In the shadow of Israel, the Greek Defense Minister knows no bounds in his threats

Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias delivered a speech at the 3rd International Maritime Security Conference held in Athens. Before delving into the details and evaluation of the speech, let us mention the event itself. The conference series, hosted by the Eugenides Foundation, is not merely an academic event; it stands out as a concrete reflection of Greece's effort to institutionalize its maritime geopolitics, maritime security, and multi-domain warfare approach.

Eugenides Foundation

The foundation was established in 1956 by the Greek shipowner and philanthropist Eugenios Eugenidis to contribute to maritime education, but it has recently become a center for geopolitical and maritime security discussions. The latest conference, held under the main theme of “Maritime security in an era of geopolitical, geoeconomic, and technological disruptions,” serves as a platform where a system-based and multi-layered security architecture that goes beyond the classical understanding of sea power is discussed.

The panels held at the conference focused on the security of global maritime trade, critical straits (Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb), AI-supported warfare systems, technological transformation in the maritime domain, and gray zone conflicts. These topics demonstrate that the maritime perspective of Greece—which operates the world's largest tonnage merchant fleet (in terms of ship ownership and flag registry)—is not limited to the Aegean, but covers a wide spectrum from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean, and from the Eastern Mediterranean to global trade routes.

The organizational structure of the event is noteworthy. It includes the state, academia, the private sector, and think tanks, as well as shipowners, port operators, and logistics actors. The conference presents a hybrid model that brings them all together on the same ground, as if in preparation for a wartime period. At the international level, the participation of figures from circles such as the American Stratfor (Shadow CIA) and the Mackinder Forum shows that the conference is based on a thought network integrated not only with national but also with Western (+Israeli) security architecture.

Dendias's Speech

The most remarkable speech of the conference was delivered by Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias. Dendias's speech is a clear declaration of the transformation taking place in Greek defense doctrine. In his speech, which pushed the boundaries of both Greek national power and the guidance of universal logic and knowledge, Dendias both gave striking messages regarding Turkey and explained the plans for the future of Greek sea power.

We Will Attack From Everywhere, With Every Weapon

Referring to the Turks, Dendias said, “In the future, a potential aggressor will have to know that we will be able to respond not only from the Aegean, but from the Eastern Mediterranean and everywhere we deem necessary, with a large number of strategic missiles from protected platforms.” Regarding the future force structure and strategy, he added: “Of course, we will protect the Aegean. And we will protect it much better than we have until today. But we will do this in a much more complex way. We will do this with missiles. We will do this with unmanned maritime vehicles. We will do this with small platforms operating on the surface. We will do this with unmanned systems that will operate underwater. Thus, we will ensure the security of the Aegean much more economically than in the past. We will grant our large platforms freedom of movement and deterrence... Within the framework of Agenda 2030, we have launched an initiative we call 'Achilles' Shield.' This system consists of five layers: Sea, Land, Air, Cyberspace, Space...”

This approach put forward by Nikos Dendias describes a transformation that captures the spirit of the age at first glance. Distributed structures, low-cost strike elements, unmanned systems, and network-centric warfare... However, the issue is not to produce fancy concepts and doctrines, but to make them sustainable. Multi-layered and technology-intensive models like “Achilles' Shield” look perfect on paper, but war itself is not a technology showcase; it is a durability test. The real determinants of such a structure are blood and iron. The manpower ready for war feeds the blood, while continuity, durability, production power, and the industrial and financial infrastructure supporting them feed the iron. Considering Greece's current economic capacity, its dependence on foreign countries in the defense industry, and its very limited production capability, how the system imagined and conceptualized will be maintained in a long-term conflict is a serious question mark. What will replace the missile stocks when they are exhausted? How will the sensor-network architecture survive under electronic jamming and the kinetic attacks of suicide UAVs? How will satellite-supported systems be operated without interruption in times of crisis and war? These are not theoretical questions; they are questions that directly determine the fate of war. Therefore, although the model drawn by Dendias points to a technologically correct direction, it carries the risk of producing a fragile dependency rather than a decisive superiority on the field, unless the production, logistics, and economic sustainability behind it are ensured.

Deterring Turkey

In his speech, Dendias says: “The only thing we need to do is to be strong enough to deter any threat that may come from our neighbor. Greece must have a 360-degree perspective. 220-230 degrees of this 360 degrees look at the sea. Therefore, how we act in the maritime environment is of vital importance to us... We will grant our large platforms freedom of movement and deterrence...” Expressing the scenario they would face if they created a fait accompli against Turkey in the Aegean, he adds: “Because the scenario we have faced so far was this: Someone comes and occupies one of our small islands. Then the question is put before Greece: What will we do? Shall we declare total war? Shall we enter Eastern Thrace? Or shall we organize an extremely difficult operation to take it back?”

The real problem here is that the concept of “deterrence” is misplaced. Greece's goal should not be to deter Turkey. Because for Turkey, some topics are not ordinary competition, but a matter of direct vital interest. Initiatives such as the unilateral declaration of 12 miles, the creation of a de facto fait accompli on our continental shelf in the Aegean or Eastern Mediterranean, or the imposition of the Seville map on the field are not seen by Turkey only as moves that disrupt the status quo; in such a case, the issue moves out of the perspective of deterrence and escalation and is promoted to a vital priority area for Turkey. Turkey reserves the right to intervene against such steps. This uses the right to self-defense, which is clearly defined in international law, in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In short, if the Greek deterrence narrative that starts the crisis is established, but Turkey sees this as a vital struggle, the equation changes completely. In short, trying to “deter” Turkey creates the exact opposite effect when miscalculated. Turkey does not take a step back, especially on issues that directly concern the Blue Homeland, such as maritime jurisdiction areas and the TRNC. These areas are not a matter of bargaining for Ankara, but a matter of right. Therefore, every maximalist step taken here increases tension instead of producing deterrence. Especially if it is acted upon by the pushing of external actors—France, Israel—this becomes even more risky. Because history has shown Greece many times that it is not always guaranteed who will stand by whom and for how long in times of crisis.

Greek-Israeli Alliance

When we read Dendias's speech from a broader perspective, it is seen that the recent outbursts by Greek politicians are not a coincidence in parallel with the developing relations with Israel. Throughout its history, Greece has always acted in the shadow of great powers. In this way, it constantly expanded its borders when Turkey was weak, and when Turkey became strong, it turned to targets it did not deserve at sea by using the great powers against Turkey this time. Today, this goal, together with the GCA, is to force Turkey to accept the Seville map and to end the TRNC and, therefore, the Turkish military presence on the island. After capturing these goals, there is no doubt that new goals will follow. It is very interesting that Greece and Israel are statelets with the same characteristics. Both have Great Ideals (Megali Idea) in their own right. One engraves Byzantium, the other the Promised Land, into minds from infancy. Both act essentially with the reflex of a religious state. While the Greek Constitution clearly decrees that the religion of the state is Orthodox Christianity, Israel has rapidly moved away from its secular character, especially in the last 20 years, and has evolved into a society shaped by religious, fascist, and eschatological goals. In this process, the population of the secular (hiloni) segment in Israel, most of whom are technocrats, is decreasing, and a significant part of the middle class—including seculars—is leaving the country. The fact that Greece did not react to the intervention of Israeli warships against the Sumud flotilla, which was taking aid to Palestine within its own search and rescue zone on May 1, 2026, and was almost in cooperation, is actually an expression that both states are now acting together in every field. The fact that the Zionist/Evangelist front in the US has become inseparable from the Greek lobby has ultimately given life to the Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Security Initiative between Israel, the GCA, Greece, and the US against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, apart from the fact that Greece and the Greek Cypriots are in the same camp as Israel, which is completely humiliated in the world morally and ethically and is a war criminal, it is noteworthy that Israel has put both states in the position of voluntary proxies to suppress Turkey. On the other hand, France's signing of strategic defense cooperation agreements with both Greece and the GCA has been a concrete indicator that Turkey is also surrounded by NATO partners on the Blue Homeland and TRNC front. This is the conjuncture in which Dendias wrote his speech.

Dendias and Israel have excessive confidence in technology, intelligence, and precision strike capacity. However, real life, especially the Ramadan War experienced with Iran, clearly shows that these capabilities are not decisive on their own. In addition to military developments such as the collapse of Israeli air defense in the war, the hitting of many strategic areas, the public living in shelters for days, and the damage to the Israeli ground force in the face of the military capabilities displayed by Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, the fact that war costs exceeding 130 billion dollars in Israel put the economy in a difficult position; the limits of social mobilization (especially 100 thousand people from large religious segments cannot be recruited), the pressure on capital and qualified manpower, dependence on maritime transport lines, and the suspension of the operations of some ports on the Red Sea-Mediterranean axis are weaknesses that make it difficult for Israel to transform its operational superiority into strategic sustainability. In such an equation, risks such as the disruption of maritime transport, the contraction of foreign trade, and the limitation of land routes through Jordan and Egypt will also come into play in a possible expansion scenario. Therefore, the issue is not just the ability to strike, but how long that ability can be sustained and on what economic and social ground. At this very point, reading Israel's current kinetic agility as a permanent superiority against an actor like Turkey, which has a vast geography, deep industrial infrastructure, and multi-dimensional power production capacity, can turn into a serious strategic mistake.

A Mindset Full of Contradictions

Dendias's speech contains contradictions from time to time. While he places Turkey at the center for almost half of his speech, he sometimes displays a different approach. He says: “I want to state this clearly: Greece should not be a Turkey-centered country. Turkey is not our main problem. And it should not become our main problem.” Yes, he says “Turkey is not our main problem,” but when you look at the entire speech, Turkey is at the center of the system he has established, the investments he has made, and the threat picture he has drawn. There is an approach that puts Turkey at the center, tries to balance it, and even tries to suppress it. In other words, the discourse is one thing, the reality is another. He says “We are looking 360 degrees,” but the center of gravity of that 360 degrees is the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. This means a security architecture that is effectively Turkey-focused. There is no point in hiding this. If Dendias really says “Turkey is not the main problem” as he said in his speech, then Greek foreign policy should also be consistent with this. In other words, theory and practice should match. But the picture seen today is the exact opposite of this.

Or, while talking about balancing his goals with his capabilities, he can set global goals. “In this environment, we as Greece have to make choices. We are not chasing goals that exceed our height. We are a small, medium-sized country. However, at the same time, we have the world's largest merchant fleet. We are dependent on open sea transport lines. The effect of this is not only seen in numbers or statistics. Inflation is killing the economy and hitting the poorest segments of society especially hard... Greece has to develop a broad maritime security perspective that extends not only to the Aegean, but from the Black Sea to the Red Sea, from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean,” he says. On one hand, he talks about deterring Turkey, and on the other, about showing presence in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The bill for this approach falls on the Greek people. The economy, which is already in a difficult situation, is under even more burden with billions of euros in defense spending.

The Absurdity of Full Jurisdiction for Islands

Perhaps the part of his speech that breaks records in being detached from reality was the interpretations he brought to maritime law. “However, I do not forget a challenge that is closer to our home. Because we still have a neighbor that interprets maritime law in a very unique way. For example, our dear neighbor Turkey clearly claims that islands do not have a continental shelf. It argues that no matter the size of the islands—for example, Crete—they cannot create an Exclusive Economic Zone. It claims that the Aegean islands are located on the Asian continental shelf. These claims are voiced seriously in international platforms. Yet, if a first-year university student taking an international law course wrote such a thing, they would either fail the exam or their friends would laugh until they cried. But we are facing these theses in serious forums all over the world.” Dendias's words are problematic from a scientific point of view. Because international maritime law is not black and white. Interpretation, jurisprudence, and geography are the primary determinants.

Turkey opposes the evaluation of islands as if they have equal rights with the mainland without considering their locations. This approach is consistent with the jurisprudence of international law based on the principle of equity, and it is a necessity imposed by the unique geography of the Aegean. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants rights to islands in principle, but “equity” is essential in delimitation. In a semi-enclosed sea like the Aegean, where there are thousands of Greek islands, granting a continental shelf to these islands, which remain under the influence of the Anatolian peninsula and still have 6 miles of territorial waters, is incompatible with equity. Granting a continental shelf to islands a few kilometers from Anatolia and cutting off the mainland from the sea is contrary to equity. In short, the Aegean is a special sea dense with thousands of islands, islets, and rocks, and the standard method cannot be applied here.

As a matter of fact, while nearly 50% control has already been achieved in the Aegean with 6 miles of territorial waters, giving full effect to all islands with a continental shelf with absurd Greek theses means that the remaining area will also largely turn into Greek maritime jurisdiction. Extending territorial waters to 12 miles would turn more than 70% of the Aegean into Greek territorial waters, effectively creating a “Greek lake.” They can make their own public accept this, but I also laugh until I cry at their expectation that Turkey will say yes to such a result, or their attribution of tens of thousands of square kilometers of maritime jurisdiction to the island of Meis, which has a circumference of about 9 km in the Eastern Mediterranean, by ignoring the Anatolian coastline length of 1700 km.

Conclusion

This speech Dendias gave in Athens is not only a presentation of a defense doctrine, but also a clear reflection of the strategic mentality that Greece is in. This mentality is based on an understanding that grows with external support, especially from Israel and France, ignores the gap between its own capabilities and goals, and constantly produces maximalist claims in order to balance Turkey. However, history has shown us many times that geopolitics is shaped not by dreams, but by capabilities and sustainable power production. The picture Greece draws today is an approach that relies excessively on technology and external alliances, but puts the dimension of continuity and durability, which is the most basic truth of war, into the background. Yet, war is a matter of access to energy, production power, human resources, logistics depth, and economic resilience. Every bright concept or doctrine established without these elements and not filled in reveals its fragility in the first serious crisis. On the other hand, the deepened military-technological closeness established with Israel and the defense ties developed with actors like France provide Athens with self-confidence in the short term, but produce dependency in the long term. This dependency is also encouraged for arms sales. Greece is almost invited to the Thucydides trap. Macron's coming to Greece does not come from a love of fake Hellenic culture, but from the motivation to sell more frigates, warplanes, and weapons to Greece. Furthermore, such alliances do not guarantee absolute support in times of crisis; on the contrary, they turn Greece into an outpost of great power competition. One of the countries that has paid the heaviest price for this throughout history is again Greece. Repeating the same mistake in a different format today is a result of conjunctural courage rather than strategic mind.

More importantly, the discourse that the Greek side has built on “deterring Turkey” is actually the product of a misreading. Because for Turkey, the TRNC, the Aegean, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Blue Homeland topics are not a preference, but a direct area of sovereignty and vital interest. Any de facto situation to be created in these areas moves out of the classical deterrence equation and is moved to the ground of self-defense. After this point, the game changes, risks multiply, and the area of control narrows. Therefore, every maximalist step taken by Greece has the potential to create an effect that escalates tension instead of producing deterrence.

In the picture that emerges in the final analysis, although Greece says in discourse that “Turkey is not the main threat,” it builds its entire security architecture on Turkey in practice. This contradiction is not sustainable. Turkey, on the other hand, has the ability to produce resistance against such pressures with its vast geography, deep industrial infrastructure, multi-dimensional military capacity, and historical reflexes. For this reason, what will determine the balance in the TRNC, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Aegean is not the superiority of narrative, but the real balance of power on the field and the continuity of this power.

In short, the picture drawn by Athens is a search for power projection. However, unless this projection is based on a solid foundation of production, economy, and strategic mind, it produces a temporary dream, not a permanent superiority at sea and on land. Turkey, on the other hand, does not accept imposition in its vital sovereignty areas, does not allow fait accompli, and responds on the field when necessary. As long as this equation does not change, the path to real stability in the region does not pass through maximalist dreams and washing the brains of small children with Megali Ideas, but through reason, seeking peace, and a balance based on equity. The Greek does not need to go far to see what war brings.