Somewhere at the end of the Old World

U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance gave a speech at the Munich Security Conference a few days ago. Vance stated that the real threat to Europe does not come from external actors like Russia or China, but from Europe itself—that is, from within.

He attributed this internal threat to Europe's anti-democratic rhetoric and actions. By these rhetoric and actions, he meant the stance taken against far-right parties and the social media restrictions imposed on the discourse of these parties. Vance also created a "shock effect" by meeting with the leader of the populist-racist far-right AfD in Germany.

Moreover, this distinguished Munich performance by the vice president came just after Trump announced that he would hold a long meeting with Putin and negotiate in Saudi Arabia to end the Russia-Ukraine War. We already knew since his election campaign that Trump wanted to end the war. But Europe being left out of the Riyadh table came as a cold shower for Europeans.

There are two facts revealed by these events that have taken place in recent days. The U.S. seems to have left Europe stranded in its current state. The expression on the face of conference chairman Heusgen at the closing of the conference shows exactly this: "We fear that our common values are no longer that common." So what will Europe do? According to the U.S., they should increase their defense budgets.

But for many European countries, this is one of the most feared scenarios. However, it is clear that the old continent will inevitably have to do something under these conditions. In this context, even Turkey has come to mind again, and with its "candidacy" status at that. You know, the country that was imagined as a buffer zone for refugees, and whose citizens cannot even find visa appointments because too many refugees are seeking asylum. I am not being sarcastic, as I realize that no design is one-sided. But I was still surprised, honestly...

Other than that, one reason I brought up Turkey is that I think two opposing trends will emerge for Turkey somewhere at the end of the old world. First, as in the example above, Turkey may come to mind more often. Some opportunities to be evaluated may arise from being remembered again, and furthermore, what Europeans call non-polarity may benefit the vague "autonomy" policy that Turkey is trying to follow. However, Turkey may also have to struggle with additional instability in surrounding regions in such an environment of security-insecurity. I think new instabilities are a near possibility.

Apart from this, there is undoubtedly some bad news for the opposition in Turkey in these days when we are sitting on the edge of the old world. While the new order is being discussed, concepts such as the Western liberal order or the post-Western international order have often been used to refer to both a distinction and a competition. We agree that competition is permanent, but it is certain that we are facing a global wave of illiberalism, regardless of whether it is Western or post-Western. Moreover, this wave is much stronger—and more absurd—than the form we discussed ten years ago. We are facing a U.S. that defends the "freedom of expression" of fascist parties. In this U.S., the "president's men," or let's use the trendy term, his oligarchs, are made up of Musks who push fascist parties to the forefront more with algorithms. The indoctrination faced today is often much stronger than the 1930s, which are the source of historical analogies made about the present day. In other words, the phone you constantly hold in your hand is more effective than the Italian dopolavoro. In such a global plane, Turkey's "competitive authoritarianism" may not have much meaning left. The global legitimacy of the democracy promised by opposition parties—at least some of them—is gradually decreasing. In such a plane, the opposition, which is already rowing against the wind, will also have to resist the global wind.

It is certain that we are witnessing a great transformation. Of course, not exactly by choice...