The Main Opposition's Foreign Policy

A few days ago, CHP Chairman Özgür Özel made a statement regarding bribery allegations involving the Turkish House (Türkevi) in New York. Because this statement, which I will touch upon at the end of this article, received intense backlash from the opposition public in Turkey, Özel was forced to make an additional statement. Although this incident serves as a starting point for today's article, let me warn you: I have no intention of repeating what has already been written and drawn extensively on this subject. Rather, I want to put into writing some of the weaknesses I see in the opposition's general approach to establishing a fundamental foreign policy line.  

However, first of all, I must say that the main opposition party should not be viewed as a monolithic structure that thinks the same way on every issue. We are talking about a multi-layered structure extending from the headquarters to the local level. Yet, considering the history of the CHP, this is neither new nor a surprise. The most recent example of this situation in foreign policy was seen in the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) issue, which is also debated by the public. A statement made by Retired Ambassador/MP Namık Tan, one of the CHP's foreign policy advisors, in a parliamentary speech, where he used the prefix "fairy tale" for the Blue Homeland, sparked a debate. Following this, Yankı Bağcıoğlu, the CHP's Deputy Chairman with a military background, clearly stated that this issue was outside (or above) political debates. While this situation exemplifies the intra-party differences I mentioned, it also points to the possibility of having different projections in foreign policy. 

The CHP also has impulsive moves on some issues that do not lead to results. For example, Syria. Since the beginning of the civil war, the CHP has been on a different line from the ruling AKP party on this issue. When the rhetoric of normalization/dialogue with Assad and Syria intensified this summer, news began to spread in the media that Özgür Özel would go to Damascus via Lebanon. When you scan the issues of newspapers from the first half of July, you see some news about this mission and even that the green light was given from Damascus for this visit. As a result, this visit did not take place. However, at that time, what exactly the CHP aimed to achieve with this visit remained somewhat ambiguous. Since I only know what was reflected in the media, let me write that. The CHP had said it could take on a mediation role. But I suppose no one questioned whether the CHP had such power over the AKP and Assad. Another thing that was not calculated, in my opinion, was the possibility that such a visit could turn into a propaganda weapon against the main opposition party. One must also add to the list how Syria could portray this visit. As a result, the CHP's desire to set the game by going to Damascus quietly fell off the agenda at the end of July. As far as I could follow from the media, Damascus had not actually given the green light to such a visit anyway. In short, I do not believe that such impulsive moves and inconclusive initiatives in foreign policy are of any benefit to the main opposition party. 

Yet, the real area where the main opposition needs to make more decisive moves is Turkey's position and its place in the world. Here, we see a vague vision of direction. For the last few weeks, I have been trying to talk about Turkish foreign policy and systemic changes in this column. In such a period when Turkey is experiencing drifts in its foreign policy, the CHP criticizes these drifts and reacts to events. However, I am not sure if it offers a clear and distinct alternative. From what I understand from the main opposition's rhetoric, Turkey's place in foreign policy is envisioned in the West. The goal of reviving EU membership and establishing more balanced relations with NATO is at the forefront. However, these are not emphasized much. Is the reason for this that the rising anti-Western/NATO/EU sentiment in Turkey currently carries a high cost for such an emphasis? Or is it the lack of a clear plan on the path to these goals? I suppose it is both. However, just as the opposition needs to create a well-thought-out, planned, and consistent foreign policy alternative, it is also essential that it defends it courageously when it does create one. Foreign policy has long ceased to be an area of interest only to a small and elite group. In short, a comprehensive policy is needed in this area as well.  

Speaking of an alternative, let's come to the final issue. The starting point of this article was actually the Türkevi issue, about which Özel made two statements. For some time now, the main opposition has been constantly emphasizing being "Turkey's party" on various platforms. Frankly, it is an overly defensive rhetoric. Moreover, for a party that has survived for over 100 years, it is also unnecessary. When you keep this emphasis in mind, Özel's statement does not come as a surprise. But still, one must ask: If, in a conjuncture where everything is permissible internally, one is to act as if a monolithic reaction is required because everything externally has become a national issue, will the dirty laundry be kept hidden in an allegation where Turkey's reputation is also at stake? I think this question is important and closely related to the points above. Because if this is the case, then the possibility of the opposition putting forward a planned and consistent foreign policy alternative, as I mentioned above, also decreases. Something to ponder upon...