The Öcalan Doctrine: Democratic Confederalism

The model proposed by Öcalan is clear: Democratic Confederalism.

What is Democratic Confederalism?

Its theorist is Abdullah Öcalan. It is a model he developed while in the İmralı prison.

•It is a political paradigm based on a stateless society.

•It is a democratic self-organization (decentralized and spontaneous organization) that possesses characteristics of a confederation, based on elements of autonomy, direct democracy, political ecology (the study of the relationships between environmental issues and political, economic, and social factors), feminism, multiculturalism, self-defense (where responding to an armed attack with arms is considered legitimate), self-governance (autonomy), and a cooperative economy.

•It was created by being influenced by Middle Eastern history and general state theory.

•Initially, he set out to establish a Kurdish Nation-State on a Marxist-Leninist basis, but he became disillusioned with the Nation-State model and state socialism. He abandoned the statist-centralist socialist model.

•He no longer aims to establish an independent Kurdish State from Turkey, but rather an autonomous, democratic, and decentralized model.

•Thus, he has reformulated the political goals of the Kurdish freedom movement.

•Öcalan's doctrine includes a conception of socialism that does not rely on any state.

•Every community and nation has a confederal structure within itself.

•He has taken the structure of the Middle East as a model.

•He envisions that the 22 Arab States could realize this structure among themselves, and that Turks could also establish a "Turkish Democratic Confederalism" among themselves.

Öcalan explains the system as follows;

"Democratic Confederalism is not a state system. It is the democratic system of the people where there is no state.

It is a system where all segments of the people, especially women and youth, create their own democratic organization, and where politics is conducted directly, on the basis of free-equal confederation citizenship, in their own free citizenship assemblies at the local level.

It is based on the principle of self-power and self-sufficiency. It derives its power from the people. It adopts the goal of achieving self-sufficiency in every field, including the economy.

It is based on the democratic communal structure of the natural society that has not wanted to enter into the statist-society centralization throughout the history of civilization, from clan and tribal systems to the present day."

According to Öcalan, this system is the antidote to nationalism.

THE TURKEY MODEL

What Öcalan wants from Turkey is also clearly listed.

•Acceptance of Turkish Citizenship instead of the Turkish Nation

•Each group living out its own cultural identity

•Education in the mother tongue, public service, representation in the TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)

•The nation-state is the denial of direct democracy and must be destroyed.

•All peoples have the right to self-determination.

•Democratic nations can form their own confederations.

•Democratic confederalists in Turkey; Botan Region (Siirt/Eruh), Garzan region (Siirt/Kurtalan), Amed (Diyarbakır), Serhat (Kars, Ardahan, Ağrı, Iğdır), Dersim Region

•Kurdish-Turkmen Region west of the Euphrates

•Mersin, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş

DEMOCRACY WITHOUT A STATE DOES NOT NEED GEOGRAPHICAL BORDERS EITHER

Yes, these words belong to Öcalan. This is the new paradigm!

The DEM Party, the PKK, and Öcalan have united on this issue.

While the İmralı delegation says "there is no division," the PKK, in its latest statement, gave its answer to Bahçeli with these words:

"As the problem belongs to all of us, the duty also belongs to all of us."

After declaring with these words that there is no question of being liquidated and that they themselves are a part of the process, it addressed Turkey with high-handed, insolent statements.

"The state should not be afraid; Apo and the Kurds will not destroy the state. They will restructure it on a basis sensitive and open to democracy.

The Turkish society should not be afraid; Apo and the Kurds will not divide Turkey, they will work to democratize Turkey on the basis of Kurdish freedom."

"The PKK and the Kurds will change, the Republic of Turkey State and the Turkish environment will change, the Middle East and the whole world will change."

It is evident that the project has changed.

The new project is far beyond the danger of Turkey merely losing a piece of land.

The new project is a CHAOS PROJECT.

The envisioned new structural change is a DUAL STRUCTURE. It is not limited to just one geographical region, nor is it limited to just the Kurds.

It is a demand for different ethnic, religious, and national groups scattered across every corner of the country to govern themselves by clustering and through people's assemblies, without being tied to a state.

Murat Karayılan, on the other hand, states that if Turkey does not reach an agreement with them on the basis of democratic unity in this model, they can also implement this democratic confederal system independently.

The fact that the PKK, DEM, and their other stakeholders have pinned their hopes on this DERANGED MODEL is important in terms of understanding the dimensions of the threat. However, what is even more important is whether the government knows where it is running with the hope it has pinned on Öcalan.

WHAT IS HAPPENING? WHERE IS THE GOVERNMENT RUNNING?

The public is curious about the answers to these questions. Questions are coming one after another.

•Does Bahçeli not know that Öcalan will not unilaterally liquidate the PKK with the call he made? A person who receives information from "deep" sources certainly knows this.

•Can he make a call without the knowledge and approval of the President? Of course, he cannot.

•Is it normal for the President to stand behind the scenes in the face of so many events and watch the process with weak "approval messages"? Of course, it is not.

•With this call, is the government aiming to regain the votes it has lost and to make its reign eternal by taking the DEM Party along with it in the New Constitution process?

If the process evolves to a result, that is, if Öcalan receives what he wants and supports the government, it could happen.

•How would the Turkish Nation accept this scenario of betrayal?

•However, if the process is carried out in stages and continued as suggested by Kurdish theorists, if weapons are first silenced with negative peace and then the second stage is passed with a New Constitution, the election to be held in the intervening time period could provide an advantage to the government.

•Would Öcalan risk this? Previous experiences show that he would not.

•Is Bahçeli's move a political move that consolidates his own political power and increases his votes with a new image?

It is not; it has received a huge reaction from the base. To silence these reactions, Presidential Advisor Ayhan Ongan threatened the public with the words: "Those who do not take into account Devlet Bahçeli's call that the Turkish century will be incomplete without the Kurds will pay the price."

•Is the Turkish Nation's view of the process that started with Öcalan positive? It is not.

•Why does the process not occupy the agenda as it did in the days it first started?

This is the key question!

The media that creates the agenda is also the one that sets the course for it, which is politics. Recently, apart from the Bolu Fire, the public has been directed to issues such as detentions, television raids, arrests, the incident involving lieutenants, and the presidential rivalries within the CHP.

The detentions, arrests, and the incident involving lieutenants are deliberate moves aimed at silencing the public by creating a climate of fear.

The government and its media first consciously create tension, and then apply a strategy of intimidating those who react by using the power of pressure through the judiciary.

The most effective method of increasing reaction by increasing tension is the detentions and arrests applied to names known and loved by society, which the public believes are "unjust and unlawful."

•Is this method foreign to society? It is not.

•When did it happen? In the Ergenekon, Balyoz, and Espionage cases.

•What was the result?

•The public became silent and afraid.

•The second key question: Do you remember an event where the public showed its democratic power through protest actions?

•The Gezi Protests

•Result? It is obvious!

•Who benefits from a similar social reaction? Those who have the power and authority to structure the administration as they wish by declaring a state of emergency and martial law...

One wonders, is this the purpose of creating tension in the new paradigm that starts with the right to hope for Öcalan and continues with arrests?