The First Battle of İnönü: Who hoped for what, and what did they find?

The First Battle of İnönü, which took place around this time 103 years ago, was a turning point in the War of Independence. While the struggle against the Greeks prior to the Battle of İnönü in January 1921 was primarily based on guerrilla warfare, the period of major battles began from this date forward.

Atatürk’s strategy for the War of Independence was not to fight on all fronts simultaneously, but rather to leave the strongest enemy, the Greeks, for last and to conclude the fighting on other fronts before facing them. Atatürk deemed this strategy necessary because he did not see a chance of success if fighting occurred on all fronts at once, and because the army had been severely exhausted during the First World War, a long period of restructuring was essential before confronting the Greeks. Keeping the Greek Front weak was a risky strategy, and 1920 would prove to be quite difficult. However, in 1921, the fruits of Atatürk’s “concentration” strategy would be harvested.

This strategy led to the Greeks winning very easy victories in 1920, resulting in their occupation of a vast region, including Bursa. Losses were inevitable under Atatürk’s strategy. However, thanks to this strategy, critical time was gained, and the Turkish army reached the capacity to face the Greeks. By the time the First Battle of İnönü occurred, the Eastern Front had been closed, the French in Southeastern Anatolia had been discouraged, internal rebellions had been overcome, and the Ethem the Circassian (Çerkez Ethem) problem, which was ongoing when the battle began, was also about to be resolved. Most importantly, the era of the Kuvayı Milliye (National Forces), based on irregular units, had ended, and a system based entirely on a regular army had been adopted. A regular army was essential to defeat the Greeks. The Kuvayı Milliye, on the other hand, only promised to slow down and wear down enemy forces to a certain extent. By the beginning of 1921, with the exception of Ethem the Circassian’s rebellion, the Turkish army could focus entirely on the Greeks, and the Ethem the Circassian issue would be resolved immediately after the First Battle of İnönü.

Atatürk’s successes were also being observed by the Greeks, and the developments in Anatolia had thrown their existing strategies into disarray. In 1919 and 1920, the Greeks had mostly faced irregular Kuvayı Milliye forces. The Greek high command had attributed this to the complete collapse of the Turkish army. The current developments, however, showed that the Turks were hiding their true strength and that there was an army ready to fight them. Yet, Greek intelligence could not provide a clear figure regarding the size of the Turkish army or how much of it consisted of irregular versus regular units. Therefore, a decision was made to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force. Depending on the outcome of the attack, Greek forces in Anatolia would either be reinforced or operations would continue with the existing units.

Another reason for the decision to attack was to show the British that Venizelos’s Anatolian policy was still being pursued. Eleftherios Venizelos had lost the November 1920 elections, and the royalist Dimitrios Rallis had replaced him. As a result of Rallis bringing King Constantine, who had been deposed in a British-French backed coup in 1916, back to the throne, the British had withdrawn their support for the Greeks and left them alone. Rallis and the Greek generals, who considered British support critical, hoped that by further escalating the war started by Venizelos, they could regain British friendship. These dreams would prove to be in vain.

The Greek III Corps (Izmir Corps) set out from Bursa on January 6, 1921, with a force of 15,000 soldiers (70% of its total strength) with orders to capture Eskişehir. If the Greek forces could defeat the Turkish units that had established a defensive line in Bozüyük in front of Eskişehir within a day or two, they would advance toward Eskişehir; if they could not, they would return. The I Corps would support the III Corps with about 3,000 soldiers (10% of its total strength). The sole purpose of the I Corps was to conduct diversionary attacks.

About four months before the Battle of İnönü, the Turkish side had calculated that the next Greek operation would be directed toward Eskişehir and had fortified the mountainous terrain around Bozüyük, which the high command considered the best defensive region. The Turkish plan was based on stopping the numerically superior enemy forces with passive resistance in the fortified zone at Bozüyük.

The moment the Greek III Corps moved toward Eskişehir, it was detected by Turkish scouts, and the operation against Ethem the Circassian was halted that same day, with units in the region being dispatched to the fortified zone in front of Eskişehir (the battle would end before the vast majority of these units could reach the battlefield). İsmet Pasha, who directed the operation, established his headquarters at the train station in the town of İnönü in Eskişehir. For this reason, the battle became known as the Battle of İnönü (the Greeks call it the Battle of Bozüyük).

Greek forces reached the Turkish positions on January 9. However, the clashes on January 9 consisted only of reconnaissance attacks, and the main battle began on January 10. On this date, the strength of the Turks on the battlefield was around 6,000, and when the I Corps tasked with diversionary attacks is taken into account, the Greeks had a three-to-one numerical superiority. In terms of firepower, the Greeks were far superior.

As an experienced commander, İsmet Pasha determined that the weak Greek attacks on January 9 were intended as a diversion and kept his reserves back rather than sending them to the conflict zone. This decision would be of critical importance in winning the battle. On January 10, the Greeks attacked the 30-kilometer-long defensive positions throughout the day, first in the south and then in the north. Although the Greeks achieved some success with attacks concentrated on narrow areas, all the lost ground was retaken with counter-attacks organized by the reserves İsmet Pasha had held back. On the night of January 10, III Corps Commander General Konstantinos Petmezas decided to retreat, believing that the mission had been accomplished. Indeed, it had been confirmed that all the Turkish units they faced were members of the regular army. The Greek retreat took place gradually on January 11 and 12. When the battle ended, the losses on both sides were quite low.

With the Battle of İnönü, the regular army passed its first test against the Greeks and played a critical role in boosting the morale of the Turks, who had not achieved any significant success against the Greeks until that day, by proving that the Greeks could be stopped. For the Greeks, the result of the battle meant that their fears had come true. While they had captured Bursa in just one day with fewer forces in the summer of 1920, they had been stopped at the very first defensive line about six months later and had not even been able to reach the vicinity of Eskişehir. The Turkish army was ready for war, and it was obvious that it would become even stronger over time. However, this development would lead the Greeks to decide to escalate the war further rather than deter them. After the defeat at the First Battle of İnönü, the Greeks decided to repeat the attack with a larger force by reinforcing their troops in Anatolia. The real war between the Greeks and the Turks was just beginning, and the First Battle of İnönü would be the smallest-scale battle of 1921, the year in which the bloodiest battles of the war would take place.