The effects of ship attacks in the Black Sea and Senegal on Turkey

As the Russia–Ukraine war enters its third year, the risk of the conflict spilling over into non-combatant countries and global maritime trade routes has reached a critical stage. First, on November 27, 2025, a Turkish-owned, Panama-flagged tanker named Mersin was heavily damaged and rendered almost completely unusable by four separate external explosions during the night while anchored at the port of Dakar, Senegal. Subsequently, on November 28, 2025, two tankers in the Central Black Sea, the Gambia-flagged KAIROS and VIRAT, were targeted by suicide attacks involving USVs (Unmanned Surface Vehicles) within the Turkish continental shelf/EEZ boundaries, approximately one hour apart. Following these developments, the Russian-registered tanker MIDVOLGA-2, which was transporting sunflower oil from Russia to Georgia, was also subjected to a UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) attack on the morning of Tuesday, December 2, 2025, approximately 80 miles off the coast of Sinop.

DESTABILIZING THE BLACK SEA AND THE MONTREUX REGIME

The occurrence of three separate attacks on commercial ships in the Black Sea in five days demonstrates how sensitive the security balances have become for Turkey, which has been the executor of the Montreux regime since 1936 and possesses the longest coastline in the region. These successive attacks reflect Ukraine's desire to liken the Black Sea to the chaotic environment of its own internal war and its effort to prolong the conflict in a manner consistent with the interest perspectives of Paris, Berlin, London, and Brussels. One of the indirect goals of these actions is to drag Turkey into the conflict. Similarly, the fact that the Turkish-operated tanker Mersin was hit by a professional sabotage at the port of Dakar shows that these incidents are no longer isolated; a more comprehensive operational strategy aimed at creating pressure on Turkey is in effect. Turkey's active neutrality policy within the framework of Montreux and the fact that it is not obliged to comply with sanctions outside of UN resolutions significantly disturb the Kiev administration and the Western capitals that direct it. The increase in attacks on merchant ships in the Black Sea has begun to directly affect both Turkey's maritime trade routes and its energy supply security.

THE GOAL IS TO PROLONG AND EXPAND THE WAR

After the 2014 Maidan events, the Kiev administration surrendered itself to the strategic minds of London, Washington, Paris, Berlin, and Brussels; it became one of the main elements of the conflict against Russia in accordance with the West's geopolitical goals. Initially relying on NATO, US, and EU support, Kiev acted with the expectation of Russia's collapse, the overthrow of the Putin administration, and a “decisive victory for the West.” In this context, Zelensky, who was at the table during the March–April 2022 Istanbul talks, suspended negotiations under the guidance of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and the war continued. However, the reality on the ground dashed these expectations. Russia adopted a long-term attrition strategy and gained the upper hand. At the point reached today, while the US is withdrawing its support, the only cement keeping the UK and EU countries standing is anti-Russian sentiment and the continuation of the conflict. The timing and target selection of the attacks in the Black Sea are indicators of Ukraine's desire to expand the conflict horizontally. Kiev is trying to compensate for the initiative it lost on the ground by creating a crisis in the maritime dimension. Despite peace initiatives conducted under US mediation, the unlimited support provided to Ukraine by the UK and some EU countries gives Kiev the courage to turn the Black Sea into a new field for “punitive operations.” Even the “preemptive strike” rhetoric against Russia by the Italian admiral who chairs the NATO Military Committee clearly reveals the dangerous threshold that has been reached. Turkey's balanced and multidimensional policy in the Black Sea is met with discomfort by some Western circles, and pressure attempts on Ankara are increasing. Turkey's decisive role in the grain corridor process, its limited but stable support for Ukraine, and its keeping of communication channels with Russia open have created a perception in the West of an “insufficiently aligned ally.” Therefore, it can be assessed that the attacks occurring within Turkey's continental shelf aim to draw Ankara into the equation or weaken its decisive role over Montreux. The fact that the sabotage in Senegal targeted a Turkish operator may serve as a message aimed at pressuring Turkey through the “shadow fleet” narrative. While Greek tankers are not targeted while carrying out similar activities, the selection of Turkish-owned tankers makes this geopolitical squeeze more visible. When the attack on the Novorossiysk port and CPC filling facilities is added to this, it is understood that Ukraine has now made energy and trade routes in the Black Sea a strategic target and aims to erode Turkey's energy transit role. Consequently, the deliberate destruction of the Black Sea's international commercial position has turned into an important strategic communication tool for Kiev.

WHAT DO MARITIME LAW AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT SAY?

In terms of International Humanitarian Law, unarmed merchant ships are considered “civilian objects” due to the nature of the cargo or passengers they carry, and targeting them directly is prohibited. This status also covers the crew and passengers. Humanitarian law mandates the protection of civilians within the framework of the principles of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity. Attacking civilian ships belonging to third states is a serious violation of the rule that “those not party to the conflict cannot be harmed” and may constitute a war crime. The Turkish continental shelf/EEZ is not a theater of war; no party has declared this region a restricted zone. Warnings such as NOTAM/NAVTEX have not been issued either. Therefore, an attack on a merchant ship constitutes an “illegal armed act” in terms of international law. The sabotage that took place inside the port in Senegal, being independent of conflict conditions, falls into the category of terrorism or organized sabotage. Within the framework of Maritime Law and the Law of Naval Warfare, merchant ships are innocent/civilian platforms that must be protected. Traditional naval warfare law mandates the execution of procedures such as warning, stopping, searching, seizing, and safely evacuating the crew before an attack. According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the freedom of the seas is essential; it is legally impossible to make a commercial tanker sailing in international waters a military target. Since the Turkish continental shelf and EEZ region have not been declared a conflict zone by any country, Ukraine's targeting of commercial ships with unmanned vehicles or drones is contrary to both the fundamental principles of maritime law and the obligation of distinction, proportionality, and precaution at sea. Unilateral sanctions do not have binding force in international law; unless there is a UN Security Council resolution, such sanctions cannot create legitimacy for an attack on a ship. Therefore, the recent attacks in the Black Sea can be evaluated as acts that do not comply with the protection statuses of humanitarian law and naval warfare law, and which constitute piracy and arbitrary use of force.

STRATEGIC AND LEGAL ADVICE FOR TURKEY

Turkey is resolutely implementing the principle of active neutrality defined by Article 19 of Montreux. NATO membership does not contradict this legal framework. Turkey is not obliged to comply with any sanctions unless there is a UN resolution; pressure from the US–UK–EU axis is not binding for Ankara. Under these conditions, Turkey must take more active measures to protect the safety of international maritime trade in the Black Sea. It is important to take the attacks in Senegal and the Black Sea to the UN Security Council, demand an international investigation, and identify the perpetrators of arbitrary attacks on maritime trade. The neutrality responsibility imposed on Turkey by the Montreux regime must be preserved, and this stance must be reminded to all actors in clear language. The fact that Greek tankers are not targeted while transporting Russian oil, while Turkish-owned ships are systematically selected as targets, shows that Turkey has become the focus of geopolitical pressure attempts. Therefore, Turkey must strongly defend the thesis that “Ankara's neutrality cannot be interfered with” both within NATO and in bilateral relations. Deterrence against attacks on Turkey's areas of jurisdiction in the Black Sea must be increased; maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned surface vehicles, and surveillance systems must be concentrated in the region; if deemed necessary, an escort application for commercial ships should be initiated. Every attack on Turkish-flagged or Turkish-owned ships should be considered an act directed at the Turkish state, and the corresponding counter-measure capacity must be clearly demonstrated. It should be recalled that two Ukrainian warships are still detained in Turkey, and the military and technical support provided to Ukraine should be reviewed. Turkey's decisive role in the grain corridor should be clearly reminded to Kiev, and it should be expressed in diplomatic language that hostile actions against Turkey will endanger the future of this corridor. Limiting certain logistical and technical support provided to Ukraine by Turkish firms can also be considered as a pressure element. While the rising tension in the Black Sea increases Turkey's geopolitical weight, it also increases the risks. Therefore, Turkey must strengthen its deterrence while maintaining its neutrality; the safety of maritime transport, energy supply security, and Turkey's regional reputation must be kept at the center of this strategy. If Ankara does not do what is necessary, the Zelensky administration, under the influence of the UK–EU axis, will not hesitate to turn the Black Sea into a new war laboratory. It should not be forgotten that our ancestors, even during the most difficult periods of the Second World War, managed to remain neutral in the Black Sea despite external pressures.