An assessment of the current state of the Russia-Ukraine War

The Russia-Ukraine War has increasingly begun to mirror the First World War. Much like the Western Front of the First World War, the conflict has transformed into a war of attrition where maneuver has increasingly taken a backseat, and the capacity to generate fire and the ability to convert that fire into destruction have come to the fore. The fact that conditions have come to resemble the First World War has also made the battlefields similar to those of that era. The phenomenon of trench warfare, which left its mark on the First World War, is also frequently encountered in the Russia-Ukraine War.

The war entered its form of a war of attrition by Russia's design. Although the Russians began the war with rapid attacks, they could not establish superiority over Ukrainian forces, and their operations in 2022 ended in a fiasco. Following the total collapse of their plans, the Russians completely changed their concept, turning toward a technical war based on material that suited their means and capabilities. The type of warfare they are currently applying resembles a mixture of the “methodical battle” method invented by the French during the years of the First World War and the strategy the Germans applied at Verdun.

The methodical battle method is based on carrying out attacks largely from fixed positions by sending as much fire as possible onto the enemy, with minimal room for maneuver. The strategy the Germans followed at Verdun, on the other hand, was based on suddenly seizing a key point to draw as many enemy units as possible toward them and destroying the enemy that rose to counter-attack with firepower. The Russians are trying to do with offense what the Germans tried to do in defense. The approach the Russians are currently following, while promising small successes over very long periods using a great deal of resources, guarantees that losses are kept to a minimum (at least by Russian standards). If the opponent cannot respond to the fire sent upon them in equal measure and stubbornly continues to hold their positions, suffering heavy losses is inevitable.

Although I have given examples of the French and Germans above, the strategy the Russians are currently applying reflects the war of attrition theories of Russian theorist Aleksandr Svechin. It is possible to see the situation currently unfolding in Ukraine in Svechin’s book titled Strategy. As a resource-rich country, Russia can handle these types of operations, and since shifting to this approach, it has been making progress, albeit slowly. Ukraine, as of now, does not appear to be in a position to handle the costs demanded by a war of attrition. They are suffering from a serious shortage of personnel, and they are increasingly dependent on external support for equipment and ammunition.

The process that led the First World War into a four-year trench war emerged with the realization that the doctrines of all parties fighting on the Western Front were obsolete. Britain, France, and Germany had simultaneously lost their offensive capabilities, yet they had maintained their ability to produce destruction. Because the only effective way to protect against the destruction created by artillery was to go below ground level, the war suddenly turned into a war based on pits.

In the Russia-Ukraine War, there is no visible obsolescence in the doctrines of either side similar to that of the First World War. However, it has emerged that the Russian army is extremely incompetent and in a state where it cannot successfully implement its existing doctrines. Despite this, it still maintains its ability to produce destruction with its endless resources. While Ukraine has put up a successful defense against Russia, it has been seen that its offensive capability is not noteworthy, and it was not expected to establish a visible superiority over the Russians with its already limited resources. As a result, a situation of symmetry similar to the Western Front of the First World War emerged, and with Russia bringing a type of warfare that emphasizes firepower to the fore, the war turned into a trench war.

Russia has been launching attacks on the northeastern, eastern, and southern fronts for several months. As a result of its slow but steady attacks, Russia succeeded in taking the city of Avdiivka, where Ukraine's most fortified positions were located. The Russians' goal in Avdiivka was as much to grind down as many Ukrainian reserves as possible by drawing them to this point as it was to capture the region. With the style of warfare they adopted, the Russians reversed the advantages that Avdiivka offered to Ukrainian forces and turned the positions into a death trap. The Ukrainian high command, in a correct move, decided to abandon Avdiivka, which had turned into a meat grinder, to the Russians and withdrew their units from the city. Although Russia's very slow progress made the scale of their success barely noticeable, they achieved their goals and caused the Ukrainians to focus on the region, leading them to expend their limited reserves and material resources in Avdiivka.

Ukraine is also conducting its own war of attrition by striking Russia's industrial infrastructure and energy production centers with unmanned aerial vehicles and long-range missiles. Ukraine is trying to weaken Russia's production capacity as much as possible with the long-range air strikes it carries out. Although these attacks cause significant material loss, they have not been able to cause visible damage to Russia's fighting capacity. In other words, it cannot be said that the war of attrition conducted by Ukraine is effective.

In addition to industrial and energy facilities in Russia, Russian military and logistical elements, primarily targets in occupied Ukrainian territories, are also regularly struck by Ukrainian air attacks. However, these attacks have not been able to deal a visible blow to Russia's operational capability.

Ukraine achieved the only noteworthy result as a result of its air strikes in the Black Sea, and as a result of the blows dealt to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Ukraine was able to restart its maritime trade.

Although Russia began the war with major fiascos, it seems to have turned the war into a form where it can provide superiority over its opponent with the war of attrition it is currently applying. The Ukrainian army, which does not have sufficient reserves, cannot replace the losses it has suffered, and the units on the front are experiencing serious ammunition shortages. Although the weapons and ammunition support of Western countries has played a critical role so far, the prolonged war has significantly reduced the stocks of the countries sending aid to Ukraine. It is almost certain that the Russians will continue their attacks in the spring months, and the performance of the Ukrainian army in the continuation of the war will be determined by the ammunition production capacity of the countries sending military aid to Ukraine and their willingness to continue that aid.

Despite everything, the Ukrainians continue to inflict heavy losses on the Russians, and it is indisputable that they fight better than the Russians. However, fighting better than the opponent does not mean the war will be won. In the First World War, Germany had an indisputable tactical superiority over its opponents, and just as Ukraine has embarrassed Russia, they embarrassed their enemies on the battlefield countless times. The Allied powers managed at the strategic level what they could not manage at the tactical level and barely defeated Germany through a war of attrition. The German army had fought so successfully that not a single enemy soldier had set foot in Germany even at the moment it raised the white flag of surrender.

Whether the Russia-Ukraine War will end in a similar way, we will see together.