March 18 Çanakkale Naval Victory

Today marks the anniversary of the March 18 Çanakkale Naval Victory. 109 years ago today, the Ottomans achieved one of the most glorious victories of the First World War by repelling a combined British and French fleet consisting of powerful capital ships. The March 18 victory was not only a military event that changed the course of the First World War and the fate of the Ottoman Empire, but also one of the turning points that laid the foundations of the Republic of Türkiye.

The Gallipoli Campaign was the first battle after the Battle of Sarikamish to move the First World War outside of Europe, effectively turning it into a true world war. Furthermore, by the autumn of 1914, the First World War had reached a stalemate on the Western Front, and the British, in particular, were looking for a new front to change the course of the war. The Ottoman Empire, both as the weakest link in the alliance and with its vulnerable coastlines, offered many potential points of attack to Britain, which possessed the world's most powerful navy. From November 1914, discussions began in London regarding landing operations on Ottoman shores.

Although highly strategic targets were being considered, such as the vulnerable İskenderun and its proximity to the Berlin-Baghdad Railway line, the target was ultimately set as Istanbul due to urgent aid requests from the Russians, who were completely helpless against the Germans. To reach this goal, the Dardanelles Strait had to be crossed first. Among the potential targets, Çanakkale was the most heavily defended, and the possibility of Russia dropping out of the war at any moment led to the operation being scheduled much earlier than it should have been. Moreover, at the moment the operation began, neither the British nor the French had a single reserve division to send to the theater of operations. The price of these two critical errors occurring in succession would be heavy.

When the campaign was being planned, no one had any idea how to attack the Ottomans. The pre-dreadnought type capital ships that were to carry out the attacks were not designed to hit targets on land, but rather to engage other ships - they were platforms specifically designed to sink their counterparts, the armored warships. Since the guns to be used were not designed to destroy fortified positions, the effectiveness of the bombardment by the ships was completely uncertain. As it was not considered likely that the fortified positions where the Ottoman batteries were located could be neutralized by bombardment alone, the inclusion of ground troops in the operation had been discussed. However, both Britain and France had suffered heavy losses on the Western Front in 1914 and did not have a single division to spare for deployment to another front in early 1915.

Winston Churchill, the mastermind behind the Çanakkale campaign, for infantry support had consulted with Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, and Venizelos had agreed to send three infantry divisions. However, this operation was not approved by Chief of General Staff Ioannis Metaxas and King Constantine, and was additionally vetoed by the Russians (Istanbul could only remain for the Russians, and any Greek claim over Istanbul was not even a subject for negotiation). 

Although the Greeks being out of the picture made postponing the operation necessary, the British were not in favor of waiting, and the Russians were also pushing for the operation to be carried out as soon as possible. Under the existing conditions, starting the operation involved serious risks, and the order to attack would be given while ignoring these extremely obvious risks.

Admiral Sackville Carden, commander of the Allied fleet, had decided to advance in stages rather than launching an all-out assault on the straits. First, the fortifications outside the straits would be destroyed, then the mines in front of the straits would be cleared, then the fortifications inside the straits would be demolished, and finally, the minefields within the straits would be cleared. The operation began on February 19. The fleet, consisting of British and French ships, began shelling the Seddülbahir and Kumkale batteries at the entrance to the straits. Because the attacking ships took care to stay out of the range of Turkish artillery, the shelling was conducted from as far away as possible; as a result, the Turkish fortifications did not sustain significant damage (since the gun emplacements were protected by high, earth-covered walls, they could not be significantly damaged even at close range, except by a direct hit). As a result of the February 19 operation, there were two German and two Turkish casualties, one of whom was a lieutenant, and not a single gun was damaged.

Following February 19, there was no activity until February 25 due to worsening weather conditions. Although no significant losses were sustained as a result of the intense bombardment repeated on February 25, the personnel at Seddülbahir and Kumkale received orders to retreat during the shelling and abandoned their positions. Taking advantage of this, The British landed a small unit on shore, blew up 48 guns at Kumkale and Seddülbahir, and retreated with only nine casualties. 

With the batteries facing the outer strait silenced, the mines at the entrance to the strait became accessible for clearing. However, although the fixed guns had been silenced, mobile howitzers made the work of the minesweepers (fishing boats used as minesweepers) as difficult as possible. On March 3, to blow up the howitzers just like the fixed batteries, from the same point 400 British marines who landed on shore were repelled, suffering 70 casualties without being able to damage a single gun. The Turks had not fallen for the same trick again.

After a long effort, the Allied ships had gained the chance to enter the strait without being affected by the mines. However, they had now lost the advantage of firing from outside the range of Turkish guns, and it was unclear how the mine lines in the strait would be cleared under the bombardment of Turkish artillery. Since the ships could not fire indirectly like howitzers, they could not hit the Turkish positions. The vast majority of the shells fired hit the earthen walls and exploded harmlessly. Only direct hits could put the Turkish guns out of action, and since the silhouette of the guns was quite small, it was very difficult to score a hit. The Turks, on the other hand, could easily hit the massive silhouettes of the battleships from close range. The only way to put the Turkish guns out of action was to land troops on shore. However, it did not seem likely that the first units would reach the front in March either.

As a result, On March 10, the approach of advancing in stages was abandoned, and a decision was made to force the strait in one go with all available ships. It was known that the guns on the ships could not cause significant damage to the perfectly constructed fortifications. The expectation was that the immense firepower produced simultaneously by the massive guns of the 18 battleships would demoralize the Turks, who were assumed to have very few artillery shells (a completely false assumption), and that they would abandon their positions and begin to flee in a disorganized manner.

Indeed, on February 25, the units at Seddülbahir and Kumkale had abandoned their positions as a result of intense bombardment. However, this withdrawal had taken place under the orders of the command echelon to prevent unnecessary losses (the British likely did not know that the withdrawal was carried out under orders). Likewise, since the Allied forces were firing from outside the range of the Turkish guns, there was no point in the soldiers holding their positions. If the ships of the combined fleet were to enter the strait, conditions would be completely different.

Contrary to the British estimates, the Turks were more than ready. From the moment the Allied fleet gathered off the coast of Çanakkale, the Turks had increased both the number of mines and artillery. Some of the Yavuz's guns (the Yavuz was under repair at the time) and a portion of the coastal batteries in Istanbul were dismantled and transported to the Dardanelles, and the Nusret minelayer had created new mine lines before the Allied forces' attack. Some of these mines would remain undiscovered by the Allied forces.

The attack by British and French ships on March 18 began in the morning hours. The enemy fleet first carried out a bombardment, taking care to stay outside the range of Turkish guns, as they had done before March 18. In the afternoon, the French ships were the first to enter the strait, accompanied by four minesweepers. The minesweepers were easily driven off by howitzer fire, and the lead ship, the French battleship Bouvet, was first heavily damaged by fire from Turkish coastal batteries, and then sank immediately after striking a mine laid by the Nusret. The other French ships, the Suffren and the Gaulois, managed to escape, though heavily damaged. 

The British ships that entered the strait immediately after the French were no luckier than their counterparts. The battlecruiser, which was not the target of any artillery, Inflexible managed to exit the straits with great difficulty after hitting a mine. Irresistible, which was first heavily battered by artillery fire like the Bouvet, was first rendered completely ineffective, and then the drifting ship began to take on water after hitting a mine. The battleship Ocean, which was sent to tow the Irresistible out of the straits, was also rendered ineffective after hitting a mine. After the survivors from the crews of both ships were rescued, the British fleet abandoned the ships to their fate and left the straits. Both ships sank in the evening hours. The operation had not unfolded at all in the way the British had expected.

Very few of the Ottoman coastal batteries had been involved in the conflict, and the Allied forces had been stopped by the fire of only four of the fourteen coastal batteries. Except for the Rumeli Mecidiye Battery, which was directly hit and devastated by the fire from French ships, there were no positions that sustained significant damage, and only 9 of the 176 coastal guns possessed by the Ottomans were put out of action. The mine lines that made the Dardanelles impassable had sustained no damage at all. Total casualties, including the Germans, were 95. On the Allied side, three of the 18 major warships had sunk, and three had been put out of action after sustaining heavy damage. More than 600 soldiers had lost their lives on the Bouvet alone. The loss of the British, who managed to rescue their soldiers from their sunken ships, was sixty people. While the Allied forces had clearly lost a third of their combat power, it is possible to argue that the Ottomans were almost completely unscathed and were as ready for battle as they were on the first day.

Although the operation resulted in a complete fiasco, the British did not initially abandon the idea of forcing the straits by sea alone, and Churchill ordered the operation to continue in the following days. However, the commanders off the coast of Çanakkale were aware of the situation, and as a result of their insistence, the idea of forcing the straits by sea was abandoned, and a land operation was decided upon.

The operation was a complete failure.

The Allied powers' attempt on March 18 was based entirely on unfounded assumptions. The morale of the Ottoman soldiers was far from collapsing. The Allied bombardment did not have the slightest negative impact on the morale of the Turks; on the contrary, they fought with unprecedented heroism and indifference, as seen at the Namazgâh Battery, where personnel continued to fire their cannons despite a fire breaking out in the ammunition depot.

Although forcing the straits without infantry support was an extremely absurd strategy, the participation of ground troops in the operation would likely not have changed the outcome. Furthermore, the region was very well defended, and since the warships could not inflict significant damage on the Turkish batteries, they would not have been able to provide sufficient fire support to their own troops. Conversely, Allied infantry attempting to capture the Turkish batteries would have had to operate under the pressure of Turkish cannons and light weapons before even reaching the shore. In other words, the inclusion of ground forces in the operation would most likely have resulted in even greater losses for the Allied powers. This is precisely why the landings that began on April 25 were carried out at points on the Gallipoli Peninsula facing the Aegean Sea rather than the straits.

With the victory on March 18, the first phase of the Gallipoli Campaign was completed. This decisive victory had been quite easy for the Turks. The second phase, in which the Turkish will would be truly tested, would begin after a five-week break.