Russia's strategy shift in the Russia-Ukraine War

Russia is a country that has produced some of history's leading military theorists. While this sentence may sound like an example of "competence," the reality is quite the opposite. Throughout its history, the Russian army has been an armed force that has stood out for its incompetence and ineptitude. Although Russia has achieved many victories in its history, the Russians have never been a society that won wars by demonstrating sophisticated skills on the battlefield. They won their victories through their sheer size and numerical superiority. Naturally, this insurmountable performance issue led many military and, at times, civilian thinkers to rack their brains and develop theories in this field.

Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893-1937) and Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938) are two military theorists who lived during the same years, were the most prominent in Russia, and shaped the doctrines of other armies as well as Russia's after the Second World War. 

Tukhachevsky and Svechintheorized two completely opposite concepts. Tukhachevsky focused on "deep battle," which is based on achieving decisive results in a short time, the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, or the complete occupation of the theater of operations. "deep battle" When designing his concept, Svechin developed a theory of a "war of attrition" based on the exhaustion of the enemy, which yields results over a long period of time. "war of attrition" theory.

In Tukhachevsky's deep battle concept, mass attacks are launched in a coordinated manner from many different points, and relying on numerical superiority, it is assumed that the enemy cannot successfully defend every point. At points where the defense collapses, units rapidly penetrate deep into enemy territory, seize key locations, cut off the enemy's logistics lines, and outflank enemy units engaged in combat in other positions. Thus, even if the defending side manages to stop the Russians in certain areas, the war enters a course that the defending side cannot handle, and the defense ultimately collapses.

In the war of attrition theorized by Svechin, however, there are no objectives such as collapsing the opponent's operation, destroying their armed forces, or occupying enemy territory, as is the case in deep battle. On the contrary, this type of operation completely leaves the initiative to the opponent, and it is assumed that the operation conducted by the opposing side will not pose a significant obstacle to the operation conducted by the Russian army. The operation is mostly carried out by sending as much fire as possible onto the enemy from fixed positions or from the air. In this way, the opponent cannot benefit from the advantages offered by the defense and is left with a dilemma between engaging in a firefight with the Russians and launching a counter-offensive. The goal is to exhaust the enemy's resources and render them unable to fight. Since the concept does not require taking the opponent's moves into account, the margin for error on the battlefield is also quite low. In this type of warfare, what must be taken into account is that weapons and ammunition production must always be greater than the opponent's, and units must be better supplied than the opponent's. In other words, the weight of the war rests more on the elements in the rear than on the units at the front.

Neither approach was a theory invented from scratch by Svechin or Tukhachevsky. In fact, throughout their history, the Russians have applied similar versions of both methods many times. Svechin and Tukhachevsky, however, refined and organized these methods so they could be applied more consciously, preparedly, systematically, and without wasting time. When both thinkers put forward their theories, rather than solving the Russian army's problem of incompetence, they sought ways to prevail over the opponent “despite the incompetence.” Although their theories were completely opposite, they met on a common ground: balancing the tactical and operational ineptitude of the Russian army with the country's massive manpower, powerful industry, and unlimited resources.

Another common point between Tukhachevsky and Svechin is that they were executed by Stalin's order just one year apart. Although their theories were shelved after their executions, both types of warfare were put into practice during World War II and continued to be developed systematically after the war.

The Russia-Ukraine War, however, revealed that Putin had forgotten the past. The 2022 operation was built on a “blitzkrieg” style that only capable armies could handle, rather than a warfare technique suited to the qualities of the Russian army. The plan was to neutralize the Ukrainian army and completely occupy the country within ten days. Germany had successfully applied this method many times in the early years of World War II. However, Putin's forcing the Russian army to fight like the German army caused them to be humiliated before the whole world. Although Ukraine faltered in the first days because it was caught unprepared for the sudden Russian attack, it recovered in a short time. By mobilizing completely, Ukraine neutralized the blitzkrieg waged by Russia through a “people's war” and subsequently launched a counter-offensive, routing the Russian army.

Although the results of the 2022 operation revealed that the hereditary incompetence in the Russian army still persists, defeating a country like Russia, which has many jokers up its sleeve, is not an easy task. The Russians completely abandoned the 2022 strategy and tactics, which were completely incompatible with their army, and chose to side with Svechin at the crossroads they found themselves in. This was a very logical move. After all, the Ukrainians can easily neutralize the tanks that lie at the heart of Tukhachevsky's theory. In contrast, they have no effective solution against the artillery that lies at the heart of Svechin's theory. Furthermore, Tukhachevsky's style requires a long preparation period, and it is possible that the Russians might be preparing for an offensive based on Tukhachevsky's principles to knock out Ukraine after shaking it for a certain period with Svechin's style. The fact that Svechin's strategy is being implemented systematically and without going through a trial-and-error process shows that the Russians are acting quite consciously. 

Russia is largely conducting the war of attrition with mass artillery bombardments. They are forcing Ukrainian units in fixed positions into a dilemma between being bombarded and launching a counter-offensive. If the Ukrainians choose to endure the bombardment, they slowly erode in the positions they are holding. If they choose to launch a counter-offensive, they are mostly easily dispersed through heavy weaponry. The operation conducted by Russia minimizes the risk to its own troops while offering the Ukrainians two options: achieving nothing while suffering few losses, or achieving very little while suffering heavy losses. Although abandoning positions and retreating, as seen in Avdiivka, might seem like a third option, it results in a Russian advance, effectively leading back to the first two options in practice.

Through a war of attrition, Russia has not only neutralized Ukraine's concept of people's war and gained superiority over Ukraine, but it has also shaped the war into the form it desires. As of now, Ukraine has not been able to produce a solution against Russia's war of attrition. They have accepted the war of production and supply dictated by Russia and are trying to balance the Russian army's firepower by producing as much fire as they can. However, the only thing they can do is slow down the Russian army's operation as much as possible. According to reports, Russian artillery fires five times more shells than Ukrainian artillery. 

The only obstacle currently preventing Ukraine's collapse is the US and European countries that provide regular support in weapons and ammunition. However, the Russian industry is producing more weapons and ammunition than Ukraine obtains through foreign aid. Furthermore, they are also receiving ammunition and weapons aid from Iran, North Korea, and China. 

Although the countries supporting Ukraine plan to increase production, it is unclear how they will defeat Russia in a game it designed itself. The problem in 2022 was a result of the Russians adopting a strategy and doctrine that did not suit them. Now, they are fighting with a doctrine and strategy that is perfectly suited to them, and history has proven many times that standing against a Russia that uses its resources effectively is a very difficult task. Ukraine is being dragged toward exhaustion step by step, as predicted by Svechin. As of now, it does not seem that the current conditions will change without a new move from Ukraine and its supporters that would change the rules of the game.