Is Europe being dragged into a new major war?

Through Ukraine, Europe is encouraging uncontrolled escalation with Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The fundamental problem is not the increasing probability of war, but the erosion of the parties' crisis management capacity.

The war in Ukraine is no longer just a regional conflict taking place on Ukrainian soil. The tension between NATO and Russia on the line stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and from Poland to Kaliningrad, has entered a new strategic phase. The Russia-Ukraine war has recently entered a very dangerous escalation phase again. Especially in the last ten days, the high-intensity missile and UAV attacks carried out by Russia against Ukraine show that the war has entered a new phase not only on the front line but also in strategic depth. Intense attacks on Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro, and energy infrastructure have begun to strain Ukraine's air defense capacity. In the same process, while Russia is increasing its pressure to advance on the front line, especially on the Donbas axis, signs of growing manpower and ammunition losses on the Ukrainian side are noteworthy. It is no coincidence that analyses suggesting Ukraine is now experiencing strategic defense fatigue are multiplying even in the Western media. As these lines are being written, Russia's advice to NATO states to evacuate Kyiv should be taken into account. It seems Putin and the Russian state will not allow Ukraine to become a new Afghanistan—that is, a war of attrition zone. At the same time, it was alleged that Russia carried out a UAV attack on an apartment building in Romania. Putin, however, accused the Western media, implying that this was a false flag operation. (Considering the recent history of false flag operations by the US and the UK, and recalling the admission by CENTCOM Admiral Cooper during the Iran-Israel-US war that they used Iranian Shahed UAVs manufactured through reverse engineering, we can say that the same could be done for Russia.)

In parallel with these developments, Europe is experiencing the most dangerous security crisis of the post-Cold War era today. However, the real problem is not the increasing probability of war, but the erosion of the parties' crisis management capacity. Just as Europe was dragged into major wars before 1914 and 1939 amidst alliance systems, arms races, media propaganda, and an environment of mutual distrust, a similar psychological and strategic climate is forming today. But the difference today is that the process is taking place in the nuclear age, in an environment of UAVs, hypersonic missiles, and AI-supported war technologies. The risk of miscalculation has now reached an existential level for humanity. In particular, the Black Sea airspace, the Suwalki Corridor—which provides the only transport opportunity under NATO control that controls Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast bordering Lithuania—the border of Belarus, which neighbors Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania, and the Baltic airspace have become some of the most dangerous contact areas in the world today.

EUROPE'S DECLINING CAPACITY AND INCREASING PROVOCATION ABILITY

Despite these events, the contradiction between the economic picture Europe is in and its language of war is enormous. Europe today does not have the production infrastructure, ammunition stocks, and social resilience to sustain a major war. Despite this, its capacity to create crises and encourage escalation is increasing. While European economies are under serious pressure from deindustrialization, rising energy costs, production losses, public debts, and demographic collapse, it is thought-provoking that Atlanticist circles are turning toward an increasingly aggressive line against Russia and seeing rearmament as the solution. Especially Merz, Macron, Starmer, and Baltic security circles are shifting toward an increasingly aggressive line against Russia despite the peoples they represent, dragging Europe toward an increasingly high-risk strategic line. However, there is a serious disconnect between Europe's real military capacity and its political rhetoric. For this reason, the strongest element Europe possesses today is not military power, but the capacity to produce provocative strategic behavior. The greatest danger arises here. Because actors with weakening capacity often start to behave more riskily. In this case, they look for cheap states to shed blood for them.

RUSSIA IS CHANGING THE PARADIGM

In this very atmosphere, one of the most important strategic messages Moscow gave came through the Oreshnik system. The message Russia gave in the Oreshnik attack on Kyiv last week is directed not only at Ukraine but directly at NATO. The Kremlin is clearly declaring that the war will not be limited to the Ukrainian field alone and that it can deploy next-generation high-precision systems that can reach deep into Europe if necessary. The Oreshnik message is a message of psychological deterrence beyond a classic missile demonstration. Here, Moscow is sending a message, especially to Poland, the Baltic line, and Germany, that if Ukraine continues drone attacks into Russia with your help, then NATO will effectively become a party to the war and Europe will no longer be safe. When these developments are combined with the escalation on the Baltic–Belarus–Poland line, a highly dangerous picture emerges. The nuclear exercises conducted with Russia in Belarus, the military buildup around Kaliningrad, the anti-Russian drone attacks and sabotage allegations brought to the agenda via Latvia, and the nuclear deterrence rhetoric of Poland and France are carrying Europe to the riskiest period since the Cold War. Especially the fact that Kaliningrad has become a direct target in NATO planning is seen as an existential threat from Moscow's perspective. Because Kaliningrad is not just a military base, it is the strategic lock of Russia's Baltic access. The process taking place in Europe today has gone far beyond the classic defense reflex. The resulting picture is turning into a multi-layered geopolitical struggle where controlled crisis production, hybrid warfare, economic attrition, energy competition, psychological warfare, and nuclear deterrence are used simultaneously. Europe today sees Russia through the glasses that England saw Germany in 1914. Europe is challenging Russia, trusting that if it fights, the US will come to its aid as it did in both world wars. However, Russia is not an ordinary continental power. The encirclement and forcing into war with NATO of a state that possesses the world's largest nuclear capacity, massive energy resources, critical mineral reserves, and Eurasian depth produces not only regional but global consequences.

Moscow, on the other hand, sees Europe's increasing hostility and intent. It is moving away from the limited operation option (SMO) at the beginning of the war. In the first period, Russia was pursuing a controlled pressure strategy to force Ukraine into a neutrality agreement. However, the messages coming from the Kremlin in the recent period show that this has changed. The fact that Russian diplomats are openly bringing European targets to the agenda, that NATO elements in Kyiv are being indirectly targeted, and that the names of factories and institutions producing weapons and sensors for Ukraine in NATO countries are being published to send a message are signs of a new paradigm. Moscow is now showing that the war may not remain only on the Ukrainian field. Europe is hardening politically, but not all NATO members are ready to enter an all-out war with Russia. For this reason, Moscow believes that limited but high-impact attacks on selected NATO targets will not automatically trigger NATO's Article 5. This thesis is becoming increasingly visible in the Russian strategic mind. Because according to Moscow, in a limited crisis situation centered on the Baltic countries or Poland, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, and even some Western European states may be reluctant to enter the war directly. Especially the issue of whether Washington would risk a nuclear war for Europe is now being debated even in Europe.

CRACKS WITHIN NATO ARE DEEPENING

As the global system is increasingly divided into harder blocs, the American-centered unipolar structure established under the rhetoric of a rules-based international order after the Cold War has lost its sustainability. However, the Atlantic system, which does not want to lose its hegemony and colonial tradition, is making its containment strategies more aggressive instead of retreating. The strategy of attrition of Russia that NATO is conducting through Ukraine is no longer just about defending Ukraine. This process aims to erode Russia's strategic depth, put it under pressure on the line stretching from the Black Sea to the Baltic, and break the Eurasia-centered alternative power architecture. In response, Moscow is also moving beyond classic conventional deterrence and making the nuclear threshold card more visible. Russian strategists like Karaganov argue that tactical nuclear weapons should be used against Europe if necessary and that this will push back European hostility by providing high deterrence.

This situation makes diplomacy dysfunctional. Because the parties now read a step back not as a compromise, but as a sign of weakness. In such a psychology, the negotiating table ceases to be a ground for real solutions and turns only into a tool for gaining time. While Russia's refusal to step back is seen as revisionist aggression from NATO's perspective, NATO's expansion strategy is read as a direct existential threat from Moscow's perspective. This mutual threat perception carries the classic security dilemma to a much more dangerous level. At the point reached today, alliance systems are destroying the strategic flexibility of states. This process drags states into reactionary security behaviors instead of rational calculation. Most of the great wars in history were born in exactly this environment.

Today, NATO is not as homogeneous as it appears from the outside. While the Baltic countries, Poland, and the UK advocate a more aggressive line, many European countries are wary of the economic and social costs. The fact that the US's priority is increasingly shifting to China and West Asia also increases the uncertainty in Europe. Washington no longer appears to have the intention of carrying the Ukraine file with unlimited resources. This makes Europe more aggressive but at the same time more fragile. For this reason, Moscow thinks that NATO's political integrity is more fragile than its military capacity. The Russian strategic approach is now based not only on military attrition but on producing political divergence within NATO.

NEW DETERRENCE ERA AND EUROPE'S BLINDNESS

The crisis experienced today is not a classic war preparation that the parties manage in a controlled manner by setting rational goals. The real danger is the erosion of control mechanisms. For this reason, the current process is not so much a planned all-out war as it is an uncontrolled drift where the risk of chain escalation is growing. Russia's hypersonic capacity, vast ammunition production infrastructure, energy resources, and Eurasian depth have changed the war model Europe is accustomed to. The Oreshnik message is not just a technical but a psychological threshold. Moscow is now sending the message that it is ready for war with Europe. The most critical aspect of hypersonic systems is that they dramatically shorten decision times. Crisis scenarios that leaders could evaluate in hours during the Cold War have now been reduced to minutes or even seconds. This is where the real danger begins.

Europe, on the other hand, is still acting with the unipolar psychology of the 1990s. This is the real strategic blindness. Because the power it faces today is neither Saddam's Iraq nor Yugoslavia. It is facing a Eurasian power with the world's largest nuclear capacity, massive energy reserves, and Chinese support. Russia is now clearly showing that it does not believe in the unlimited deterrence capacity of the US after the defeat in Iran and of NATO after what has been experienced in Ukraine for the last 4.5 years. For this reason, the psychology of war is becoming more dangerous. Because the parties are acting on the assumption that the other will step back. The Baltic-Belarus-Poland line has become one of the most risky contact areas in the world today. This region is now more than just a classic military buildup area; it is a geopolitical fault line where the psychology of the nuclear threshold is directly felt. Kaliningrad Oblast is of critical importance in this respect. Because this is not just a military base. It is the key to Russia's Baltic access. It is also the main pressure area for NATO. The Suwalki Corridor is the most fragile physical contact point between NATO and Russia. A small military contact here could trigger a chain escalation mechanism.

US Army Europe and Africa Commander General Christopher Donahue stated in a statement in July 2025 that Kaliningrad had become a region surrounded by NATO countries, and said that the alliance could neutralize this region in a shorter time than ever before. Donahue's expression, "you can control the sea from land," was interpreted by Russia not only as a military assessment but as an open declaration of blockade and de facto intervention scenarios against Kaliningrad. The voicing of such rhetoric about Kaliningrad, which is one of the important elements of Moscow's nuclear deterrence, was recorded as a sign of a dangerous escalation in NATO-Russia tension. For this reason, the intensity of nuclear exercises on the Belarus-Lithuania border is extremely risky. Because the line between deterrence and preparation for attack is becoming increasingly blurred. In this context, the constant nuclear war atmosphere created on the European public also puts great pressure on decision-makers. Such environments increase the risk of error. As a result, the world today is going through not only regional wars but a crisis of the global system. While the American-centered unipolar order is dissolving through the Pacific, West Asia, the Mediterranean, and Eastern Europe, a new balance of power is being established through a bloody transition process. The most dangerous periods in history have been exactly these transition phases. In this environment, the greatest threat is not irrational leaders, but the system's own automatic crisis production mechanism. The risk of miscalculation is therefore the greatest danger facing humanity.

TURKEY'S STRATEGIC DILEMMA

The world is going through a new power transition period. While the Atlantic-centered order is eroding, Eurasia-centered new power centers are rising. While Europe is losing its economic capacity, it is turning to a harder line in its security rhetoric. This picture places Turkey, which is the lock of the Black Sea, at the center of geopolitical turbulence. When the developments before the NATO Summit to be held in Turkey on July 7-8, 2026, are evaluated together, it is seen that a multi-front pressure strategy extending from the Aegean to the Black Sea is being applied to Ankara. Although Turkey is a NATO member on paper, it is coming face to face with some actors within NATO on many issues in the field.

In this framework, the EFES-2026 Joint Exercise conducted in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean was not just a training activity, but a comprehensive show of force where Turkey demonstrated its will for deterrence in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean with its military capacity and defense industry power. The Blue Homeland Law initiative and the Ministry of National Defense's statements that rights and interests will not be compromised also completed this message. However, it was noteworthy that Greece increased its military rapprochement with Israel, announced new armament programs, and intensified provocative activities around Meis during this very period.

Energy competition in the Eastern Mediterranean is also part of the same pressure picture. Chevron's acquisition of new license areas without considering the Libyan continental shelf and the rights of the TRNC shows that the energy struggle in the region is accelerating. While Eastern Mediterranean resources are becoming more critical for the West due to crises around Hormuz and energy supply security concerns, Turkey continues to be the main geopolitical variable in this equation.

Developments in the Black Sea should also be evaluated in the same framework. Attacks on merchant ships with unmanned sea vehicles carrying Ukrainian markings off the coast of Kilyos cannot be seen only as a message given to Russia. The real problem is that maritime security is being targeted in Turkey's area of authority and responsibility. When considered together with the attack on the Altura tanker in March, concerns that the war in the Black Sea is wanted to be moved toward the Turkish coast are strengthening. One of the goals is to pull Ankara into a harder NATO line and weaken its balance policy. (It is noteworthy that while there was no condemnation or statement from our media, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Ministry of National Defense regarding the attacks in Kilyos, condemnation messages regarding the Turkish ship allegedly hit by a Russian UAV in Odesa came with great speed.)

Turkey is facing simultaneous pressures today through the Greece, GCA, and Israel axis in the Aegean, and through the Ukraine war and hawkish circles within NATO in the Black Sea. For this reason, it is necessary to look at events not individually, but as parts of the same strategic picture. Besides this, there is also the risk of reactivating ethnic, sectarian, and identity-based fault lines that could weaken Turkey's national unity and solidarity internally. The internal crises and fragmentation tendencies experienced by the main opposition party should also be watched carefully in this respect. Because in periods of great geopolitical pressure, the most fragile point of states is not the external front, but their internal integrity. There is not even a comment, let alone a contribution, from the main opposition on the extremely vital and serious foreign/security policy issues experienced today. Therefore, an anti-thesis to the government's view cannot be produced in Turkey on NATO and EU issues. This situation offers an opportunity that the collapsing Western hegemony would look for and not find. However, internal integrity is as important as external pressures. History shows that in great geopolitical struggles, the most fragile point of states is often the internal front. The Mosul issue is a striking example of this. While Turkey was focused on the Mosul case in 1925, the outbreak of the Sheikh Said Rebellion turned Ankara's attention to internal security problems, and as a result, England got what it wanted regarding Mosul. When the internal front weakens, the chance of success in the external struggle decreases.

For this reason, the main task before Turkey is to protect the Montreux regime without getting caught up in provocations in the Aegean and Black Sea, not to become a party to the war in the Black Sea, and to maintain its national interest-centered balance policy. For Turkey, the issue is not the Ukraine war, but the Black Sea balance. Montreux is not just a contract, it is the foundation of Turkey's strategic autonomy. The active neutrality regime that Turkey displayed in the Second World War thanks to the Montreux regime is being criticized by the anti-Russian sworn hawkish front of NATO, especially England. Unfortunately, an arm-wrestling match is taking place within us between the national and NATO fronts. This contradiction will increase as the NATO summit approaches. Turkey has vital and common interest areas with Russia such as trade, tourism, energy, Syria, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea. For this reason, Ankara's main priority is not to be the front line of the NATO-Russia showdown, but to maintain its balancing position. The transformation of the Black Sea into a NATO lake will create a serious strategic risk not only for Russia but also for Turkey.

The main test Turkey will face in the coming weeks is not to get caught up in the Aegean, Mediterranean, and Black Sea provocations and false flag traps of Greece and NATO, not to become a party to the escalating tension in the Black Sea, to protect the Montreux regime, and to prevent internal political divisions from turning into a national security weakness. The greatest threat is not planned war, but miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation. Turkey's need is not to open new fronts, but to protect state reason. A cool-headed, geopolitical balance, and national interest-centered strategic approach will continue to be Turkey's strongest security shield against the approaching global turbulence.