Who won in Syria? Who lost?

What has happened in Syria has, among many other things, provided a view of the state capacity of the countries that influence and direct developments in Syria, have relationships with the conflicting parties, and support them. While Russia and Iran have lost, the hands of the US and Israel have been greatly strengthened.

As for Turkey's gains and losses, there are very different views on this matter.

Did Turkey win? If it won, what did it gain? Or is it on the losing side?

To give clear answers to these questions, one must first see three things.

The first is to see that the PKK – PYD – YPG terrorist organization has been completely neutralized, the second is that the Syrian refugees under temporary protection status in our country have returned to their countries, and the third is that Syria has been able to preserve its territorial integrity.

There is more. It is also essential to be certain that no terrorist attacks or mass migration originating from Syria will come to Turkey.

Therefore, making big and ambitious statements, or giving definitive, sharp judgments is wrong. Those who do this are playing to domestic politics.

It is evident that the government, which could not protect the Tomb of Suleyman Shah—Turkish territory in Syria—and which tries to send messages to the domestic audience by appointing district governors to districts and deans to faculties in Syria, has been unable to prevent Israel from expanding its occupation of Syrian territory, despite all the anti-Israel rhetoric. It is also known that HTS, which Turkey recognized as a terrorist organization in 2018 but has recently begun to call opposition or jihadist, has not thrown a single pebble at the US and Israeli targets that are occupying Syrian territory. It is also unknown how much the stance HTS will take against the PKK – PYD – YPG terrorist organization will satisfy Turkey. Let us not forget that the leader of HTS tries to appear very moderate in interviews he gives to Western media, especially the US.

The gap between rhetoric and reality is not new in our country's foreign policy. There are many examples. Especially the words of Turgut Özal, who, before the Gulf Crisis, was practically scrambling to enter the war on the side of the US, are still in memory: "We will put in one and take back three."

This style has neither been taken seriously nor has it been effective. On the contrary, it has eroded existing prestige, respectability, and deterrence. Our counterparts in the West, knowing that these words were said entirely for domestic consumption, have never dwelt on them, have not cared, and have not taken them to heart. This situation has caused Turkish diplomacy to be seen as what foreigners call "diplomacy without teeth," that is, diplomacy without sanctions, powerless diplomacy. It is bad for such an impression, image, or perception to form about a state.

Therefore, in foreign policy, it is not important to talk a lot, to talk inappropriately, to talk loudly, or to talk by shouting; it is important to make your counterpart, your adversary, your allies, and the world feel, think, and see that you have the power to put your words into action. Determination, consistency, respectability, prestige, and deterrence are achieved in this way.