Turkey's population is not renewing itself! Fertility rate at its lowest level in history

The 2024 birth statistics published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) have revealed that the country is facing a silent demographic crisis. The total fertility rate has fallen to 1.48. This figure indicates that Turkey has dropped below the population replacement threshold and that the social structure is aging rapidly.

While Turkey has boasted of its young population for many years, it is now rapidly approaching the league of aging societies. Demographic structures worldwide are undergoing a profound transformation. Declining fertility rates, increased life expectancy, and advancements in healthcare are increasing the proportion of the elderly population while the youth population is gradually shrinking. Turkey has also transitioned from a period of high birth and death rates to a stage where both are low. This transformation is already laying the groundwork for the demographic dynamics that will be encountered in the future. The fact that the median age is increasing every year and the fertility rate has fallen below 2.1—the threshold for population replacement—signals a silent and deepening demographic crisis.

In this article, we will demonstrate that this decline is not merely a numerical reality, but a signal of a transformation that deeply affects Turkey's economic, social, and strategic structure.

Change in Fertility Rate in Turkey Throughout History

Although Turkey still has a relatively young population structure, it is approaching the category of rapidly aging societies. The fertility rate, which represents the average number of children a woman can have in the 15-49 age group—the period when a woman is fertile—was at the level of 6-7 children per woman in the 1950s. This rate remained above 5 until the mid-1970s, and the decline accelerated further from the late 1980s and early 1990s. The fertility rate, which remained stable slightly above 2.1 for a while at the beginning of the 2000s, has started to decline again in recent years and has fallen to the level of 1.48 children per woman as of 2024.

The Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) published the “Birth Statistics, 2024” report on May 13, 2025, delivering the painful news that a critical threshold has been reached regarding Turkey's demographic future. The number of babies born in Turkey throughout 2024 was only 937,559, with 51.4% being boys and 48.6% being girls. Beyond being one of the lowest birth figures in recent years, this number shows that a profound transformation is taking place in the country's population structure. Even more striking is the drop in the total fertility rate from 2.38 in 2001 to 1.48. The fertility rate in our country has been well below the threshold (2.10) required for the population to renew itself for the last eight years. This situation is a harbinger of serious demographic and socioeconomic problems for the future.

Alarm Bells Ringing in Fertility and the Map is Silently Turning Red

The decline in fertility rates across Turkey is not unique to just a few cities. While the number of provinces where the fertility rate fell below 1.50 was only 4 and the number of provinces where it fell below 2.10 was 57 in 2017, the number of provinces where it fell below 1.50 rose to 55 and the number of provinces where it fell below 2.10 rose to 71 in 2024. While the number of provinces where the total fertility rate was 3 children or more was 10 in 2017, it was only the province of Şanlıurfa in 2024.

Fertility rates have fallen to particularly low levels in the western and northern parts of Turkey. This rate has fallen below critical thresholds such as 1.12 in Bartın and Eskişehir, 1.15 in Ankara and Zonguldak, 1.17 in İzmir, 1.20 in Istanbul, 1.64 in Adana, and 1.37 in Bursa. On the other hand, fertility above the population replacement level is still observed in eastern provinces such as Şanlıurfa (3.28), Şırnak (2.62), and Mardin (2.32), which share the top 3 spots in terms of total fertility rate. However, the general trend points to a serious decline across the country.

Total Fertility Rate by Mother's Education Level

It is observed that the fertility rate decreases as the education level increases. In 2024, while the highest total fertility rate was 2.65 children for mothers who were illiterate/literate but did not graduate from any school (while this rate was 2.78 in Adana and 2.37 in Bursa), the lowest total fertility rate was 1.22 children for mothers who were higher education graduates (while this rate was 1.28 in Adana and 1.17 in Bursa).

Total Fertility Rate by Urban-Rural Classification

In 2024, the total fertility rate was 1.83 children in places classified as rural (1.58 in Adana and 1.37 in Bursa), 1.58 children in places classified as medium-density urban (1.98 in Adana and 1.64 in Bursa), and 1.39 children in places classified as high-density urban (1.61 in Adana and 1.34 in Bursa).

Fertility Rate by Age Group

While the highest age-specific fertility rate was in the 20-24 age group with 144 per thousand in 2001, it was seen in the 25-29 age group with 100 per thousand in 2024. This situation shows that fertility occurs at later ages for women.

The average age of mothers who gave birth in 2001 was 26.7, while it was 29.3 in 2024. The average age of mothers who had their first child in 2024 was 27.3.

Is the Myth of Young Turkey Coming to an End?

In the past, Turkey stood in a different position compared to the aging countries of Europe thanks to its young and dynamic population. However, as of 2024, the fertility rate in Turkey (1.48) has approached the average total fertility rate of the European Union (27 member countries) (1.38) according to 2023 data. When the total fertility rates of these 27 European Union member countries are examined, it was seen that the country with the highest total fertility rate was Bulgaria with 1.81 children, and the country with the lowest total fertility rate was Malta with 1.06 children. This rate was 1.66 in France, 1.39 in Germany, 1.21 in Italy, and 1.12 in Spain. Turkey, with a total fertility rate of 1.48 in 2024, ranked 9th among European Union member countries. This development indicates that Turkey is about to lose its “young country” advantage and is rapidly beginning to resemble the aging population structure of European countries.

Why is it Falling? The Invisible Causes of the Demographic Crisis

Behind this sharp decline in birth rates in Turkey, there are not only changes in individual preferences but also multi-layered economic and social factors. First of all, the increase in women's education levels and the spread of university education are pushing the age of marriage and childbirth to later years. For women participating in business life, having children is postponed to later ages, which narrows the fertility window. In this context, when the total fertility rate is examined according to the mother's education level, it is noteworthy that while the highest total fertility rate in 2024 was 2.65 children for mothers who were illiterate/literate but did not graduate from any school, the lowest total fertility rate was 1.22 children for mothers who were higher education graduates.

However, the most decisive factor is economic pressure. Rising cost of living, increases in housing and rent prices, child care costs, and health and education expenditures are causing young couples, especially in big cities, to delay or completely cancel their decision to have children. Food inflation, the prices of basic baby products, and the real erosion of wages make having children an economic luxury.

Furthermore, the political atmosphere and social climate in the country also fuel this crisis. Lack of confidence in the future, social polarization, the increase in young people's dreams of going abroad, and political uncertainties make it difficult for individuals to make long-term life plans. Young people now avoid having children not only for individual reasons but also because of systemic uncertainties.

What Awaits Turkey? Possible Consequences of the Silent Crisis

If this trend continues, the consequences Turkey will face will not be limited to population alone. The decrease in the young population will lead to a decline in the number of individuals of working age, and productivity will decrease. With an aging society, pension systems will be strained, social security expenditures will increase, and this will create serious pressures on the state budget. Not only population dynamics, but also fundamental areas such as economic growth, labor supply, and the sustainability of the social security system will be directly affected.

Educational institutions will have to shrink, the number of students in schools will decrease, and new problems such as teacher surpluses will arise. In addition, the aging voter profile will be decisive in political trends, and policies may increasingly become elderly-focused.

Is There a Way Out? Long-Term Strategies Against the Crisis

Reversing this picture is not possible with just a few financial incentives such as child benefits. For Turkey to solve its fertility crisis, it needs long-term, comprehensive, and integrated social policies. First of all, the social infrastructure that supports having children needs to be strengthened. Policies such as expanding public nurseries, extending maternity leave, and providing flexible working hours for working parents will lighten the burden on families.

Steps such as providing special support to young couples in housing policies, offering interest-free loan opportunities for first-time home purchases, and implementing permanent income support per child can encourage decisions to have children. Increasing access to women's health and fertility services and conducting awareness campaigns on reproductive health will also be important supporting elements.

However, the most fundamental issue is restoring a sense of confidence in the future to society. Without a predictable and peaceful political environment based on the rule of law, no matter how much the desire to have children is encouraged, a permanent solution cannot be produced.

CONCLUSION: Demographic Crisis is a Problem of Confidence in the Future

TÜİK data clearly shows that Turkey is no longer a young society, but an aging one. This transformation is a structural crisis that affects every area, from the social security system to health services, and from the economy to social balance, not just the population structure.

The dramatic decline in the fertility rate is an indicator not only of economic conditions but also of the weakening of the social mood, institutional trust, and belief in the future. Having children in Turkey is no longer an investment in the future for individuals; it has become an increasingly growing economic and social risk.

This picture is a national issue that requires not only families but also the state, local governments, civil society, and the business world to take responsibility. The decline in fertility rates is too deep to be explained by individual preferences; it is directly related to structural elements such as social trust, the rule of law, merit, and predictable public policies.

The significant decline in the fertility rate threatens not only the demographic structure but also the country's long-term economic and social stability. This process is a clear reflection of the erosion of trust in Turkey's economic and institutional structure. Before this crisis, which is progressing silently today, becomes tomorrow's social collapse; it must be addressed with holistic, supra-political, and long-term policies, and hope must be restored to society, confidence to the youth, and support to the family. Because the value a society places on children is actually a mirror of the value it places on its own future. This crisis is a silent but effective warning. If the necessary steps are not taken today, not only the population but also hope will diminish tomorrow.

A social state reform guided by the right policies will enable Turkey to build not only today's demographic crisis but also tomorrow's welfare society...