The Testament of Peter the Great

There is a historical fear of Russia in the European subconscious. This fear, based on the assumption that Russia will eventually try to invade Europe, emerged in the second half of the 18th century, peaked in the 20th century, and began to decline with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

This fear was solidified by a document titled The Testament of Peter the Great. Originally titled Aperçu sur la Russie (Overview of Russia) and presented to the French government in 1797 by the Polish General Michal Sokolnicki, this document claims that Peter the Great bequeathed the westward expansion of Russia and that this testament became the centerpiece of Russian foreign policy.

The Testament of Peter the Great would become one of the pretexts for Napoleon’s 1812 Russian campaign and a fundamental source of war propaganda. Although it was later understood that the document was a forgery and that Peter the Great never made such a testament or recommendation, the Testament of Peter the Great would never lose its popularity; on the contrary, it would influence other European countries and shape Europe’s general perspective and policy toward Russia.

The fear of Russia gained unprecedented strength in 1904 with the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Until that date, although Russia was a power feared for its size, it was thought that it could reflect very little of its magnitude onto the battlefield due to infrastructure deficiencies. However, a Russia capable of using its resources much more effectively thanks to railway networks would begin to be evaluated by many as a power capable of dominating the world. British geopolitician Halford Mackinder, in his article The Geographical Pivot of History published shortly before the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, argued that a Russia that had solved its infrastructure problems would turn into the Mongol Empire of the 20th century and bring the entire world under its control. This article, considered a milestone in the science of geopolitics, would guide the policies of many countries toward Russia.

However, history showed that Mackinder and those who shared his ideas were wrong. Although the power reached by the Soviet Union during the Cold War partially vindicated Mackinder, history revealed that there was no place for the Mongol Empire in the modern world. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, fear was replaced by contempt.

From the very beginning of the war, Ukraine played on the Russian fear in Europe’s subconscious, emphasizing that if Ukraine fell, it would be Europe’s turn. This rhetoric was strangely supported by Putin himself. Comparing himself to Peter the Great, Putin stated that the war he launched against Ukraine was similar to the war Peter waged against Sweden. Later, citing a 400-year-old map as a source, he claimed that there was no such place as Ukraine and that they were trying to take back land that was originally theirs. Putin’s history-based discourse and his mention of Peter’s name inevitably bring to mind the Testament of Peter the Great and imperialism.

The Western world does not seem to take these approaches very seriously. While this rhetoric finds many supporters in Europe, it seems more reasonable to define the current effect as “anti-Russian sentiment” rather than a fear of Russia. Likewise, the majority in Europe currently believes that Russia attacking NATO would be equivalent to suicide. In other words, it would not be wrong to say that the debacle Russia suffered in 2022 reinforced the contempt that had formed with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

French President Emmanuel Macron is one of the supporters of the Testament of Peter the Great approach. In his statement on February 26, Macron tried to reignite this rhetoric by stating that the future of Europe depends on the outcome of this war. Macron claimed that if NATO does not support Ukraine as much as necessary, Ukraine will lose the war, and as a result, Russia will target NATO countries in the coming years, declaring that they would not hesitate to send troops to Ukraine if necessary to prevent this.

Macron’s call did not find a response across Europe, and the reaction he received is indicative of the West’s perspective on Russia and the Russia-Ukraine War. Immediately after Macron’s statement, many NATO country leaders, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, stated that they were not in consensus with Macron and that sending troops to Ukraine was out of the question. Furthermore, Scholz put an end to another debate by adding that the German/Swedish joint-made long-range Taurus cruise missiles would not be sent to Ukraine.

The scale of the aid that NATO countries have sent to Ukraine provides us with data on how seriously they take the war. Including humanitarian aid, the United States allocates 0.3% of its GDP (US military aid is currently halted), and the European Union allocates 0.4% to aid going to Ukraine. Russia’s budget for the war corresponds to 6% to 10% of its GDP, and it is also procuring weapons and ammunition from China, North Korea, and Iran. Although North Korea and Iran have relatively small economies compared to European and US economies, their capacity should definitely not be underestimated as they possess a defense industry of a size disproportionate to their economies.

Countries supporting Ukraine have a combined economy twenty to twenty-five times larger than the Russian economy. Despite this, the number of weapons and ammunition in Ukraine’s possession is much lower compared to Russia, and there does not seem to be a significant change in the near future. Indeed, Zelensky recently complained that they had only received thirty percent of the 1 million artillery shells promised by Europe. Without the aid provided, Ukraine’s chance of resisting Russia is near impossible.

Although the fact that the aid sent remains well below the required level stems from the infrastructure deficiencies of Europe’s war industry, it also reveals how willing Europe is to be a part of this war.

In other words, the Testament of Peter the Great seems to have little validity in today’s Europe, and Russia takes this war much more seriously than the Western world does.