From the 1956 Suez Crisis to the 2026 Hormuz Crisis; History repeating from Hungary to Taiwan

The year 1956 is one of the breaking points of modern geopolitics. The Suez Crisis, which began on July 19, 1956, when the US withdrew funding for the Aswan Dam in Egypt, turned into a full-blown crisis on July 26 when Egypt's revolutionary leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Britain and France were losing their interests in the canal. In reality, those who panicked were the representatives of finance capital, as the canal was the goose that laid the golden eggs.

ISRAEL: THE TRIGGERMAN OF THE 1956 SUEZ INTERVENTION

After Gamal Nasser became the president of Egypt in 1954, the British Navy withdrew from Egypt. However, it reserved the right to return in the event of a crisis and did not accept that it had completely lost control over the region. Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 was seen as a major threat to Britain, both in terms of energy supply lines and imperial prestige. Diplomacy failed during the August–October period of 1956, and on October 22–24, a secret amphibious attack plan on the canal zone was devised between Britain, France, and Israel in Sèvres, near Paris. Israel was not an auxiliary actor in the Suez intervention; it was the triggerman at the center of the plan. Knowing that Britain and France could not generate international legitimacy to attack Egypt directly, Israel would start the war by attacking the Sinai on October 29, 1956, and then Britain and France would intervene under the pretext of separating the combatants to take control of the Suez Canal. Academic studies and memoirs clearly reveal that Israel consciously assumed the role of the first aggressor in this process and provided the military start of the operation. Therefore, although the Suez Crisis appeared to be a tripartite war, it was in reality a pre-planned, coordinated intervention, and Israel was the key element of this plan. In other words, just as it is today, Israeli geopolitics was at the center of the process. On October 29, 1956, Israel entered the Sinai; on October 31, Britain and France began air strikes; and on November 5–6, landings were made at Port Said.

EISENHOWER'S REBELLION

However, US President Eisenhower strongly opposed this attack, which had been carried out without his knowledge. The Suez intervention was weakening the West in the Cold War balance and pushing newly independent countries toward the Soviet Union. Therefore, the operation had to be stopped immediately. Prime Minister Eden initially did not want to back down, believing the operation would succeed militarily. The US pressured the pound sterling by cutting off the flow of oil to Britain from the US. By blocking IMF loans, it cornered the Anthony Eden government financially. A ceasefire was hastily declared on November 6; Britain and France withdrew from the canal zone in December; and Israel was forced to leave the Sinai by March 1957. Thus, in just 8–11 days, the British Empire breathed its last. This was not a military collapse, but a financial one brought about by US pressure.

THE 1956 HUNGARIAN UPRISING AND SOVIET INTERVENTION

In the same timeframe, the anti-communist uprising that began in Hungary on October 23, 1956, turned into a strategic opportunity for the Soviets because the West was divided and preoccupied in Suez. During the Hungarian uprising, the country's prime minister was Imre Nagy. He implemented reforms, transitioned to a multi-party system, and announced that Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Upon this, one day before the Anglo-French amphibious operation at Port Said, on November 4, the Soviets entered Budapest with tens of thousands of soldiers and hundreds of tanks to regain control; Nagy was executed. The Soviets intervened in Budapest while the United Nations was concerned with the Suez crisis and the war started by Israel on October 29, and while a major amphibious assault operation was being prepared in the Mediterranean. Thus, the Hungarian issue was pushed to the background, and this situation led to the Soviet intervention being largely protected from international pressure. Ultimately, it was assessed that the states representing the "free world" would not have the right to criticize the Soviets for the intervention in Hungary while they were attacking Egypt alongside Israel. This was, in fact, the development that angered Eisenhower the most. Britain had the capacity to continue the operation militarily, but it was not in a position to carry it financially. As a country importing approximately 1.5 million barrels of oil per day, it had acted without securing its energy security and without US support. On January 9, 1957, British Prime Minister Eden resigned.

THE COLLAPSE OF BRITAIN

This collapse was not sudden, but gradual. In the 19th century, the pound sterling was at the center of global trade and the reserve system. However, from the beginning of the 20th century, the US surpassed Britain in production. Two world wars had placed London under a heavy debt burden. Despite this, in 1945, the British Royal Navy was one of the world's greatest powers. It was a global imperial navy with nearly 900,000 personnel, dozens of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, and hundreds of destroyers. However, it shrank rapidly due to post-war economic collapse and dependence on the US. Although the navy still looked large during the 1956 Suez Crisis, it had transformed into a structure with weakened strategic power that could no longer act independently. Britain agreed to withdraw from Suez with the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement and was forced to back down after the crisis due to US pressure. This process began the end of imperial naval power, and in 1971, they completely withdrew from "East of Suez," handing over their bases and facilities in the Persian Gulf to the US Navy. Thus, it lost its global maritime dominance.

TODAY IS ACTUALLY YESTERDAY: THE HORMUZ CRISIS

70 years later, a similar systemic fracture is re-emerging as of March 2026 with a crisis centered in Hormuz. As the fourth week of the Gulf War, which began with Israeli brinkmanship and US power, approaches, the Strait of Hormuz is effectively locked. By the 4th week of the war, the cost to the US has exceeded 30 billion dollars. Only a few tankers can pass through the strait, where normally about 140 ships pass daily. This line, which carries approximately 20% of world oil trade, has largely come to a standstill. Mutual energy production and distribution fields have come under fire. What is happening has directly triggered a physical supply and logistics crisis. A sharp rise in oil and natural gas prices is inevitable. Global effects are spreading rapidly. The increase in energy prices will directly affect fertilizer, agriculture, industry, and semiconductor (chip) production, and will trigger food security crises in a short time. Economic contraction and social tensions, especially in the Far East, may become inevitable. This process, which started in the Gulf, is more than a war; it is a fracture that disrupts the functioning of the global system. The fracture on the US energy front is even deeper. On March 15, 2026, the US decided to release 172 million barrels of oil from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve, dropping the reserve from 415 million barrels to approximately 243 million barrels. Since the US daily consumption is about 20 million barrels, this reserve can theoretically meet only about 12 days of consumption. In 2009, this reserve was 727 million barrels. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that the US is simultaneously waging war and experiencing budget crises (government shutdown). In a conjuncture where annual interest payments are approaching the 1 trillion dollar level with a debt exceeding 40 trillion dollars, Trump's request for an additional 200 billion dollars in defense from Congress on March 18 shows that this process is economically unsustainable. A structure that cannot even pass its own budget internally trying to increase power projection externally points to a deep institutional imbalance. This is no longer a simple political crisis; it is also an indicator that the US has turned into a divided and reactionary structure. On the other hand, China and Gulf countries are reducing their shares in US bonds. This situation shows that the dollar's role as a global reserve currency is eroding. This picture is a modern reflection of the process Britain experienced with the pound sterling.

THE RECEDING US NAVY

The true power of the US is the dollar and its navy. However, both are weakening today. Its military capacity on the ground is not enough to reverse the picture in Hormuz. While two aircraft carrier strike groups create a psychological effect, they cannot create a material effect. The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier group cannot approach the coasts due to Iran's intense missile and UAV threat. Problems never end on the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, which is kept off the coast of Saudi Arabia due to the Houthi risk in Bab el-Mandeb in the Red Sea. A fire on the ship that lasted 30 hours was hidden from the public. The ship is returning to Crete, where it came for investigation and repairs. In the Pacific, the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier is under maintenance, the USS Tripoli and the 31st MEU on board have left the region, and at least four destroyers have been diverted to other mission areas. For this reason, the number of US surface ships on continuous duty in the Pacific has fallen to critical levels. This picture clearly shows that the US, which as of 2026 has 292 ships (233 combatant) but only 104 ships (75 combatant) actively ready for war, cannot sustain power projection on two fronts simultaneously. The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit sent to the region consists of approximately 2,500 personnel and is far from producing deterrence against a country like Iran, which has a population of nearly 85 million and deep geographical depth. On the other hand, the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which departed from San Diego on March 20, 2026, will only reach the Gulf 3 weeks later. Even if both marine units were to combine, the military effect they would create would be extremely low; on the contrary, American casualties would be higher than estimates.

On the other hand, the fact that there has been no strong response to Washington's call to NATO and Asian allies to "send ships to the Gulf" to open Hormuz shows that this transformation has begun. At this point, the fundamental truth of international relations emerges once again: states do not have permanent friends, they have permanent interests. All these developments confirm on a global scale the warning Colin Powell gave for Iraq in 2002: "You break it, you own it." If you disrupt an order with brute force, you have to take responsibility for the chaos that ensues. The crisis currently unfolding in Hormuz shows that this principle now operates on a global scale.

WESTERN PACIFIC AND TAIWAN CRISIS POTENTIAL

The Hormuz crisis is hitting the Indo-Pacific area the hardest today. While energy importers like Australia, Japan, and South Korea take a heavy hit, exporters like Russia will benefit from high prices. The crisis provides Russia with a gain of 150 million dollars a day with the lifting of Trump sanctions. On the other hand, countries whose energy security is shaken will rapidly turn to new alliance searches.

The development that makes this picture even more critical is taking place on the Korean Peninsula. At a time when the US is shifting THAAD and Patriot elements from South Korea to the Middle East, North Korea has conducted new ballistic missile tests in the last week. Furthermore, it is assessed that cruise missiles fired from its newly commissioned destroyer-class platforms may have the capacity to carry nuclear warheads. These developments show that the US missile defense umbrella in the Pacific is weakening and the regional deterrence architecture has become fragile. According to a report published in the Financial Times on March 21, 2026, it is warned that the intensive use of Tomahawk cruise missiles and air defense interceptors (Patriot, SM-series) in West Asian operations is also necessary to defend Taiwan and attack Chinese forces at the beginning of a conflict, and that the US production capacity is limited and ammunition replenishment could take months or years.

In conclusion, China's pressure on Taiwan draws strength not only from its own capacity but also from the US's loss of attention and resources. The US has entered a search for balance on different fronts simultaneously. While the Trump administration tries to produce a success story via Cuba, China is constantly increasing its military pressure around Taiwan. In the second week of March 2026, more than 40 warplanes and more than 10 naval elements operated around Taiwan in just 24 hours. This is not a temporary exercise, but a permanent containment doctrine. When the Soviets intervened in Hungary in 1956, the West could not respond. The model China is applying around Taiwan today could lead to a similar result. However, the difference this time is greater. China is not only a military power but also a system-building actor in the fields of production, trade, and finance. As of 2025, having the world's largest navy numerically and its weight in global production accelerates this transformation. In 1956, the US was the rising hegemon, Britain was the collapsing power, and the Soviets were the regional hard power. In 2026, China is the rising hegemon candidate, the US is the struggling incumbent hegemon, and Taiwan is in the position of the new Hungary. However, this time hegemony will not be handed over within the family. The Suez Crisis brought an end to Britain. The Hormuz Crisis could create a similar fracture for the US. Because this time, there is a power ready to take over the system not only militarily but also economically and financially. In 1956, the US was ready; today, China is ready. Therefore, Suez was an end, while Hormuz could be the beginning of a new era.

In conclusion, the world is passing through a new threshold. Energy, security, transport corridors, and economic balances are breaking simultaneously. Israel and the US stand out as the initiators of this process. It is no longer possible to talk about the IMEC Economic Corridor, the Abraham Accords, or the Peace Committee for Gaza—the dreams of the US, India, and Israel—for a very long time. Finance capital flees from uncontrolled war. The region will rapidly move away from investment and prosperity. Stopping the war is not possible only with Iran's resistance. What is decisive is the pressure that rational states will exert on the US and Israel. Indeed, the cautious stance of Europe, Japan, and South Korea, and their refusal of Trump's request for warships, show that this crisis is struggling to generate global legitimacy. If the process is not reined in, this period will go down in history not as a long-lasting regional war, but as a chain of global economic and social upheavals. The Trump administration stopping the escalation is no longer a choice, but a necessity for global stability. Israel, with a population of 9 million, has triggered a process that will affect the fate of 8 billion people by using a power like the US. The misfortune is the scarcity of rational people in the US who are aware of this situation. "Quem deus vult perdere, dementat prius." (Those whom God wishes to destroy, He first makes mad.)

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TURKEY

In the context of this war, which has entered its fourth week, it is possible to say this clearly: Turkey is a state that managed to remain actively neutral in the Second World War, a catastrophe far greater than the crisis it faces today. At the foundation of this success lies the strategic leverage provided by the Montreux Convention, the deterrent psychological effect created by the War of Independence, and the steel-like binding force of social solidarity and state wisdom that continued even after the passing of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. These three elements are the most important insurance policies that keep Turkey out of war.

Today, we are at a similar historical threshold. However, the current crisis carries the risk of uncontrolled escalation and regional collapse beyond classic inter-state balances. Therefore, Turkey's most vital choice must be active neutrality. Turkey should not be a part of the border-changing, regime-toppling, and chaos-producing policies imposed by the US-Israel axis in the region.

The most critical issue for Turkey is the integrity of Iran. The fragmentation of Iran or its being dragged into a civil war means not only the collapse of a neighboring country but also a risk of chain instability and fragmentation in Turkey's southeast. Therefore, Turkey's primary strategic goal should be to ensure that Iran emerges from this crisis by preserving its state integrity.

In this framework, Turkey should maintain balanced relations with Iran; conduct active diplomacy to prevent Gulf countries from being dragged into a war with Iran under US pressure; and try to convince Iran that horizontal escalation will set the region on fire.

In the energy dimension, Turkey is relatively advantageous. Access to Russian, Azerbaijani, and Turkmen resources limits dependence on Hormuz. However, this advantage should not create complacency. Turkey should prepare its people for the effects of this crisis in terms of energy supply security and food security, implement austerity measures, and exercise discipline in public spending. Just as the bill for the economic crisis experienced during the Covid period was reflected in the markets months later, the restrictions caused by the disruption of the supply chain that the war will create in oil, natural gas, fertilizer, and other side areas will be reflected in the public's pocket with the same intensity. News reports have already appeared in the media that some states have reorganized speed limits on roads to reduce gasoline consumption. Let alone Turkey, even in a giant like the US that produces its own oil, the gallon of gasoline had increased by 1 dollar in 3 weeks while these lines were being written, and it continues to rise.

In the military and security dimension, the most critical principle is this: Turkey must not be drawn into this war under any circumstances. Whether through false flag operations, provocations, or allied pressure, Turkey must not become a party to the war. In this context, Turkey's national interests must be kept far ahead of NATO interests. As Kissinger once said, "Alliance treaties are not suicide pacts." The Iran crisis has once again revealed that NATO membership creates strategic risks for Turkey. In this context: The process of withdrawing American nuclear weapons at Incirlik from Turkey at the end of the war should be initiated, and a request should be made for the transfer of the Kürecik radar from Turkey to another NATO state.

Cool-headedness should be maintained against possible provocations by Greece in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, but military readiness should be kept at the highest level; a defense pact should be signed rapidly with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and the military presence on the island should be strengthened in a permanent and deterrent manner; power projection should be made visible on the ground by deploying a strong naval task group and air elements to the Eastern Mediterranean. In this framework, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) patrols should be initiated from the air and surface against Israeli and American submarines that could be positioned for false flag operations in the territorial waters of the TRNC and Turkey.

The current picture regarding air defense is also unacceptable. Turkey's dependence on American Patriot systems to protect its own airspace contradicts the progress in the defense industry. Therefore, priority should be given to HİSAR and SİPER systems to rapidly establish a layered air defense network. Iran's missile technology showed that THAAD and Patriot systems are insufficient in engagements outside the atmosphere against new-generation hypersonic/ballistic missiles. Therefore, these facts should be taken into account while developing the SİPER-3 series missiles. The S-400 system, which is the most valuable and longest-range air defense missile system we have, should not be used for this war and should be saved for a large-scale war in which Turkey will be a combatant. Because if this system is used now, the US and Israel could disable it with a false flag operation. One must act carefully in this regard.

In the field of command and control, serious measures should be taken in parallel with the lessons learned from the war. In this war, Iran has survived not because it was strong in the first strike, but because it was not managed from a single center. Distributed command, local initiative, and redundant personnel ensured that the war continued even if the center was hit. Turkey has a centralized structure. This provides efficiency, speed, and control in normal times, but carries the risk of creating serious shocks in the decision-making, communication, and coordination chain if it collapses in a high-intensity first strike. The problem is to slow down and become paralyzed at the first moment. Therefore, Turkey's most critical need is to develop a structure for simultaneous resistance and survival while maintaining its conventional power. Critical infrastructure, energy, transport, and communication systems should be made redundant and fragmented. The command-control structure should not remain dependent on a single center, and local elements should be empowered to use initiative without waiting for orders in a blitzkrieg-type war.

Another area of vulnerability is that we have not been able to nationalize in the digital field, such as phones, Wi-Fi, surveillance camera circuits, etc., that are dependent on the US and Israel. Those who criticized Aselsan when it produced our first mobile phones must surely understand the mistake they made now. National solutions must be produced rapidly for digital structures dependent on the West. Our engineers, who have caught up with the world in SİHA and UAV technologies, must also break new ground in this field. Otherwise, rival states will have the freedom to track every person at every level with the precision of a hitman by using advanced artificial intelligence programs on these networks.

Finally, Turkey must manage this crisis not only with a defensive reflex but with strategic wisdom. At a time when the US is experiencing a loss of control and Israel is expanding the regional fire, what Turkey needs to do is not to take sides, but to establish balance.

In this context, Turkey should derive the power of its weight from international law and standing by the oppressed. It was a major mistake for Turkey to condemn Iran along with other proxy Arab states instead of condemning Israel and the US after the Arab and Islamic countries' ministerial meeting held in Saudi Arabia on March 18. Turkey should not be in a position that supports the American military presence in these countries and the use of this presence in an attack on Iran. For although these countries said at the beginning of the war that their airspace and bases were closed, the facts are not so. It has been watched live in open sources that the military targets hit at these bases belong to the US. In this context, resistance must now be shown to the statements of the US Ambassador to Ankara against Turkey's constitutional integrity and national interests. Although this person is someone whose name frequently appears in the Epstein files, he still continues his duty and can recklessly make statements regarding the establishment of a puppet Kurdistan in Israel and our region. Why is warning this person being postponed? Where does he get his power from? The public has the right to know this.

It should not be forgotten that we have reached these days by supporting the overthrow of the Assad regime, which established a resistance front with Iran—the opponent of Israel—in Syria, through the remnants of the terrorist organization founded by Al-Qaeda, i.e., the US, in Iraq. More recently, the US and Israel have begun to pressure the Colani Government to be used against Hezbollah, alongside Israel, which has displaced 1 million people and massacred hundreds in Lebanon in the last 3 weeks. Leaving aside the use of Syrian airspace by Israeli planes in the attack on Iran, time will show how long Colani can withstand this new development.

Turkey, which managed to stay out of a catastrophe in the Second World War in which 80 million people lost their lives, must show the same strategic patience in a much more complex but equally dangerous process today.