The Greek factor in US naval war logistics

During the Second World War, the US's global logistics requirements triggered the greatest maritime transport mobilization in history. In the later years of the war, the US created a massive fleet in record time with the legendary Liberty and Victory class dry cargo ships and T2 class tankers. The US's total shipbuilding capacity peaked in 1943, and more than 2,700 military and commercial ships of all classes were delivered throughout that year. This number represents the largest fleet of ships produced in a single year in world maritime history.

A WORLD RECORD IN TIME

The scale of wartime American shipbuilding is better understood when the construction times and tonnages of Liberty, Victory, and T2 tankers are evaluated together. The 10,000 DWT capacity Liberty ships were built in an average of 30–45 days, pushing speed limits with one ship completed in a record 4 days and 15 hours. The 15,200 DWT capacity Victory ships, which had more advanced engine and boiler systems, were generally built in 60–70 days, with the time dropping to 55 days in some shipyards. The 16,500 DWT capacity T2 class ships, which were large oil tankers, were completed in an average of 70–90 days, and this time could drop to 55 days during periods of intense production. These three ship types formed the logistical foundation of victory by ensuring the uninterrupted flow of cargo, fuel, and materials needed by the Allies throughout the war, thanks to the creation of large-tonnage transport capacity in a short time. It is estimated that US shipyards completed an average of 8–10 ships per day in 1943 alone. This extreme production speed was the main factor that determined the course of the war through logistical superiority. As a result, Liberty ships for cargo and materials, Victory ships for sensitive and high-priority shipments, and T2 tankers for transporting the fuel of war were built at record speeds, forming the infrastructure of the Allied victory.

THE MOST CHALLENGING FRONT: THE PACIFIC

The Pacific front received the largest share of the logistics mobilization. This front required the most geographically widespread naval logistics effort in history. Everything the US needed to fight in the Pacific was transported by sea. Since there was no infrastructure in the Pacific similar to a railway or land transport system within a continent, it was transported by sea. This made the Pacific Front the most costly and complex area of the war from a logistical perspective. According to calculations by various sources, the total cargo transported to the Pacific reached approximately 46 million tons via more than 50,000 sea voyages between 1941 and 1945. The overwhelming majority of this cargo was transported by the US Navy Service Force (ServPac), the logistics institution of the US Navy, and the Army Transport Service (ATS), the transport organization of the US Army. As the fleet grew in the later stages of the war, the US integrated commercial ships into the military transport system, especially after 1943, putting hundreds of civilian merchant ships into the service of the navy.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT FLEETS

Although the US began building a giant fleet, especially in the first years of the war, that is, in 1942 and early 1943, one of the most critical elements that kept American forces afloat was the merchant fleets of allied and neutral countries. In this context, the fleets of Greece, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, and the British Commonwealth became the US's closest logistics partners on both Atlantic and Pacific supply lines. The history of cooperation between the merchant fleets of the US and Greece also dates back to this period.

GREEK SHIP LOSSES

A large part of the Greek fleet served under charter to the American and British Navies in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters of operations during the war. Greek-flagged ships played an important role in transporting ammunition, fuel, provisions, construction materials, and military aid sent under Lend-Lease. The Greek fleet, which had a capacity of approximately 4.8–5 million DWT in 1939, was one of the top three players in world tramp shipping. However, with the start of the war, the ships that entered US service through charters suffered heavy losses in a very short time due to Atlantic convoys, the Murmansk line, German-Italian air attacks in the Mediterranean, German submarine (U-boat) attacks, and the mine threat. Approximately 2,200 Greek merchant ships were lost throughout the war. The total tonnage of these losses was around 3.5 million DWT. 80% of the Greek merchant fleet had sunk. Approximately 2,500 Greeks and 20,000 sailors from the Philippines, India, England, Norway, Egypt, and the Caribbean who worked on these ships drowned. These figures show that the Greek merchant fleet suffered one of the heaviest losses of the war proportionally and was almost completely destroyed. Generally speaking, although it remained behind the transport contributions provided to the US by the merchant fleets of Anglo-Saxon states and those of Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands during the war, the fact that almost the entire Greek merchant marine fleet was lost is significant. The transfer of Liberty ships to Greek shipowners by the US under favorable credit conditions in the post-war period should also be evaluated as a strategic support given to the recognition of these heavy losses and the reconstruction of Greek shipping.

AMERICAN NAVAL WAR LOGISTICS TODAY

The US Navy had reached 1,378 ships from 282 in one year during World War I, and a force of 6,000 ships during World War II. In the Second World War, nearly 5,000 of the 6,000 ships were auxiliary ships. More than half of these were aimed at war logistics. Today, the US Navy has 293 combatant ships. In this situation, it is not possible to conduct even a two-front war. More importantly, today, let alone the Pacific, the US is in a position where it cannot establish a "sea lift" with its own means even on the Atlantic front. However, from 1945 to the beginning of the 21st century, the US Navy had won the Cold War not only with its superior technology but also with its logistical capabilities; tankers, heavy cargo ships, Ro-Ros, and tens of thousands of sailors had been the transfer power of American military might. However, when we come to today, we see that this system is on the verge of collapse. The US merchant fleet is at its lowest level in history. While there were over 1,000 large-tonnage US-flagged merchant ships in 1950, this number has fallen below 80 today. One of the fundamental reasons for this is that the Merchant Marine Act (Jones Act) has become a situation that prevents renewal. The 1920 law eliminated competition by mandating that coastal shipping be carried out only by US-built, US-flagged, and US-crewed ships, disconnected shipyards from global competition, and made the US flag one of the most expensive operating regimes in the world. As a result, shipowners fled the US flag and turned to the flags of Liberia, the Marshall Islands, and Panama. In other words, the US has blunted its global logistics veins because of its own legislation. On the other hand, the majority of the 130 ships of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) fleet, whose primary duty is war logistics, are aging. The Ready Reserve Force (RRF), with 46 ships, has become inoperable. The operational rate of both fleets is low, the crew pool has narrowed, and the shortage of trained sailors has become chronic. Together, these fleets can currently carry 2–3 heavy brigades, 100,000 vehicles, 120,000 TEUs, 450,000 tons of fuel, and 250,000 tons of ammunition/dry cargo at one time. If we consider that the need in the Pacific will be around 15 million tons per year, the gravity of the situation is understood. While only about 200 of the US's 293 ships are in oceans worldwide, how many ships will it be able to allocate against China, which has 355 ships in the Pacific? On the other hand, while China has 5,500 state ships to form military convoys, this number is 176 for the US.

THE DIFFICULTY OF PACIFIC OPERATIONS

The fact that distances in the Pacific Ocean are four to six times longer compared to Atlantic crossings puts US military power at a disadvantage against China in terms of logistics. In this area, unlike in Europe, the Baltic, and the Mediterranean, countries are very far from each other. There are large sea crossings of thousands of miles between them. In particular, the means to provide the daily flow of 200–300 thousand tons of cargo required by a high-intensity war have almost disappeared. The US's closest allies, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, need very high amounts of diesel and jet fuel for their aircraft, helicopters, and warships. The only source for this is the US. It is an inevitable result that in such an important war, the Strait of Hormuz will also close and Iran will take a position against the US, and therefore, even if Saudi Arabia takes a position alongside the US, the transfer of fuel to Asia from the Gulf by sea will become nearly impossible due to the likely closure of the Strait of Hormuz. In this case, it is clear that the safest oil transport line will be between the US west coast and its allies. To ensure this transport, a very dense tanker fleet is needed. On the other hand, there will also be a need for dense general cargo and container ships for the heavy equipment, weapons, ammunition, and other supply materials to be transferred to the Pacific Front.

TO WHOM WILL THE US APPLY?

Today, three countries form the backbone of world maritime trade: Greece, China, and Japan. According to UNCTAD data, Greece controls 16.4 percent of world tonnage with 398 million DWT, China 14.4 percent with 347 million DWT, and Japan 9.9 percent with 241 million DWT. In total, the three countries manage more than 40 percent of the world merchant fleet. While 80 percent of world trade is carried by sea, energy transport, container shipping, bulk cargo movement, and LNG traffic are in the hands of these three nations. In particular, the Greek fleet controls 30 percent of the world market in tankers, which are important for war logistics; and nearly 10 percent in container shipping. In other words, in a war environment where the US will have difficulty even ensuring the refueling of its own navy, the world's most critical fuel transport power is in the hands of Greece. For this reason, the US will have to apply to the merchant fleets of Greece and other "Flag of Convenience" countries again, as it did in the past.

TODAY IS DIFFERENT FROM YESTERDAY

Today, the vast majority of those working on Greek ships are not Greek. In most of them, the captain and chief engineer are Greek, but only 15% of the ship's personnel are Greek. The rest are Filipino, Egyptian, or Indian nationals. Similarly, only 15% of Greek-owned ships are Greek-flagged. 85% are under flags of convenience such as Liberia, the Marshall Islands, the Bahamas, Malta, and Panama. Therefore, in a possible US–China war, instead of the 2,200 Greek sailors who drowned in the Second World War, this time, except for the Greek captain and chief engineer and a few Greek sailors, the majority will be Filipino, Egyptian, or Indian sailors who will die. The question of how Greek shipowners will behave in such a US–China war will be shaped not only by commercial concerns but also by geopolitical pressures, financial dependence, insurance mechanisms, and strategic relations between great powers. Looking at today's structure, a very large part of the Greek merchant fleet is integrated into the US and UK-based finance, insurance, and legal systems. Ship financing for Greek shipowners is provided by New York and London banks, insurance regulations are carried out with Lloyd's and OFAC-compliant structures, and all pricing in the freight market operates within the dollar system. For this reason, it is highly probable that the Greek merchant fleet will be chartered in the Pacific theater of operations under US pressure. The fact that Greece is not only a NATO member but also hosts the most critical US bases in the region such as Souda, Alexandroupoli, Larissa, and Skyros also shows that Greek shipowners will naturally be tied to the US in a future great power conflict. The decision-making processes of these shipowners regarding sending their ships to the war zone are a bit more complex. The shipowner's basic reflex is to look at the balance between opportunity and risk. Since insurance premiums will increase dozens of times in a war situation, it is clear that Greek shipowners can only head to the front line if the US provides a state guarantee. If the US assumes convoy protection, state-backed charter contracts, and war-risk insurance obligations, a significant portion of the Greek fleet will turn into the logistics backbone of the US military. If state guarantees and naval protection are provided as in the Second World War, the Greek fleet will not avoid entering the war zone. However, today the US does not have a sufficient number of warships to provide naval protection. It has difficulty allocating warships even to aircraft carrier strike groups, let alone commercial convoys. On the other hand, one critical area is "flags of convenience." Almost all of these flags are in the direct or indirect control area of the US. As a result, the behavior code of the Greek merchant fleet in a US–China war is largely clear. Shipowners will most likely serve the US side due to economic interest, insurance pressure, sanctions, and financial dependence; flags of convenience will close to China under US pressure; and the limited number of Greek-flagged ships will remain in NATO-compliant missions.

GREEK-US NAVAL COOPERATION

The agreement discussed between Greek Foreign Minister Dendias and US Secretary of State Blinken on May 18, 2022, and presented with innocent expressions such as "maritime environment protection initiative," actually meant the integration of the Greek fleet into the future American war logistics chain. Since that day, with the "United States-Greece-Israel Eastern Mediterranean Counter-Terrorism and Maritime Security Partnership Act" passed by the American Congress in April 2025, they have now created an alliance format against Turkey. In this context, we can say that the increasing US-Greek relations within the scope of the 2022 and 2025 agreements may pressure Greek shipowners in the future to use ships carrying US-controlled flags of convenience, if not Greek-flagged ships, in the Pacific theater of operations. When these ships sink, those who die will mostly be Filipinos, Egyptians, and Indians. It is clear that shipowners will cover their losses from both insurance and US funds. However, we cannot say the same for the cheap-blood countries of the dead. On the other hand, it is difficult to say that the US, which provided all kinds of warship escorts for convoy operations in the Second World War, will provide the same support this time. Therefore, many of those who go out to sea will not return. Because the US is not in a position to provide escort ships. In short, the US situation in the Pacific is dire. Let alone a war situation, the US is facing transport problems between its own assets in the Pacific, which are under its protection and sovereignty, not to mention transport for its allies in peace and crisis situations. Because since only American-flagged ships operate between US territorial waters, only one or two American-flagged and American-crewed merchant ships provide transport opportunities per month between Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, Wake Island, and Midway Island. This is insufficient for the great showdown in the Pacific.

CONCLUSION

The real issue that will determine the future of the Pacific today is who has more ships, more logistical capability, and more sailors. The fate of war is now more about getting fuel, ammunition, and supplies to the other end of the Pacific on time than about super weapons. The US has destroyed the superiority it gained with logistics in the Second World War with its own hands today. The giant that once had more than 1,000 merchant ships has fallen below 80 ships today, and even the number of warships to provide convoy escort has become limited. For this reason, in a possible US–China conflict, Washington has only one option: to embrace allied state shipowners, especially the Greek fleet, just as it did in the 1940s. Here, the first thing that comes to mind will be the Greek fleet. Because it is the largest fleet in the world. However, this time the picture is different. The Greek flag has decreased to almost nothing; while ships carry the flags of Liberia, the Marshall Islands, the Bahamas, Malta, and Panama, they are filled with Filipino, Indian, and Egyptian sailors. Shipowners are deeply tied to the US finance, insurance, and legal system. On the other hand, the new American-Greek axis, which started with the Blinken–Dendias meetings in 2022 and deepened with the 2025 Eastern Mediterranean Security Act, has already linked the Greek merchant fleet to the US's future logistics chain. At the moment of pressure, the direction of the Greek shipowner is clear. If the credit comes from New York and the insurance from London, the ship will go where the US demands. The shipowner gets his money; the loss is covered by insurance. But the ones who will die when the ship sinks will not be the 2,200 Greek sailors of the past; this time, Filipino, Egyptian, and Indian sailors will be the cheap blood. The bitter truth is that the US is no longer able to carry even its own logistics in the vast Pacific geography. How can a system that can barely send one ship a month between its own territorial waters from Guam to Midway, from American Samoa to the Mariana Islands, manage a war logistics flow of millions of tons in the Pacific? This vulnerability will condemn the US to the Greek fleet again. However, this time, unlike the 1940s, the US does not have the power to provide convoy protection. The possibility that every ship that goes out to sea will not return can be seen today. As a result, if the US enters a major Pacific war, it will be on the demanding side, not the ruling side. It will try to cover its logistics with the Greek fleet; and the sailors of underdeveloped countries will pay the price with their lives. What will be lost among the giant waves of the Pacific will not only be ships; it will also be the US's legendary "logistical superiority" myth.

(On November 29, 2025, Beşiktaş signed a great act of loyalty. The name of Rear Admiral Cem Aziz Çakmak, who was targeted in "kumpas" (frame-up) trials and whom we lost 10 years ago at the age of 52 after contracting cancer in prison, was given to the park in Beşiktaş Dikilitaş by the decision of the IMM Assembly. We were present at the opening with his family, classmates, and loved ones. As I expressed in my speech: "Cem loved three things with emotion: His homeland, his Navy, and Beşiktaş. Today, these three emotions united in the sky." For the first time in Turkey, a martyr of the frame-up trials is being honored in such a visible place. "I wish we could have given this name to a warship; I believe those days will come too." This step is a great message with its legal, public, and moral dimensions: "We do not forget them. We keep their names alive in the most beautiful place." May the soul of the distinguished Admiral, my dear brother Cem Çakmak, the pole star of the navy, be blessed and his route be paradise.)