From economic collapse to the collapse of naval power: The (British) Royal Navy

Today, Irish journalist Chay Bowes says that the number of Admirals in the Royal Navy has long since exceeded the number of combatant ships.

As the Iran, Israel & US war continues, according to Reuters and Western media, the UK has brought up the option of escorting commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz and leading a multinational maritime security initiative. In other words, the intention to step into the field is now being openly discussed. However, the qualitative and quantitative state of the Royal Navy presents an extremely negative, even alarming picture. Today, the Royal Navy is experiencing one of the weakest periods in its history. Although the intention to escort commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz and lead a multinational maritime security initiative may be presented as a reflex of global responsibility from the UK's perspective at first glance, it contains a serious reality problem when compared with the capabilities on the ground.

The Shrinking Royal Navy

Today, the Royal Navy consists of a total of 63 ships, but only 25 of this total are actual combatant platforms; the remaining 41 ships consist of auxiliary and support elements. Within these 25 combatant elements, there are approximately 10 nuclear submarines, 2 aircraft carriers, 6 destroyers, and 7 frigates. However, even these numbers are misleading because they do not mean combat-ready ships. In the UK, a significant portion of these platforms cannot operate simultaneously due to reasons such as maintenance, modernization, breakdowns, and personnel shortages. For this reason, the combat power, which is 25 on paper, drops to a much lower level in practice. Today, only 2 of the 6 destroyers are on active duty. Approximately 5 of the 7 frigates are active. Only one of the 2 aircraft carriers (HMS Prince of Wales) is being made ready for duty. The other is in long-term maintenance (HMS Queen Elizabeth). Only one of the 6 Astute-class nuclear attack submarines is actually combat-ready. At least one of the 4 Vanguard-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines is constantly in maintenance. This picture clearly reveals how much the gap between the power on paper and the power on the ground has grown. However, this gap is not just a technical issue. It is a direct strategic vulnerability, because what is decisive in times of crisis is not the total numbers, but the force that can be used immediately. Whereas, during the period of exercises and training in 1998, when I also participated with the TCG Gaziantep frigate, of which I was the commander for 100 days in the Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Faslane regions, the Royal Navy had 17 nuclear submarines, 3 aircraft carriers, 15 destroyers, and 22 frigates, that is, 57 combatant elements. This size was already a minimum number for an island nation and at the same time a UK that possesses 15 overseas sovereign naval bases/territories. Today, Irish journalist Chay Bowes says that the number of Admirals in the Royal Navy has long since exceeded the number of combatant ships. On the other hand, aircraft carriers are the most striking example of this contradiction. The UK has two large and modern aircraft carriers in its possession. However, for today, that is, in the conjuncture where they are called to duty in Hormuz, only one of them is active, and there are not enough destroyers and frigates to protect it. In this case, the aircraft carrier ceases to be a power projection tool and becomes a potential target, which leads to the navy's most expensive platform generating strategic risk.

The Hormuz Trap

It is not a rational decision for the UK to lead the Hormuz mission by only upholding its past historical legacy. Operating in a geography with high threat density and narrow passages like Hormuz is not a military solution that can be explained only by the number of ships. In such regions, continuous logistical support, especially fuel, high ammunition stocks, and most importantly, strong, unconditional, and complete air superiority are required. For the UK to enter the region under today's conditions by relying on the US is equivalent to suicide. For example, Trump says, in his own words, that Iran used 101 missiles against the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier and that these attacks were successfully overcome, but when we look at the field, we see that the USS Lincoln had to retreat 500 miles after the attacks. The ballistic and cruise missiles, swarm UAVs, mines, mini-submarines, and fast attack elements in Iran's possession turn this environment from classic naval warfare into a multi-layered threat field. In this environment, although the escort mission appears in theory as protecting international trade, in practice, it means direct engagement. In a picture where even the US has put distance by pulling its aircraft carrier 500 miles back from the strait in this environment, the UK's stepping forward should be evaluated as a political reflex rather than a strategic reality. For this reason, the claim of entering Hormuz is more an indicator of a serious rupture between capability and intention than a security move. How did the UK, which experiences long delays even in preparing a single destroyer for Cyprus, fall into this situation?

If there is no logistics, there is no power

Naval warfare history reveals a clear truth: what is decisive at sea is sustainable power. A navy can show presence for a short time, but the issue is to be able to keep this power in the field uninterruptedly. This is exactly the fundamental problem the UK is experiencing today. The current structure of the Royal Navy is not suitable for long-term and high-tempo operations in a high-intensity conflict. The experiences they had in 2025 with the HMS Diamond destroyer against the Houthis, who do not have a navy, in Bab el-Mandeb clearly showed this. British warships operating in an intense engagement environment had to withdraw after reaching their ammunition limits in a short time.

One of the most critical elements of modern navies is the ability to generate force, that is, the power to replace. Ships require constant maintenance. Some can remain in the shipyard for months or even years. For this reason, extra platforms are needed to maintain the same mission. In the UK, this reserve capacity has largely disappeared. When one ship is in maintenance, there is no other ship to fill its place. This situation has become critical, especially in the destroyer and submarine fleet. In short, no navy can generate lasting power without logistical support, ammunition production power, and rapid maintenance and repair capability. The UK has lost this integrity today.

The Falklands War and Today

Comparing the 1982 Falklands War with Argentina to today clearly reveals the point the UK has reached. At that time, the UK was able to form a task force with 2 aircraft carriers, 8 destroyers, and 16 frigates. Today, at best, they can deploy 1 aircraft carrier, 2 destroyers, and 5 frigates. They have to cancel all other missions for the formation of this force. That is, if a crisis breaks out in the Falkland Islands today, they would have to send a warship, and even the Hormuz mission would have to be canceled. This picture clearly shows the gap between the claim of global power and current capabilities.

Shrinking Economy

The fundamental reason behind this incredible decline in the Royal Navy is the transformation of the British economy. The UK's shift toward a finance-centered model since the 1990s is the main breaking point of this process. After these years, the UK evolved from a classic industrial and naval power state into a finance-centered structure. The 1992 sterling crisis and George Soros's speculative move were one of the symbolic breaking points of this transformation. This event showed how open the British state's economic sovereignty had become to global capital movements. After this date, the UK economy turned toward a model based more on finance than production, and more on services than industry. While London became the center of global finance, the country's real capacity began to erode. After the 2008 global crisis, this erosion became permanent. Although the economy seemed to be growing, it was not deepening, productivity growth was weak, and long-term capacity building was neglected.

The economy, which moved away from production, provided growth in the short term but led to capacity loss in the long term. While London became the center of global finance, the industrial base weakened. On the other hand, the UK, which approved and followed the Zionist neocon military adventures of the US after 2001, allocated its military expenditures to the US's military proxy, that is, current expenditures, rather than developing its defense capabilities. This situation has had a direct impact on long-term defense industry and the navy. The link between the economy and military power has been broken. After the 2008 global financial crisis, the UK economy entered a spiral of low growth, weak productivity, and insufficient investment. Although the economy continued to grow, it could not produce depth. This situation limited the state's long-term investment capacity, defense expenditures were constantly under pressure during this process, and high-cost areas like the navy were the first places where this pressure was felt.

Break from the EU

The UK's departure from the EU with Brexit on January 31, 2020, right during the Covid pandemic, accelerated the economic decline. This rupture created permanent pressures on trade, investment, and productivity. The economy became more closed, investment flows weakened, and trade intensity fell. These developments shook the foundation of the global trade-centered economic model that the UK had maintained for centuries. The economic basis of the system established after 1815 and built on maritime trade began to erode. The weakening of trade and investment flows further reduced economic dynamism and created additional pressure on the already fragile structure. Thus, the UK's global trade-centered model took a hit, and the economic system entered a regime of slowing down. Brexit made these structural weaknesses more visible and more permanent. The OECD had warned even before the referendum that Brexit would be a major negative shock for the UK, and in the following years, the pressures on trade, investment, and productivity confirmed that the British economy had entered a regime of slowing down. In short, Brexit added an extra burden to an economy that was already experiencing productivity and investment problems. That is, rather than creating a crisis, it accelerated the existing erosion. Therefore, there is a chronic productivity and growth stagnation problem in the UK, and it continues.

While the squeeze in public finance, high tax and interest burdens, and pressure on public services directly affect expensive power elements like the navy, the fact that the economic model after Brexit has not fully settled and the frequently changing political leadership have weakened strategic consistency. Within this picture, although the UK still produces high influence through finance, insurance, law, diplomacy, and international networks, real economic dynamism and military capacity remain behind this influence. The resulting structure is a state that maintains its showcase power but whose fundamental capacity has eroded. The UK now appears as a country that has imperial reflexes but acts with the capacity of a medium-sized state.

Political Instability

The period after the Brexit vote was described as one of the largest political staff changes seen in the UK since the 1920s. After 2016, Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, Rishi Sunak, and from 2024, Keir Starmer served as Prime Minister. The change of 5 prime ministers in the last 10 years was not good for the navy. Such rapid leadership changes made it difficult to produce long-term industrial, infrastructure, energy, and defense strategies. Especially the market shock during the Liz Truss period showed that the UK could no longer benefit from unlimited financial trust credit as it used to. This situation weakened the state's capacity to produce long-term strategy. Whereas, areas like defense and naval power require long-term planning. When this continuity disappears, military capabilities erode.

Is the UK's Soft Power Enough?

The order the UK established after 1815 was based on a naval power that controlled maritime transport routes and ensured the security of global trade. After 1945, it largely transferred this role to the US, but maintained its influence by remaining within the system. Today, however, there is neither full dominance nor a strong implementation capability. For this reason, the UK is no longer the arbiter of maritime transport routes. However, the UK still appears to be an important actor in the global system. London continues to be an insurance and finance center, maritime law is shaped here, its influence continues in international institutions, especially the IMO, Lloyds, and UKMTO, and intelligence networks are actively working. In short, the UK still produces global influence in the field of soft power today, that is, through finance, insurance, law, and international institutions. However, this power is not supported by military capability. The resulting structure is a state that can write the rules but cannot implement them in the field. This situation increases the gap between perception and reality.

Therefore, the UK has become a country that has an imperial memory today but lives with the capacity of a medium-sized state. The current state of the Royal Navy is the most concrete indicator of this reality. Naval power is not independent of the economic foundation; when the economy weakens, the navy also weakens. The UK example is the clearest proof of this reality today.

In this framework, the mistake made in the Starmer Government's decision to send ships to Hormuz is very clear. The soft power in London, that is, the insurance reflex, is being confused with the reality of hard power, that is, naval warfare. However, what is decisive at sea is sustainable force, depth, and survival capability. The UK is winking at a responsibility far beyond its capability, inventory, and the requirements of the age today. This resembles a suicide where geopolitical arrogance and capability erosion combine, rather than a prudent security move. Entering Hormuz with the claim of protecting commercial passage without a real, permanent, controllable, and field-reflecting ceasefire and peace process between Iran and the US and Israel is taking a big risk. The end of such a step is either withdrawal or escalation. In a bottleneck like Hormuz, the sea does not forgive mistakes. Otherwise, the UK will return to the nightmare it experienced in Çanakkale 111 years ago.