Flu TV, Philosophy, Foucault

Let the title not be misunderstood. Flu TV is a channel I like. When the subject is philosophy, politics, and history, it produces broadcasts that put the "left" on the table and gently critique it. Of course, it does this mostly by hosting "leftists." One of the most delightful and provocative examples to watch is Gün Zileli. However, my subject is the broadcast titled "Is Foucault Postmodern?" featuring Ferda Keskin.

See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cFDynBaphwY

Providing a comprehensive response to what Ferda Keskin said about Foucault is difficult both in terms of this article and my own expertise. Some texts need to be reread. We have no doubt that our professor is a diligent academic regarding Foucault. I am of the opinion that our professor Ferda Keskin is the first person who should be called upon when the subject is Foucault.

However, as someone coming from the tradition of analytic philosophy and having some history with Marxism, I have to offer some criticisms of this broadcast.

The program's host, İlker Canikligil, is a liberal who is distant from Marxism but at peace with the general principles of the Enlightenment (if there are any general principles we can agree upon). Due to this stance, he is distant from both Marxism and Foucault. Because I think he accurately views Foucault as anti-Enlightenment. That is why he is surprised by Ferda Keskin's claim that the two philosophers are compatible, or even that they complement each other, while thinking that Foucault should be distant from Marx. I share İlker Canikligil's surprise. It is clear that Foucault, who is anti-Enlightenment just like the philosophers of the Frankfurt School, has an even more distant relationship with Marxism compared to that school. Again, this dimension of the issue requires a lengthy discussion. Let's move on for now.

Regarding some issues that Ferda Keskin touched upon "in passing," I cannot help but make some "pedantic" corrections.

1) The distinction between "philosopher" (filozof) and "philosophy practitioner" (felsefeci). Ferda Keskin is insistent on this distinction. As he himself stated, this distinction is more specific to Turkish. Keskin makes this distinction so rigid that the definition of "philosopher" reaches an "elevated" position. Looking at it this way, there is no room to use expressions like "bad philosopher" or "unqualified philosopher." This attitude, which sanctifies the "philosopher" to such an extent, is the product of an approach that mystifies philosophy. There is an understanding that relies on a kind of "wisdom" or "insight" instead of knowledge. Of course, such an approach is also respectable. However, it is perfectly possible to call professional philosophers "philosophers." Let's say it this way so that we can call some "philosophers" "bad philosophers" in the true sense of the word. In any language, anyone who does philosophy with professional rigor, especially those who make a living from academic pursuits in this field, is a philosopher, whether we like their philosophy or approach or not. But some are bad philosophers. While making this distinction, he requires the "philosopher" to build a system. Yet, even Foucault, whom he mentions and is an expert on, did not build a philosophical system. However, Foucault is perfectly a philosopher. Just as Nietzsche or Kierkegaard, who did not build systems, were philosophers.

2) The Continental philosophy-Analytic philosophy distinction. While talking about the absurdity of this distinction, he says that this distinction names one with a geographical description and the other with a method. There is some truth to this. However, I do not think that the adjective "analytic" here is a method, or rather, that it is a method used collectively by everyone we call an "analytic philosopher." For instance, although both Bertrand Russell and Peter Strawson are in the analytic philosophy tradition, it is difficult to talk about the latter using an analytic method. Similarly, it is difficult to say that Timothy Williamson, or even Wittgenstein (especially his second period), used an analytic method. On the other hand, it is equally difficult to say that Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant did not skillfully use the analytic method. Yet, these last three philosophers are included in the "Continental philosophy" camp in common usage. Professor Ferda Keskin mentions that there is also a methodological distinction in Continental philosophy and states that it follows a "more synthetic" method compared to the other camp. What is meant by this method is unknown. For example, it would be reasonable to consider Descartes an analytic philosopher with the thought experiments he created, the analysis he conducted, and the "analytic geometry" he established. Likewise, it would be reasonable to consider Kant as analytic rather than Continental with the boundary-drawing effort he made in his work titled Critique of Pure Reason or the logic notes he produced. For example, Frege's groundbreaking work, which we would not hesitate to count within analytic philosophy, is essentially a reckoning with two great philosophers from the history of philosophy, in other words, Kant and Mill. Therefore, the method difference Ferda Keskin mentions or his implication that analytic philosophy "does not reckon with the history of philosophy" is inaccurate. Another interesting example to talk about is the Analytical Marxism movement. It is difficult not to be confused about where to place this movement.

3) Our professor Ferda Keskin, who emphasizes the tradition of expressing analytic philosophy in "simple language," reduces the distinction to "simple." In essence, the distinction is between clarity/precision and ambiguity/obscurity. The obscurity of Heidegger and Foucault, who write obscurely on purpose, cannot be explained solely by their being within Continental philosophy. In this regard, Foucault's encounter with "analytic" philosopher John Searle is interesting in itself for understanding Foucault's preference for writing obscurely. It is certain that analytic philosophers value being understood and clarity. The motto of analytical Marxists, "no bullshit marxism," is not for nothing. They found the source of the bullshit in this obscurity and uncertainty.

4) The cultural dimension of the Continental-Analytic distinction is overlooked. In essence, the authors of the texts that are tried to be squeezed into this distinction are separated from each other due to cultural influences. The difference between them is neither entirely methodological nor entirely content-based. Analytic philosophy can be seen more as a product of Anglo-American culture. However, Kant, Frege, Descartes, and Spinoza are not part of this culture. Still, they tried to write clearly and precisely. In terms of their subjects and methods, they resemble the philosophers we count within analytic philosophy today. On the other hand, philosophers such as Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Foucault, Nietzsche, and Hegel are mostly mentioned within Continental philosophy due to their linguistic preferences. Obscure expression sometimes stems from a conscious effort to mystify, sometimes from political pressure and censorship, and sometimes from cultural expectations.

5) Perhaps due to Professor Ferda Keskin speaking extemporaneously, İlker Canikligil is forced to ask, "In that case, is Zizek an analytic philosopher?" Ferda Keskin's answer to this is that Zizek feeds on analytic philosophy, for example, the "possible world semantics" attributed to Saul Kripke. Yet, if there is such a thing as Continental philosophy, it is clear that Zizek is right in the middle of it.

6) Professor Ferda Keskin explains why he counts Hegel in Continental philosophy while emphasizing that Zizek is influenced by Hegel as follows: "Of course, we cannot say that Hegel is an analytic philosopher. Because the system he built is not about analyzing what exists, but about taking what exists, producing an explanatory conceptual framework for it, and doing this by developing relationships between concepts." What is understood from this is that analytic philosophy is content with the analysis of what exists. However, there are also philosophers within the analytic philosophy tradition who deal with what should be, not what exists. Moreover, the "analytic" in analytic philosophy does not come from the "analysis" of what exists.

7) The term analytic stems from the analysis of terms and expressions used in philosophy. This is more related to the issue of the linguistic turn in the history of philosophy and the intensification of discussions regarding the philosophy of mathematics. Therefore, it does not stem from the analysis of a political or social system.

8) Let us note while we are at it. The claim that "philosophy begins where the argument ends" is indeed interesting. Because if there is a philosophical field outside of wisdom or insight, the hallmark of this field is arguments. As Professor Ferda also said, whether it is clear and distinct or obscure, the power of a philosophical text is measured, and should be measured, by the power of its arguments. Of course, it is possible for Professor Ferda to follow a different path in this regard.

The relationship between Foucault and Marx exceeds the scope of a column. Let us just say this: if Foucault were truly in a relationship of complementing Marx, the academy of the neoliberal political order would not make room for Foucault, culturalist "Marxist readings," or psychoanalytic "Marxist readings." Of course, I am not claiming that people who spend time on these movements knowingly or intentionally defend the neoliberal discourse. But if we do not forget the function of the academy for the political-economic system, it is impossible to believe that "Western academia" has embraced Foucault—a philosopher who sees power everywhere and tries to keep people from chasing after power—with innocent feelings.