The Biden Doctrine?

The article written in the name of US President Joe Biden, which was published last month in The Washington Post as an “Opinion” piece, was the subject of my column last week, where I examined the framework it attempted to outline, primarily regarding the Palestinian issue. In that article, Russian President Vladimir Putin was equated with Hamas, and the provision of military support to Ukraine and Israel was justified on the same grounds.

On the other hand, this article, which was a product of “public diplomacy” limited to justifying military support for these two countries and clarifying the US stance, particularly on the recent Gaza and Palestinian issues, did not touch upon other issues on a more global scale at all.

The Biden administration has, until now, focused on “reasserting American leadership” even if it leans on a number of slogans, for instance, it seems far from having been able to formulate a "doctrine" like the one in the famous long interview given to The Atlantic by the previous Democratic president, Barack Obama. Democratic Party President Barack Obama, as in the famous long interview he gave to The Atlantic, a "doctrine" seems far from having been able to formulate.

At the risk of going a bit too far, it could be argued that even Donald Trump, whose presidency was extremely noisy, came closer to being able to put forward a "doctrine." Contrary to the widespread dismissive attitude, there are many analyses that take it seriously. Especially regarding our region, there are serious contributions in this direction by James Jeffrey, one of the former ambassadors to Ankara who was appointed as the special representative and envoy responsible for the global coalition established by the Trump administration to fight Syria and ISIS.

The Biden administration exhibits obvious continuities and similarities with the Obama administration on one hand, and, as will be discussed shortly, with the Trump administration on the other. Especially for an administration that came to power with the claim of being the anti-thesis of the Trump administration and announced as a fundamental principle the reversal of many decisions from the Trump era, particularly in the field of domestic policy, these continuities and similarities must certainly constitute a serious obstacle to putting forward a "doctrine." Nevertheless, even if it does not claim to establish a "doctrine," a "Biden doctrine" If one is to speak of it, an article that appears to provide plenty of clues is one published in Foreign Affairs magazine by Jake Sullivan who was essentially a bureaucrat in the National Security Council during the Obama era and has continued to serve as National Security Advisor during the Biden administration.

The article, November-December 2023 issue of the magazine, is titled "The Sources of American Power: A Foreign Policy for a Changed World." One of the aspects of this article, which is as loaded with propositions as its title suggests, that I find most interesting is that it explicitly defines a new era.

In fact, since 2017, the official U.S. national security documents have already implied a new understanding of an era where geopolitical struggle comes to the fore, with references to Russia and China as adversary powers. However, the discussions were mostly conducted by taking the "liberal international order" for granted.

Now, Sullivan describes the opening of a third era, which he defines as a "new era of competition in an age of interdependence and transnational challenges," following the first post-war period shaped by the Truman administration, whose main motifs were "strengthening democracies and democratic cooperation and containing the Soviet Union," and the second period, in which successive U.S. administrations after the Cold War attempted to "expand the U.S.-led rules-based international order" and "create patterns of cooperation on critical issues," and a third era that he characterizes as a "new era of competition in an age of interdependence and transnational challenges." “The post-Cold War era has now definitively come to an end,” he states.

Sullivan opens his article by observing that “strategic competition is intensifying” and that it “touches not only the military sphere,” but also “every dimension of international politics.” As a representative of the Biden administration, he naturally argues that the Trump administration, “retreated from the international order instead of shaping it.” argues. The title "Sources of American Power" is not without reason: The power of the U.S. is immense and it still possesses significant advantages compared to other countries, but foreign policy approaches formulated for previous eras do not work in the new era.

However, the "future of the U.S." will be "determined" by whether it can "maintain these advantages" and whether it can "mobilize the world" regarding various "transnational challenges." Sullivan, again, "when partners are stronger" that the U.S. is also stronger "they have realized" states, and therefore, in the form of helping other countries solve serious problems they cannot resolve on their own, “that they are obligated to provide a better value proposition at the global level” he argues.

However, while familiar globalist or neoliberal cosmopolitan arguments are repeated up to this point, from this point on, the narrative proceeds from a different perspective.

In the post-Cold War era, U.S. administrations, “underestimated the importance of investing in domestic economic vitality,” argues Sullivan, while on one hand, the neoliberal “end of history” thesis, while on the other hand, it begins to target the understanding of free trade that lies at the heart of globalization. The U.S. economy is facing serious vulnerabilities, and its infrastructure is confronting a lack of investment, and “the middle class is taking a hit.”

Here, “Bidenomics” is described as a policy package, which we learn is also called by that name, through which the Biden administration is investing in innovation and industrial strength in many areas. It is also mentioned that, especially when it comes to many critical minerals upon which the U.S. economy relies, the country is condemned to “unpredictable overseas markets,” many of which are under China's dominance.

These emerge as a result of the criticized blind adherence to free trade. In this new era, the U.S. is addressing these through agreements with partner and allied countries. by establishing "resilient supply chains." Here, the Trump-era "Come home!" calls or the infrastructure investments also boasted about by Trump are not mentioned.

While it is emphasized that the barriers between domestic and foreign policy should be removed through national-level public investments, the reasons why national protectionist economic policies are necessary in certain strategic technological areas are also discussed at length, yet there is no praise to be found for the "trade wars" that also began during the Trump era.

Of course, unlike the Trump era, these investments are not only domestic but also China's Belt and Road Initiative The necessity of countering massive infrastructure investment projects like those with similarly massive infrastructure projects is exemplified by the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment initiative, which Biden spearheaded within the G7, or through the “economic corridor” declaration of intent, which specifically targets the Middle East region.

Here, unlike the Trump era, for example, Arab-Israeli normalization it is always claimed that it also includes “significant proposals” regarding the Palestinians. Here, it is likely that “the two-state solution” is being alluded to, but what these mean in practice is, to put it mildly, unclear. Furthermore, military support for countries like Ukraine and Israel, similar to the op-ed written on Biden's behalf, is framed with the claim that “Americans recognize a tyrant when they see one,” and that “appeasing” would be of no use and that crises do not evolve into "regional" or "global" scale conflicts, it is defended through claims that such support is mandatory.

Up to this point, the final point worth dwelling on in this article, which is tossed from one place to another and shows very little internal consistency, is that while it accepts the current situation with China as "competition," it also argues that this is "not zero-sum." Thus, it suggests that a military competition with China is not necessarily foreseen, that competition in the economic sphere is welcomed, and furthermore, that contributions made by China in certain areas, such as the Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement,

are not seen as contrary to the interests of the U.S. are not seen as contrary to the interests of the U.S. is also specified. Here, too, it is stated that in certain "narrow technology clusters" the U.S. "must consider protecting its national interests" is also expressed. It is further argued that this does not contradict the "interconnected global economy." Trump's more straightforward

approach is also mentioned. compared to "trade wars," it is certainly more nuanced, but the extent to which it is different must still be considered highly debatable. At the end of the day, Trump also presented himself as a

"master of the art of the deal." Of course, it is certain that there has been a shift from a more personal level to a more conceptual one. In fact, the end of the article concludes by mentioning that there are encouraging signs that Beijing may also be "beginning to grasp the value of stabilization," though with a caveat: "The real test will be whether the [communication] channels [between the two countries] hold up when tensions inevitably flare up." The original text continues with this observation.

We can also consider it a kind of "Challenge accepted!" declaration.

Returning to the question in the title...

While the reassertion of U.S. leadership and its implementation through alliances and partnerships shows continuity with previous Democratic administrations, it is also evident that many of the concerns expressed by Trump on a personal level have been conceptualized and incorporated since the Trump era. As for the China puzzle, which has been viewed as an adversary for some time, "We will compete, we will partner in areas where we can and for as long as we can, and furthermore, we will strive to keep communication channels open to prevent potential crises," is the message being conveyed.

The clearest message given is that the "post-Cold War era" described mostly by the globalization process, has come to an end, and a new era in which geopolitical competition is openly acknowledged has begun. Indeed, if there is a If there is a "Biden doctrine," it likely consists more or less of these points.