The 30th anniversary of the Imia/Kardak Crisis between Turkey and Greece

In his autobiography titled My Life, released in June 2024—nearly three years after leaving the White House—the 42nd President of the United States, Bill Clinton (William Jefferson Clinton), describes the 1996 Kardak (Imia) Crisis, which brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war, on page 459 with the following words:

“Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin came to the White House on January 30 for his sixth meeting with Al Gore. After finishing his commission work, Chernomyrdin visited me to provide information about what was happening in Russia and the likelihood of Yeltsin’s reelection. Shortly before meeting with Chernomyrdin, I spoke with Turkish President Süleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller. Both said that Turkey and Greece were on the verge of armed conflict and asked for my help to stop it. They were about to go to war over two tiny islets in the Aegean Sea, which the Greeks called Imia and the Turks called Kardak. Although both countries claimed the islets, it appeared that the islands had passed into Greek ownership after a treaty signed between Greece and Italy in 1947. However, Turkey did not accept the Greek claims. Although Turks frequently visited the islets, no one lived there. The crisis had been triggered by some Turkish journalists tearing down the Greek flag there and planting a Turkish flag in its place. It was impossible to believe that two great countries, which were already having a real dispute over Cyprus, would go to war over two rocks of a few square meters where only goats grazed. But I could understand that Çiller was genuinely worried about such a possibility. I took a break from my meeting with Chernomyrdin and called Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis first, and then Demirel and Çiller again. After a few phone calls, both sides agreed not to pull the trigger, while Dick Holbrooke, who had begun working on the Cyprus issue, spent a sleepless night trying to convince the parties to resolve the problem through diplomacy. Whether or not I was successful in establishing peace in the Middle East, Bosnia, or Northern Ireland, I couldn't help but laugh at the thought that I had at least saved the lives of a few goats in the Aegean.”

The Kardak Crisis, which Clinton recalled and described with a touch of irony, actually stemmed from Greece’s ambition to turn the Aegean Sea into a Greek lake. Greece, which constantly creates problems in the Aegean Sea—also known as the Sea of Islands—also created a crisis in Kardak, attempting to force Turkey to accept its theses. The Kardak Rocks, consisting of two uninhabited rocks 325 meters apart, are located in the Southern Aegean, 3.6 miles from the Turkish mainland. The distance between the rocks and Kalymnos, the closest Greek island, is 5.4 miles, while the distance between Turkey and Kalymnos is 9 miles.

At the time the crisis began, Turkey was governed by a DYP–CHP coalition government. However, as a result of the December 24, 1995, general elections, both parties had failed. The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) emerged first in the elections. The DYP became the 3rd party. The CHP barely passed the 10 percent threshold and entered the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) as the 5th party. Since a new government had not yet been formed, DYP leader Tansu Çiller continued as prime minister, and CHP leader Deniz Baykal continued as foreign minister. Süleyman Demirel was the president. In Greece, a new government had recently been formed under the premiership of Kostas Simitis.

THE START OF THE CRISIS AND GREECE'S LAWLESS POLICY

On December 25, 1995, a Turkish merchant ship named Figen Akat, carrying cargo from Çanakkale to Israel, ran aground on the Kardak Rocks. After the accident, Greek Coast Guard boats arrived at the rocks and informed the ship's captain that the accident had occurred in Greek territorial waters and that the rescue operation should therefore be carried out by a Greek salvage vessel. The ship's captain stated that they were in Turkish territorial waters and that they had immediately requested assistance from the Turkish Coast Guard Command after the accident. These two rocks, which had not been given much importance until that day, suddenly created another crisis between Ankara and Athens in addition to existing problems.

Prime Minister Tansu Çiller emphasized nationalist rhetoric to strengthen her hand and gain an effective position in the coalition negotiations before the new government was formed. By saying, "That flag will come down, that soldier will leave," she aimed to gain public support. President Süleyman Demirel, on the other hand, was more cautious, suggesting calm and moderation, thinking that if a war broke out with Greece because of the rocks, it would be difficult to explain this to the Turkish nation, and the people would ask those governing the state, "Was there no other way to solve this problem other than war?"

A nationalist wave also rose in Greece. The Greek media also broadcasted with a high dose of nationalism and directed public opinion. Greece was doing what it always does, using the Kardak Rocks as an excuse to seek ways to have a full say in the Aegean Sea. According to Athens' calculations, if Turkey accepted that the rocks belonged to Greece, Greece would claim that the other islands, islets, and rocks also belonged to it. Turkey, however, argues that the pieces of land remaining from the Ottoman Empire, if it has not been determined by treaties which state they belong to, naturally, logically, historically, and legally belong to Turkey. This is because the Republic of Turkey was accepted as the successor to the Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Lausanne, the founding treaty.

While Turkey and Greece were exchanging diplomatic notes, tons of cement were spilled into the sea from the cement-laden ship. For this reason, the rescue operation had to be carried out as soon as possible. Turkish and Greek warships also anchored near the rocks. A Greek rescue boat approaching the ship pulled the ship to safety with the help of a rope it had tied, but when the rope got caught in the ship's swivel, a Turkish crew member on the ship immediately cut the rope. The rescued ship then quickly entered Turkish territorial waters and was towed to the port of Güllük.

After the ship was rescued, the tension over which state the Kardak Rocks belonged to escalated further. In the note it gave to Turkey, Greece claimed that the rocks had been left to it, while Turkey rejected the Greek note, pointing to the title deed records showing that the rocks belonged to Turkey.

One month after the ship ran aground, on January 26, the Mayor of Kalymnos took a priest, young people, and journalists with him, went to the rocks, and planted the Greek flag. Upon this, two reporters from the newspaper Hürriyet went to the rocks on January 27, took down the Greek flag, and planted the Turkish flag.

GREEK SOLDIERS LAND ON THE KARDAK ROCKS

While the tension between Turkey and Greece continued, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs carefully avoided escalating the tension and prioritized diplomacy. In contrast, Greece further increased the tension, and on January 28, Greek soldiers who landed on the rocks planted a flag and deployed on East Kardak (the larger of the two rocks). Greece did not stop there and sent warships around the rocks.

Instead of responding immediately, Turkey gave a note to the Greek Ambassador to Ankara, whom it summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 29. It stated that the 1932 Turkish-Italian Protocol and the 1947 Paris Treaty did not contain clear provisions regarding the ownership of the islands, and that Turkey was ready for negotiations with Greece regarding the islands, islets, and rocks whose sovereignty had not been transferred to Greece by treaties (these are briefly called EGAYDAAK). The note demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Greek soldiers deployed on the Kardak Rocks. Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, on the other hand, blamed Turkey, saying, "We declare that Greece's response to this or any aggressive nationalism will be immediate, harsh, and decisive. We will not hesitate to use all means at our disposal against Turkey. Turkish ships must leave Greek territorial waters." Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos also said in his speech in parliament on January 30 that they would not take down the Greek flag on the Kardak Rocks and would not make the rocks a subject of negotiation with Turkey. The US, which was in constant contact with both Ankara and Athens, conveyed the message to both capitals that whoever fired the first shot would face the US.

Turkey pursued a cool-headed policy against Greece's preference to deepen the crisis and its harsh rhetoric, while also trying not to appear timid to the domestic public and the world. The government instructed the army to be ready for the military option if diplomatic initiatives did not yield results. While the possibility of using weapons escalated the tension, Turkey was also concerned that Greece, which already had a share in a much larger area of the Aegean Sea than Turkey, was calculating to annex the other 150 islands in the region by the same method as a fait accompli. The dogfights between the planes of the two countries and the warships sailing very close to each other brought to mind the possibility of a regional conflict, even if not a general war.

At this stage, Turkey decided to implement the formula proposed by the then-Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, İnal Batu. Batu's proposal was as follows: There is a Greek flag on the smaller of the Kardak Rocks, also known as the Twin Rocks, i.e., the West Kardak rock, but there are no Greek soldiers. If Turkish Underwater Offense (SAT) teams infiltrated through the Greek warships, which consisted of 24 pieces of various sizes, in the middle of the night, landed on this small rock, and planted the Turkish flag, both a position of equality would be established between Turkey and Greece, and it would be easier to return to the status quo before the crisis.

This proposal by İnal Batu was accepted, and Turkey decided on this difficult and risky operation. As there was always a possibility of the infiltration team being caught, there was also a possibility of armed conflict, and Turkey took this risk. In the end, the infiltration operation, carried out with two boats in groups of five at midnight on January 30, was successfully completed when the Turkish underwater team landed on the second rock (West Kardak) 1.5 hours later and hoisted the Turkish flag. Following the success of the Turkish team, heated debates took place in the Greek parliament, and when no answer could be found to the question of how the 10-person team in two Turkish boats passing through the Greek warships was not noticed and how their landing on the rocks could not be prevented, the Greek Chief of General Staff resigned.

Conclusion

In the end, with the influence of pressure from both the US and European countries, both countries agreed to withdraw their soldiers from the rocks and take down their flags. On January 31, first the Greek soldiers and then the Turkish soldiers left the rocks they were on. The problem was solved through diplomatic means without firing a shot. However, it should not be forgotten that the crisis, in the words of US President Clinton, did not stem from two small rocks where goats grazed, but was a matter of land and sovereignty in the Aegean Sea, and that Greece, as always, started the crisis.

It is important that Turkey, while using diplomatic channels to the fullest, also succeeded in a difficult military operation, landed soldiers on a rock where there were no Greek soldiers, and planted a flag. In this way, Turkey demonstrated its political determination on one hand, proved its military capability on the other, and by making a move aimed not at increasing but at reducing the tension, gave the Greek side an opportunity to take a step back without hurting Athens' honor.

Bibliography

The newspapers Hürriyet and Milliyet of the period.

Aydın Şıhmantepe, “Kardak Krizi Sürecinin Kriz Yönetim Prensipleri Açısından İncelenmesi” (between pages 136 – 139), Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi, April 2013, Issue: 17, Year: 9, Pp: 127 – 155.

Turkish Foreign Policy Crisis Studies, 1996 Kardak Crisis, http://tdpkrizleri.org.tr/index.php/1996-kardak-crisis