The International Order and Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Year

In this first article of 2024, it would be appropriate to assess the current state of global politics and the general outlook of Turkish foreign policy. While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict maintains its place on the global agenda through the military operation Israel is conducting in Gaza, Ukraine's efforts to repel the Russian invasion also continue to be a subject of debate. In the first of these two fundamental issues, a slight deceleration is noticeable, though the risk of the conflict's dynamics spreading across the region remains a concern; meanwhile, the latter continues to hold a central place regarding the future of the international order. Looking at Turkish foreign policy, it can be said that we are facing the boomerang-like return of certain domestic and foreign policy choices made in the 2010s in the form of new problems. Let us proceed in order.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict had already become a tangled web of problems that was "managed" but never solved through policies aimed at buying time, provided it did not evolve into a regional conflict before October 7, 2023. As the process, which began with Hamas's "breakout" or breakthrough operation on that date and the killing of over 1,200 Israelis, the vast majority of whom were civilians, passes the hundred-day mark, it continues with the intensity of the fact that nearly 24,000 Palestinians, including children, have been killed alongside Hamas militants in the ground operation Israel is conducting in Gaza. There are a few points of note here. First, regarding questions about the future of the international order, who will be the dominant power in this structure, and whom it can attract, especially from the Global South, this conflict serves only to reveal where everyone stands regarding the "values" that are so often preached to the Global South. It is worth keeping in mind that this issue of "values" has always constituted the "envelope" or "form" for the international order, but never the "contents" or the "substance."

The international order and its evolution or hegemonic transitions have progressed primarily through material and, most of all, political-economic factors. Therefore, the fact that this conflict has not yet spread despite certain risks shows that it remains of secondary importance regarding any discussion to be held on the plane of the international order. South Africa's application to the International Court of Justice against Israel also remains related to the part of the conflict that affects the "values" debate.

Israel's commencement of reducing units from the division level to the brigade level in the operation has raised hopes that this conflict is slowly coming to an end. In the first weeks of Israel's ground operation, a massive pro-Hamas propaganda campaign was being conducted even from social media accounts in Turkey. This campaign also appears to have slowed down in the last few weeks. It is certain that the shift in focus, following the Houthis in Yemen beginning to target ships belonging to Israelis and countries supporting Israel in the Red Sea, has had an effect on this. However, on the other hand, it is also likely that Hamas militants have less freedom of movement compared to the first weeks of the operation in the face of the Israeli army, which has begun to establish area dominance in Gaza City and the Gaza Strip in general. The fact that videos of Hamas neutralizing Israeli tanks or soldiers are circulating less suggests this. It is still too early to think that this situation alleviates the risks to regional and international peace. While the Houthis' attacks in the Red Sea are intensifying, the US and the United Kingdom have carried out two separate airstrikes against this group in Yemen. Many militia forces in the region that are part of the Iran-backed line, which declares itself the "axis of resistance," have also increased their attacks on the US military presence in Iraq and Syria.

Returning to the war in Ukraine, it is possible to argue that this conflict currently constitutes the soft underbelly of the international order. This conflict, with Russia as one party and the Euro-Atlantic coalition supporting the other, possesses the character of a conflict where the geopolitical competition—now acknowledged by the US itself as existing in the international order—manifests itself most clearly. Unless it ends in some way, only a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan could overshadow this conflict in this regard. Otherwise, it is obvious that both Ukraine and the Western countries, led by the US, that provide military, technical, and financial aid to Ukraine are struggling to keep their interest in this conflict alive, yet they feel compelled to support Ukraine due to this aforementioned nature of the conflict. For instance, while there is a desire to prevent the spread of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it has been observed for some time that there is an attempt to move the war in Ukraine to another dimension through a show of force in the Black Sea, beyond just trying to sustain it. This is also being covered sufficiently in the Turkish press. Here, the West, and especially the US, is facing certain restrictions and obstacles stemming from the Montreux Convention, which Turkey values highly and must continue to value. Otherwise, it would be all too easy for Turkey to find itself as an instrument of a new conflict ignited in the Black Sea for no reason.

As for Turkish foreign policy, several issues have been carried over into the new year. There is no need to repeat the Black Sea issue. As long as Turkey maintains its current stance without wavering, the probability of encountering any problems here, other than the increasing level of pressure that might come from the West in the opposite direction, is extremely low. Relations with the EU, apart from the problems with Greece, have not been a significant agenda item for a long time. Turkey's calls for "guarantorship" regarding the resolution of the Palestinian issue are far from being a primary issue even for Turkey itself. Issues that seem likely to maintain their importance for Turkey throughout 2024 include efforts to prevent a potential gap in the air force following the loss of F-35s due to strained relations with the US by procuring more F-16s, the ongoing US-YPG cooperation in Syria, and especially relations with NATO. As for Fethullah Gülen and the criminal network affiliated with him, which the US continues to harbor, they are not currently in the primary position they once occupied in relations with this country, as they have been largely purged domestically. Although the recent PKK attacks Turkey has faced originate from Iraq, the close military cooperation the US has developed with the YPG, the Syrian branch of this organization, makes it even more disturbing.

Turkey's recent vulnerability to attacks, especially those originating from the PKK, is related to the fact that the YPG and PKK have filled the power vacuum that emerged particularly in Syria and Iraq, and that Turkey has chosen to maintain a military presence there and increase it in places where it is already present, with the justification of preventing them. While this choice aims to prevent such attacks within the borders, it is also an attempt to narrow the area of dominance of the YPG and PKK. As with every ethno-political issue, this matter certainly has many aspects that go beyond the military dimension. From the perspective of Turkish foreign policy, the fact that this issue mortgages relations with the West and especially the US, or even with Russia or regional countries like Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and creates a serious source of vulnerability that these countries can use to put Turkey in a difficult position, stands before us as the biggest problem. Although it is very difficult to claim that there is a definitive solution to this issue, its nature as a source of vulnerability for Turkish foreign policy can at least be reduced with certain measures. Chief among these is contributing to political solutions that aim to minimize power vacuums in Syria and Iraq. For this, diplomatic relations must be re-established and developed with all parties in both Syria and Iraq. Of course, there is no specific, certain, and absolute formula for this either.

Here, in particular, the fact that the PKK attack in Iraq, in which nine Turkish soldiers lost their lives and four others were wounded, occurred just a few days after President Erdoğan accused the US and the UK of "being eager to turn the Red Sea into a bloodbath" and stated that "they had received information through different channels that the Houthis were putting up very successful defenses and giving successful responses against both America and England," serves as a reminder once again of how necessary such measures are, regardless of whether there is a link between these two developments. On the other hand, it must be stated that foreign policy measures alone will not be sufficient for any issue, or even for any foreign policy matter. It is certainly no prophecy to predict that if domestic economic problems, social discontent, democratic regression, or conditions of legal unpredictability prevail, even the most talented foreign policy cadres and the most skillful foreign policy measures may prove insufficient.