East of the Euphrates, north of Syria

The 14-article agreement signed between the Al-Shara government in Damascus and the SDF on January 18, 2026, points to yet another—seemingly endless—turning point regarding Syria. In truth, we can summarize these 14 articles under a single theme: the expansion of the central government's sovereignty in Syria. Separate headings such as the SDF's forced integration and withdrawal to the east, the transfer of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor to Damascus, and the return of oil/gas fields to the control of the central government all point to this.

Let me state at the beginning what I would say at the end. In Syria, "this situation is far from over." In fact, the point I have emphasized most in many of the articles I have written about Syria is that our neighbor will not be able to achieve stability for a long time to come. I still think the same, because what we are talking about here is actually state-building. And as anyone who looks at the issue from this perspective would guess, implementing agreements is harder than making them. At this point, I think it will take more time for Syria to find its own "social contract."

On the other hand, if the text of January 18 is implemented, different balances may emerge for the region. For example, one of the issues we have emphasized most since the fall of Assad was Israel's strengthening in Syria. There is little sign of Israel's support for the Kurds and its desire for a fragmented Syria that would not cause it problems in this agreement, which is also supported by the US. I think the primary factor regarding Israel is Washington. Because it is clear that the US does not want a crisis between Turkey and Israel. Moreover, Tel Aviv and Washington also need each other regarding Iran, another focal point in the Middle East.

Looking at it from Turkey's perspective, Ankara's focus in the Syrian Civil War since 2014 has been more on the risk of statehood for the PYD-YPG in northern Syria than on Assad. Therefore, this agreement on January 18 is important in terms of drawing a framework close to the concept of territorial integrity that Turkey has constantly emphasized. So, how will Turkey's relief regarding northern Syria affect internal political dynamics? As is known, the issue of "peace" within the country was based primarily on a "geopolitical" context. In short, pages of analysis were written about the fact that major changes would take place within Syria and that, therefore, Turkey needed to achieve internal peace. When this agreement is implemented, the geopolitical narrative of this process will also disappear. Afterwards, what happens, or will happen, in domestic politics will show us more clearly what the process points to outside of geopolitics. It is unknown what the result will be, but it can be predicted that a table based on election alliances, constitutional mathematics, etc., will try to manifest itself one way or another...

At this point, I do not think there is any meaning in some DEM politicians conveying their unhappiness with the process. Because it is highly debatable whether they had any role other than being the spokesperson for Imralı in this process. The party headquarters issued a statement conveying that they found Turkey's stance on the SDF in Syria contradictory while conducting a process internally. I wonder if those who made this statement look at themselves... I don't think so. For example, there is a democracy issue that DEM does not want to dwell on much while conducting a process internally. But when the subject comes to Syria, their politicians say, "a non-democratic integration is unacceptable." In any case, it is obvious that the Syria they advocate and the Syria imagined by Imralı are not exactly the same. However, these contradictions do not seem very decisive for now...

Returning to the beginning, in Syria, "this situation is far from over." We will continue to read and write about this through both national and regional lenses...