself.

With the EU in this state, shouldn't we discuss Turkey's never-to-be-realized EU membership, the EU dream, how Turkey is kept waiting in the EU's waiting room, and what concessions the EU has extracted from Turkey in the process?

For many years, in parallel with the debates within the EU, Turkey pondered the direction in which the EU would develop, how it would expand, and which way it would evolve. The 90s and the first 10 years of the 2000s were spent with intense debates regarding Turkey-EU relations. In the 80s and 90s, the majority of the parties that governed Turkey, whether alone or as a coalition partner—from ANAP to DYP, from SHP to DSP—openly advocated for Turkey's EU membership. Only the MHP and the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) had reservations about this.

The AKP, which came to power alone in the elections on November 3, 2002, was also fervently supporting EU membership in its early years in power. The steps taken for EU membership, the EU's negative approach to Kemalism, and its attitude toward the Turkish Armed Forces were also supported by liberals, "fake" republicans, and ethnic separatists. The military tutelage, Kemalist bureaucracy, authoritarian state, and judicial oligarchy, which were constantly on the lips of the AKP and its partners, were already targets of the EU as well. In this context, EU membership found resonance domestically and served as a lever.

This was a broad front that also included the government. The "it's not enough but yes" team, the "we apologize.com" crowd, the anti-Rauf Denktaş "yes be annem" (yes my dear) group in the TRNC, the "fake" republicans, the leftists of FETÖ, the Iletişim Publishing circle, the Birikim magazine circle, the media of FETÖ, Taraf newspaper, and Radikal newspaper were all on this front. A large part of the business world, liberal democratic and social democratic foundations, and associations were on this front.

They advocated for Turkey to take a moderate stance against the EU's impositions, arguing that accepting the so-called genocide claims would not harm Turkey.

There is more; they wanted Turkey to make concessions in the problems experienced in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, all of which originated from Athens.

They suggested meeting the demands of the PKK terrorist organization, accepting the ecumenical status of the Patriarchate in Fener, opening the Halki Seminary, and looking with tolerance at demands contrary to the Treaty of Lausanne, which is the founding treaty and title deed of the Republic of Turkey.

According to these circles, requests reminiscent of the Treaty of Sèvres were of no importance. It was necessary to get rid of the "Sèvres paranoia." Turkish journalists and academics, whom the Head of the European Commission Delegation Karen Fogg put on the payroll and gave instructions to, were working for this purpose. This team does not call themselves Turkish; they call themselves "Türkiyeli" (from Turkey). They are also known as the "Kör Agop gang" due to the name of the tavern in Kumkapı, Istanbul, where they met. The instruction they received from Karen Fogg was this: to overcome the Turkish state and its history. If you ask them, they are democracy and freedom fighters working for the democratization of Turkey, opposing the Kemalist state and the oppressive bureaucracy.

According to them, the pressure exerted by EU diplomats so that the Annan Plan would be accepted in the TRNC was of no importance. The fact that this pressure did not align with diplomatic rules and traditions should not have been an issue.

Years have passed... Let's come to today...

Thanks to the Customs Union that entered into force in 1996, the EU is enjoying the taste of gaining great influence over Turkey's customs regime, foreign trade regime, and domestic market without making Turkey a member. The EU is enjoying the happiness of establishing an unequal, unbalanced, and asymmetric relationship mechanism between Turkey and the EU.

Since the Southern Cyprus Greek Administration, which Turkey does not recognize, was made an EU member under the name of the Republic of Cyprus and representing the entire island, and thus met with Greece under the EU umbrella, the Greek-Cypriot side also seems satisfied with its situation. So much so that on the day the Greek Cypriots became EU members, the Greek media ran headlines saying, "The great victory of Hellenism."

Debates regarding the future of the EU have lost their former heat in our country. Will it be the United States of Europe or the United European States? Will the EU be a tight federation or a loose confederation? Will it prioritize expansion with new members or focus on further integration? How many rings will it have? How many speeds will the EU have? These questions are no longer pondered much in Turkey. Even the incurable EU lovers and those funded by the EU have given up on seeking answers to these questions.

EU officials, who never gave Turkey a full membership guarantee, who said that even if Turkey is not made a full member, it should be tightly tied to the EU's doors, and who took the decision that even if governments and parliaments accept Turkey's membership, any EU member that wishes can put it to a referendum, also insistently say that it is not possible for Turkey to be an EU member. Especially in a Europe where nationalist, populist, and EU-skeptic parties are on the rise, any politician with average intelligence understands that supporting Turkey's membership is difficult for both liberals and social democrats.

Let us reiterate: at the 2002 Copenhagen Summit, while the EU offered Turkey a membership perspective on paper, it had actually and effectively blocked this path. The Turkish media did not want to see or show this. This situation also suited the government. In reality, the promises the EU made to Turkey were very vague and ambiguous. They were so obscure that they could not be compared with the promises made to other candidate countries. They did not contain a clear commitment. They did not provide a membership guarantee. So much so that even if the EU Commission wrote a progress report in favor of Turkey and recommended starting full membership negotiations with Turkey, the European Council had the authority to decide that Turkey had not fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria.

At this point, it is useful to list Turkey's position before the EU.

First, Turkey's EU membership has nothing to do with Turkey implementing EU criteria. It has to do with Turkey's geopolitical position, its large population, its Muslim identity, and its neighbors.

Second, Turkey's membership has to do with whether the EU wants to be a global power and whether it has a claim, determination, or preparation in this regard. If the EU wants to be a global power and bears the cost of this, Turkey's membership becomes possible. If the EU does not give up on the status quo and the US and NATO umbrella, and cannot afford the cost of being a global power, Turkey's membership will not be possible.

Third, thanks to the Customs Union, the EU is already getting what it wants from Turkey. With the situation as it is, it does not want to take on a heavy burden and become neighbors with troubled regions by making Turkey a full member.

Fourth, Turkey's membership would create great controversy in domestic politics in Germany, which is the leading power of the EU, as well as in France, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain, which follow it. No politician in these countries can express a preference in this direction.

Fifth, for full membership, Turkey could convince two of the 27 EU members with difficulty, but very great difficulty: Greece and the Southern Cyprus Greek Administration. These two want very large concessions and compromises from Turkey.

Sixth, by keeping Turkey in the waiting room without taking it in, the EU ensures that Turkey remains in the EU's sphere of control and does not look for other options. The only thing the EU, which is already Turkey's largest foreign trade partner, cares about in crisis regions, conflict areas, and discussions on defense, security, and a European army, is to utilize the armed forces of Turkey, which it has not made a member.

In short, for years, Turkey has been advised to make concessions on its national interests, abandon its priorities, give up its goals, and accept the EU's requests and impositions. It is said that this is the only way to democratization, human rights, and freedom. It is time for Turkey to put an end to this game.