From the Dardanelles to the Strait of Hormuz: From the brotherhood of mines and barrels to the brotherhood of UCAVs and missiles, 111 years apart

Naval warfare history is often told through the success stories of great navies that dominate the seas. The British Royal Navy in the 19th century and the US Navy in the second half of the 20th century have been at the center of this narrative. These navies have controlled global trade routes, projected military power, and played a decisive role in the international system by establishing maritime dominance. The concept of maritime dominance refers to a state's ability to use the seas freely for military and commercial purposes while denying that same freedom to its rivals. For this reason, for many years, naval power has been defined by large-tonnage warships, aircraft carriers, dreadnoughts, cruisers, and submarines.

Anti-Access and Area Denial. However, a different reality emerges when looking closely at the history of naval warfare. Throughout history, it has been extremely rare for weaker powers to face strong navies in open-sea battles and emerge victorious. Yet, sometimes weak navies have managed to defeat strong ones. Weaker states have developed different strategies to try and stop powerful navies. The most important of these strategies is the A2/AD (Anti-Access / Area Denial) doctrine. The primary goal of this doctrine is not to control the sea, but to prevent the enemy from using it. Thus, even powerful navies can face serious risks in narrow waters and regions close to the coast.

Anti-Access (A2) refers to strategies and weapon systems aimed at preventing an enemy from approaching or entering an operational area. This approach relies more on long-range systems. The goal is to deter the enemy or put them at serious risk before they even reach the region. Hypersonic missiles, ballistic missiles, long-range cruise missiles, long-range air defense systems, submarines, long-range bombers, and electronic or cyber attacks can be considered in this category.

Area Denial is a defensive layer aimed at preventing enemy forces from moving comfortably within a given area, even if they have already entered it. This approach relies more on medium- and short-range systems. The goal is to make it difficult for the enemy to conduct operations or to make the cost of doing so very high by keeping them under constant threat within the region. Naval mines, coastal anti-ship missile batteries, kamikaze UCAVs, mini-submarines, coastal artillery, short-range air defense systems, and swarm attack boats can be used in this context.

Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, who served as the commander of the Soviet Navy for 29 years during the Cold War, emphasized that modern naval power does not consist solely of surface ships. According to Gorshkov, when shore-launched missiles, naval aviation, and submarines are used together, enemy fleets can be rendered unable to approach the coast. Today, many countries are building layered defense architectures by using these two approaches together. China's system in the South China Sea, Russia's defense architecture in Kaliningrad and Crimea, and Iran's defense arrangement around the Strait of Hormuz can be counted among the typical examples of this doctrine.

The Best Example from History: March 18, 1915. Anti-Access and Area Denial is not a new concept based on modern technology. The great Turkish Naval Victory that took place in the Dardanelles 111 years ago is one of its most striking examples. During the First World War, the Turks, who were economically collapsed, had a weak navy, and were militarily backward, won a great victory against the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force of the Royal Navy—the most powerful navy in the world at the time—by using mines, coastal artillery, and the advantages of geography. This struggle was not only a military success but also a triumph of strategic thinking. For this reason, the Dardanelles naval battle is considered one of the strongest historical examples of the A2/AD doctrine. The enemy armada's access to the Black Sea by passing through the Strait was blocked by the area denial achieved at the entrance of the Strait. This event is not just the result of a battle; it is also a major turning point that affected the course of the world war and international political balances. Even though 111 years have passed, the lessons learned from the Dardanelles are still of great importance for modern naval strategy.

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND OF THE DARDANELLES NAVAL VICTORY

When the First World War began, the British Royal Navy was the most powerful navy in the world. Britain was a great maritime empire on which the sun never set, controlling global trade routes and possessing naval bases all over the world. The power of its navy represented not only military but also economic, financial, and political superiority. The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, was in a serious process of decline during this period. As a result of the Balkan Wars, it had lost most of its territories in Europe. The economic structure had collapsed, industry was undeveloped, and the state's military power had weakened. As a result of Abdul Hamid II neglecting the navy for 33 years, the navy, whose institutional culture and technical effectiveness had disappeared, could not compete with the rival's modern warships. The real goal of the war was to push back Germany, which was a rival to Britain in every field, to remove it from the sea, and to prevent its access to oil. From 1911 onwards, the Royal Navy had switched from coal to oil, and the Ottoman geography with its rich resources had now turned into an open prey. The Germans also saw the same situation and approached the Ottomans. The Berlin-Baghdad railway had turned into a very important force multiplier, much like today's logistics corridors. However, despite this alliance, Britain, France, and Russia thought that the Ottoman Empire would collapse in a short time.

By 1915, the war, which had started 8 months earlier, had turned into trench warfare on the Western Front, and the war had reached a stalemate. Russia was suffering heavy losses on the Eastern Front. Britain and France thought of opening a new strategic front to overcome this stalemate. This front would be the Dardanelles. If the allied navy could pass through the strait and capture Istanbul, the Ottoman Empire could be knocked out of the war and a direct connection could be established with Russia. This could change the strategic balances of the war. However, allied planning seriously underestimated the Ottoman defense.

THE PLAN TO FORCE THE STRAIT

One of the strongest advocates of the idea of attacking the Dardanelles was British First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill. According to Churchill, the Ottoman Empire was the weakest link in the war and could be forced to surrender in a short time with a powerful naval attack. According to him, the firepower of modern warships could destroy Ottoman coastal defenses in a short time. The first phase of the plan was to silence the batteries at the entrance of the strait with bombardment. Then, minesweepers would step in and clear the mines in the strait. After the mines were cleared, the allied navy would pass through the narrow strait, enter the Sea of Marmara, and threaten Istanbul. This plan looked strong in theory. However, the most critical problem was clearing the mines. Because the narrow structure of the strait and its strong currents made mine-clearing operations extremely difficult. Despite this, the allies prepared a large fleet. Starting from February 5, 1915, 105 ships were gathered in Thessaloniki and Lemnos/Mudros. Imperialism would attack the heart of Anatolia and the gates of Istanbul with all its might. The defense of the strait would be provided jointly by the Ottoman mine lines without a navy and coastal artillery batteries. According to sensible staff officers and past evaluations, passing through the Narrow Strait between Kepez and Nara was almost impossible. However, Churchill and his circle had made their situation assessment based on the effectiveness of the Ottoman army and navy in the Balkan War. The Allied Navy underestimated the Turkish defense. According to the plan, coastal batteries would be silenced by the great firepower of the invasion fleet's battleships, the barrels of cruisers and destroyers would silence the mobile light guns and howitzers that posed the greatest threat to minesweepers, thus sea control would be achieved, minesweepers would enter the field, and mines would be swept. Ultimately, the goal was to open an 800-meter-wide passage channel in the narrow strait between Kilitbahir and Çimenlik Point and to let the allied navy into the Marmara. Expeditionary Forces Commander Admiral Carden launched the first major attack on February 19. However, it was very difficult for them to sweep the mines. Turkish mobile guns did not allow the minesweepers to work, and the civilian personnel of the minesweepers that were damaged and sunk were fleeing their duties. First Lord of the Admiralty Churchill was increasing his pressure on Allied Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Sackville Carden. Carden, on the other hand, was confident. In a telegram he sent to Churchill on March 2, 1915, he said, "We will be in Istanbul on March 20." However, he could not withstand the pressure and was relieved of his duty on March 17, and Admiral De Robeck replaced him.

TURKISH DEFENSE SYSTEM

The Turkish defense was based on an integrated defense system where mines and coastal artillery were used together. Between November 3, 1914, and March 7, 1915, 10 lines of mines perpendicular to the coast with 377 mines had been established in the strait. However, the real surprise was hidden in the 26 mines in the 11th line, which were laid parallel to the coast in Erenköy Bay by the Nusret ship on March 8. There were 230 guns of various calibers in the strait's artillery batteries. The firing range of the best ones was around 7-8 km. Against the 18 battleships and 270 barrels of the allied fleet, only 82 of the Turkish guns in 14 fixed batteries in Anatolia and Rumelia were capable of responding to the invasion fleet's guns. Ammunition had been reduced by half. Every opportunity, including German aid, was being used, and batteries, mines, and torpedoes were being prepared for the great showdown.

Despite more than 10 heavy bombardments and mine-sweeping attempts made to the strait after February 15, the British and French could not sweep the mines and could not pass 10 miles beyond the strait. The mine-sweeping operation they started on February 25 was a complete disaster. The number of mines they could sweep did not reach 15 out of 403 mines. The civilian fishermen on the sweepers they had converted from fishing boats (trawlers) had rebelled shortly after. They found volunteer naval personnel to replace them. They were facing an extremely difficult picture. 21 British and 14 French minesweepers could not approach the mine lines under the protection of Turkish artillery. Every attempt resulted in loss of life and property.

THE MARCH 18 DISASTER

On the morning of March 18, 1915, the allied navy launched a ruthless attack with 18 large ships. However, in the afternoon, everything changed in an instant. The French battleship Bouvet hit Nusret's mines and sank within minutes. Then, the battleships HMS Irresistible and HMS Ocean hit mines and sank, respectively. In addition, 3 warships were heavily damaged. Admiral De Robeck gave the order to retreat in shame on the evening of March 18. They could return to Lemnos/Mudros Port with only 12 ships from the strait they had entered with 18 proud warships. The liberal Asquith government, where Churchill, the architect of the Gallipoli Campaign, was the First Lord of the Admiralty, had to resign 2 months after the March 18 defeat on May 25, 1915, and was forced into a coalition with the conservative party. When the Dardanelles could not be passed by sea, it was decided to invade by land, and this adventure also ended in defeat. In the 9 months between April 25, 1915, and January 6, 1916, approximately 58,000 Commonwealth soldiers, including 29,000 British and Irish and 11,000 Australian and New Zealander soldiers, lost their lives in the land campaign on the Gallipoli peninsula. This disaster also caused the fall of the government led by Asquith, and the conservatives came to power under the Prime Ministry of Lloyd George. Churchill had returned to the army as a battalion commander with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. But the worst was the state of the British treasury. They had borrowed extraordinary amounts from American bankers. The empire on which the sun never set had almost reached a point where it could not pay the soldiers' salaries. With the effect of the Irish civil war, the pound had lost 67% of its value in the period after the Gallipoli disaster. As a result, this defeat in the Dardanelles changed the course of the war. Aid could not reach Russia, and the communist revolution, the consequences of which continue to this day, took place in Russia. Instead of Russia, which left the war, the USA entered the war in 1917. 15 years after the war, Churchill gave the following statement to a French magazine (la Revue de Paris, August 1, 1930), attributing the great rout to Nusret's 26 mines:

''...These 20 iron pots, secretly laid by the Nusret ship, were intended to achieve more perfect and more definitive results than all other efforts for the continuation of the war and the future of the world. This obstacle created a series of psychological confusions that stopped the Dardanelles operation, which had been successfully started by the British. It is this obstacle alone that prevented the Dardanelles from being passed, and it is again this obstacle that saved Turkey from a defeat and prolonged the war. Because of this, victorious Europe, as well as the defeated, was shaken. The 6-7 million people whose bones cover the lands of France, Belgium, Poland, Galicia, the Balkans, Palestine, Syria, and Northern Italy did not perish by the bullets and shells of their enemies, but because of 20 iron pots stretched on wire ropes to which they were attached by their weights under the strong current of the Dardanelles on the morning of March 18."

SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE DARDANELLES AND HORMUZ

Whatever the imperial naval power represented by Britain and France in the Dardanelles in 1915 was, the imperial power based on military-technological superiority represented by the USA and Israel on the Iranian front today is the same. 111 years may have passed; platforms, sensors, destructive power, and ranges may have changed. But there is one truth that has not changed in essence. The imperial power, relying on its own brute force superiority, wants to enter a narrow geography and impose its will. The state on the defensive knows that it cannot defeat its rival on the open sea; instead, it targets passages, straits, approach directions, ports, supply points, and the psychological threshold. In the Dardanelles, this was called mines and coastal artillery. In the model Iran is applying today, this is called UCAVs and ballistic missiles.

In the Dardanelles, the Ottoman navy was not strong; but it succeeded in combining the geography of the strait, the current, the mine lines, and coastal fire within a defense architecture. The superior tonnage, superior armor, and superior number of barrels of the allied navy lost their meaning in the face of this defense arrangement in a narrow geography. Today, Iran also knows that it cannot achieve results by engaging in an open-sea battle with the US Navy. In fact, in the first 5 days of the war, 40 surface ships belonging to its navy, excluding submarines, were sunk. For this reason, it is acting according to the anti-access and area denial doctrine, not classical sea control. Iran's goal is not to destroy the American navy in its entirety. The goal is to make the Gulf and the approach waters of the Strait of Hormuz an unsafe operational area. A few successful hits, a few damaged bases, a few hit tankers, and a few closed energy facilities have been enough for this purpose.

The most striking similarity here is that the power of the attacking side and the geography and patience of the defending side become decisive. In the Dardanelles, the British and French saw the strait as a "firepower problem." They thought that if they fired enough, they would silence the batteries, clear the mines, and reach the front of Istanbul. Today, the USA and Israel also see the Iranian front largely as a "target destruction problem" using air power. They assume that as they hit missile depots, launchers, naval elements, radars, bases, and energy infrastructure, Iran's resistance will collapse. However, the goal here is to shatter the enemy's freedom of operation and sense of security. Iran is doing exactly that. Iran is trying to turn the war into a model of attrition by maintaining missile and drone pressure on Gulf energy centers, US bases, and regional logistics nodes. Today, nearly 3,000 ships are waiting in the Persian Gulf. The real energy that restricts traffic in Hormuz, forces tankers to wait, and shakes the energy market is the threat of Iran's area denial weapons, namely UCAVs and Ballistic/Hypersonic missiles. To this, we can add mines and submarines if Iran lays mines in the near future.

Another major similarity is seen in the selection of the center of gravity. In the Dardanelles, the goal of the Ottoman defense was not to search for and destroy the enemy fleet on the open sea, as it did not have an effective navy. The goal was to punish the fleet trying to pass through the strait in a narrow area, in a state of restricted maneuverability. Today, Iran is not settling scores with the US global naval power in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific either. Iran is reflecting the war to its own coasts, straits, energy terminals, Gulf bases, and logistics veins. Thus, it is turning the US global superiority into local vulnerability.

In the Dardanelles, one of the weakest links of the allies was the inability to sustain mine-sweeping activities, the defense becoming more expensive than expected, and the decrease in the tempo of operations. Today, a similar problem for the USA and its allies is seen in the need for air defense missiles, ship deployment, base security, and ammunition supply. The pressure on missile stocks and the cost of protecting elements deployed in the Gulf are increasing day by day. So much so that Patriot and THAAD batteries in South Korea are being moved to the Gulf. The essence of the A2/AD doctrine is already this. Not to defeat the attacking side at once, but to trap it in an expensive, exhausting, and politically controversial equation.

INCREASING THE RISK UNRESTRAINEDLY

111 years ago, with the defeat of March 18, proud Britain understood that the strait could not be passed by forcing it from the sea. That is why the land invasion operation began on April 25. Similarly, technically, the US Navy's ability to enter the Gulf has not disappeared. Today, the USA can also start a land invasion operation by risking heavy casualties. However, the fact that the Iranian side of the strait is extremely rugged and mountainous turns this operation into a very high-risk operational area for the USA. Let alone the land operation, despite Trump's declaration that our navy will escort the merchant ships inside, American Admirals have stated that this task cannot be performed. Furthermore, US maritime and trade authorities have advised US-linked merchant ships to sail at a certain distance from American naval ships. In other words, the problem is not whether the navy "can enter or cannot enter." When it enters, can it sustain this safely, sustainably, and by managing costs? Iran's strategy produces results similar to what happened in the Dardanelles 111 years ago right here.

In the Dardanelles, mines were not enough on their own; what made them effective was that coastal artillery prevented mine-sweeping. In other words, the issue was not the sum of the weapons, but their joint effect. Today, Iran's real success is not in a single system, but in the brotherhood between systems. While UCAVs serve the function of surveillance, harassment, creating saturation, and tiring the defense, ballistic missiles create impact with high speed and heavy destruction.

Therefore, it would be incomplete to see the model Iran is applying only as "retaliation" in the classical sense. There is a more systematic strategic mind here. Iran, just like the Ottomans did in the Dardanelles, is inviting its powerful rival not to the field where it is superior, but to the threshold where it is weak. That threshold today is Hormuz, Gulf bases, energy export lines, tanker insurance, port entries and exits, and air defense stocks. The success of the defense here lies in producing a deterrent cost rather than a direct victory. In the Dardanelles, the goal was not to destroy the Royal Navy; it was not to let it pass through the strait. Iran's goal is also not to destroy the US Navy; it is to stop the Gulf from being a safe American lake. The current picture shows that this has been largely achieved. The disruption of Hormuz traffic, the waiting of hundreds of ships, attacks on energy infrastructure, and damage to regional bases are signs of this.

Conclusion

Our March 18, 1915, Dardanelles naval victory is one of the strongest examples of the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) doctrine. A weak state was able to stop the world's most powerful navy with the right defense system. The greatest weakness of imperialism is not only its arrogance but also its mistaking its technological superiority for strategic superiority. On March 18, 1915, this delusion collapsed in the face of the brotherhood of mines and barrels. In the 2026 Gulf war, the same delusion is being tested again in the face of the brotherhood of UCAVs and ballistic missiles. Yesterday, the aggressive British-French joint navy could not pass through the Dardanelles. Today, the Persian Gulf has also ceased to be an absolutely safe inland sea for aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. History reminds us once again. In narrow geography, under determined defense, and in the face of a joint fire arrangement, brute force is not always decisive. Sometimes what changes history is not the size of the largest navy; it is the defense architecture established in the right place at the right time. Trump recently decided to send the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, which carries 2,500 marines stationed in Japan, to the Gulf. If history repeats itself with a 111-year interval and this incoming force is landed near the Strait, we can say in advance that the vast majority of the marines could be destroyed. We recommend that US military planners read the memoirs of Churchill, who was the First Lord of the Admiralty during the First World War. (6-volume "World in Crisis")