The Israel-Hamas War, risks, and the future of Gaza

Following the attacks carried out by Hamas on October 7, 2023, when it breached the Gaza-Israel border, Israel's military operations in Gaza have surpassed the one-month mark, resulting in heavy human casualties. In this article, I will discuss the balance sheet revealed by this spiral of attacks and conflict that erupted after a relatively quieter period in the Levant. In doing so, I will address the risks brought about by this latest cycle of violence, future projections regarding how it is intended to be ended, and focus on the aspects that differentiate this recent spiral from previous periods.

First and foremost, recalling which process the October 7, 2023, attacks actually brought to an end reveals the first of the risks it created. Despite having different dynamics, two separate peace and rapprochement processes were underway in this region, which we can call the Levant, on two different fronts. The first, known as the Abraham Accords, enabled Israel to establish relations with new Arab countries beyond its two existing Arab neighbors with whom it already had diplomatic relations: Egypt and Jordan. The main destination of this process, in which the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco formalized their relations with Israel, was seen as the successful conclusion of a similar process with Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, alongside this process encouraged by the US, a relationship-building and mutual detente process had also been initiated between Iran and Saudi Arabia under Chinese mediation. In fact, while these two processes were reconciling the main poles of the Arab-Israeli and Shia-Sunni conflict axes, they would have removed the region from the hot agenda of global politics and allowed the main sponsors of both processes—the US and China, but especially the US—to turn their focus toward the Asia-Pacific, which is considered the primary theater of competition. The spiral of violence that began with the October 7, 2023, attacks dealt a blow to both processes.

THREAT FROM IRAN

If not the detente reached between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the latter's initiative to establish official relations with Israel was at least suspended for a while. In this respect, it can be argued that the Iran-Saudi Arabia detente has also become more fragile due to the possible Iranian contribution to these attacks—which Israelis specifically allege—that harmed Saudi Arabia's future calculations across the region. Despite the open-air prison conditions experienced by Gazans, the Hamas attacks, which can also be considered a result of a kind of outrage against the willingness shown by many Arab countries to establish diplomatic relations with Israel without seeing or demanding any improvement in the Palestinian issue, are also evaluated by Israelis as attacks encouraged by Iran out of fear that a large Arab-Israeli front, likely to be positioned outside and against it, would emerge through the Abraham Accords. While it seems highly likely that Iran and its allies, which form the famous 'axis of resistance' that Iran calls the 'muqawama' (resistance) axis, supported Hamas with weapons, ammunition, or technically, there is little sign that they were aware of the October 7, 2023, attacks. In fact, there is some information to the contrary. It is even highly doubtful how much Hamas's political bureaus abroad were aware of these attacks. Because it has been reported that Hamas, which reduced its use of technology to the minimum level required in the face of Israel's high-tech defense systems, organized and carried out these attacks at the cell level. On the other hand, Hezbollah did not neglect to provide support in the form of causing a division of forces with missile attacks targeting Israel from the north while these attacks were taking place. Iran, for its part, threatened Israel by announcing that all options were on the table if it did not stop its attacks on Gaza.

Under these conditions, the possibility of a regional conflict, which emerged as a serious risk, was voiced most by Israel and the US. The US immediately moved two separate aircraft carriers and their support ships to the Eastern Mediterranean, sending a clear message to Iran and Hezbollah. Furthermore, many reports were published stating that it had clearly communicated through third parties that it would intervene in favor of Israel if its security were jeopardized.

All of this has caused a tense wait in the region. While messages from the Hezbollah camp regarding the anticipation of last Friday heightened concerns about where the conflict might evolve, the speech delivered by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah that day did not contain any declaration of an attack on Israel.

The US was primarily held responsible, with claims that US bases in the region would be targeted. Although a declaration of war against Israel came from the Iranian-backed Houthi forces in Yemen as part of the anti-Israel front, a long-range ballistic missile launched by these forces toward Israel was successfully destroyed by the Arrow 2 air defense system, which protects Israel against such missiles, and no further attacks occurred from the Houthi forces beyond that.

Thus, following the Iron Dome air defense system, which has proven effective against short-range missiles, Israel has also tested its air defense system against long-range missiles in a real-world scenario for the first time. This missile attack from Yemen was the first long-range missile strike targeting Israel decades after the Scud missiles fired from Iraq in 1991, which targeted Israeli cities but were destroyed by US-supplied Patriot air defense systems.

Setting these limited attacks aside, there are sufficient reasons for Hezbollah, apart from Iran, not to turn the clashes with Israel into an all-out war. First, there is the fact that it took sides in favor of Assad in the Syrian conflict, resulting in the loss of about 2,000 of its militants. Hezbollah's situation regarding internal Lebanese balances has also changed significantly since 2006. Having lost some of its former allies, the organization must also take into account that, in the face of Lebanon's deteriorating economic situation, its Shiite base, which would move further north in the event of a possible Israeli attack, would not be welcomed as warmly by other Lebanese as they were in 2006. The extremely serious warnings issued by the US as soon as the clashes began must also be another factor compelling both Iran and Hezbollah to restrain themselves.

THE WORST FEARS HAVE NOT YET MATERIALIZED

The conclusion drawn from all these points is that, at the regional level, beyond the heavy humanitarian losses in Gaza, two separate negative developments have emerged: the disruption of the Abraham Accords process and the risk of regional conflict. Regarding the latter, it is encouraging that Iran and Hezbollah have, so far and for the time being, restrained themselves, preventing the conflict dynamic from spreading across the region. On the other hand, following Jordan, one of the Arab countries that first established diplomatic relations with Israel and has had relatively less problematic relations to date, Bahrain, which established ties with Israel through the Abraham Accords process, has also limited its response to recalling its ambassador from Israel. Similarly, Turkey has also recalled its ambassador, although it has maintained a less harsh stance than it did during the 2008-2009 period. In particular, the fact that Bahrain chose to recall its ambassador rather than fully withdrawing from the agreements it recently signed with Israel suggests that a process could begin in which Saudi Arabia might also re-engage with the Abraham Accords, at least during the initial period of detente following the end of Israel's military operations in Gaza. Therefore, despite the horror of the attacks and the magnitude of the ensuing spiral of violence and human loss, the feared outcomes in both areas have not yet materialized.

The fact that these fears have not yet been realized leaves little room for optimism regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, which constitutes the core context of the latest spiral of violence. In truth, the Abraham Accords process, combined with the negligence of the Trump era, had already removed the resolution of the Palestinian issue as an anchor for any progress, leaving it entirely at the mercy of Israel. Today, this situation has become even more apparent.

The attacks of October 7, 2023, abruptly ended the tolerance and room for maneuver previously granted to Hamas by Israel and the West. The West views as legitimate Israel's desire to "erase" Hamas from Gaza through military means, even at the cost of many Gazan civilian lives.

Setting aside the question of whether goals such as the total "erasure" of any terrorist organization are realistic, it remains unclear when this goal will be considered achieved or what conditions must be met. Furthermore, there are few clues as to how Gaza's wounds will be healed after this goal is reached, how social life and peace will be restored, or what kind of political administration is envisioned for the region. This uncertainty, combined with the lack of a single, coherent Palestinian cause on the Palestinian front, paints an even more pessimistic picture. It is worth examining the various proposals put forward regarding how Gaza will be governed after Israel's ground operation.

If we set aside the three traditional options—a "two-state solution," a "single democratic Israeli-Palestinian state," and the "destruction of Israel"—no approach has yet been proposed that addresses the post-operation status of Gaza within the framework of resolving the Palestinian issue.

It is suggested that while the U.S. offers public support to Israel, it is attempting to draw certain boundaries behind the scenes and is developing proposals for Gaza to be protected by some form of international peacekeeping force once Israel's operations reach their objectives. Among the claims is that they have proposed this peacekeeping force be led by the United Nations or Saudi Arabia.

Setting aside whether the United Nations, or especially Saudi Arabia, has such a capacity, it is also unclear why the latter would want to take on such a responsibility. On the other hand, a report prepared by Israel's Ministry of Intelligence discusses three options regarding this matter: bringing the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza, bringing in another local Arab element, or completely 'evacuating' the Gaza population to the Sinai Peninsula, the region of neighboring Egypt closest to Gaza. Since the report surfaced, this third option in particular has caused a major uproar.

This latest option, which resembles the 'Gaza is Egypt' version of the approach once adopted by Likud officials, 'Do you want Palestine? Here is Jordan for you!' appears to be a final 'solution' where Israel aims to get rid of the Palestinians without making any territorial concessions.

Beyond this report, it is also a subject of speculation that Israel has made many economic promises to Egypt in exchange for accepting such a proposal. Of course, while it would be quite difficult for Egypt to explain such a choice to its own people and the wider Arab and Islamic world, it is certainly not out of the question, considering the recklessness of the Abraham Accords, which paid little regard to Palestine.

On the other hand, while bringing 'another local Arab element'—whose composition is unclear—to power in Gaza would require great effort, it carries the risk of turning into a Hamas-type organization within a few years. Meanwhile, the return of the Palestinian Authority to the region is rejected by its own officials with the reservation that 'it would be like returning there on an Israeli tank or an F-16.'

Therefore, leaving aside the uncertainty of the war, if Hamas can be defeated, two unavoidable potential options stand out: either Gaza will be controlled by Israel for at least a while, or it will be emptied as a result of the evacuation of its population to Egypt and subsequently annexed by Israel.

Regardless of what happens, the question of what will become of Gaza following a potential Hamas defeat—in the face of general indifference from the Arab and Islamic world toward Palestine—is actually linked to the question of what will become of Israel and what kind of Israel the Israelis want. Will it remain a state where some within its borders are citizens, while others are not even considered citizens but live under blockade, and where different statuses based on origin exist even among its own citizens? Or will it transform into a democratic state where being Israeli encompasses everyone within its borders, regardless of whether they are of Jewish or Muslim, Hebrew or Arab origin? Until this is decided, the future of Gaza and Palestine is destined to remain uncertain.