The reflection of current geopolitics on the Aegean

The war in Iran, which began on February 28 with attacks by Israel and the US, seems set to continue. Throughout this process, we have been and continue to be subjected to systematic disinformation. However, one truth we can sense behind all this fire and smoke is that the war and its potential consequences are prone to creating a new regional order or subsystem. In short, it would not be wrong to suggest that this war has the potential to create a distinction for the region similar to a 'before and after February 28'. 

The war has also begun to completely restructure the map of security and insecurity surrounding Turkey. Turkey itself became a target for neutralized missiles. Beyond this, however, the war has brought back to our agenda some issues we are accustomed to discussing in the context of Turkish-Greek relations. To put it more clearly, current geopolitics has created a comprehensive situation that links the war in Iran to the demilitarized status of the Aegean islands. 

First, let us underline that we have been discussing Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics through different axes for quite some time. For instance, the problems that the 'strategic partnership' between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus—which has become increasingly internalized since the 2010s—could create against Turkey's interests in the region was a subject noted by everyone familiar with the area. In fact, last year, Greece revealed its goal of protecting the Western Thrace and Aegean Islands against regional 'threats' with what it called the Achilles Shield, which is essentially a multi-layered air defense system. This regional threat was specifically Turkey, a country they are wary of regarding UAV technology but with whom they also frequently meet with the intention of maintaining a positive agenda. The Achilles Shield project involved the purchase of Israeli-made systems. Let us also note: as I write these lines today, a working group in the Greek parliament has approved these purchases. 

Another pillar of this alignment, as is known, is Cyprus. With the war in Iran, the situation on the island has become even more complicated. As is well known, when the 

British bases on the island were subjected to a drone attack, two situations became apparent. Although it may be a thing of the distant past, our European friends used to imply that they did not want to be neighbors with the Middle East during discussions about Turkey's membership, using this as an excuse. It has thus been clearly seen with Cyprus that this has long been surpassed. The second point is this: as a result of the situation in Iran, the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus have become a region where military activity and buildup have increased. I am truly curious to see how this buildup will proceed after the war. 

Let us come to the reflection of this geopolitics on the Aegean islands... Greece has taken or announced that it will take several steps due to the fragile situation in the region. All of these steps essentially involve the fortification of several islands that are in a demilitarized status. Let me say at the beginning what I intend to say at the end: Greece is trying to 'turn the crisis into an opportunity.' In other words, it is clearly looking to derive a new status quo from this. 

It must be said here that Greece has adopted a course of action based on islands with different statuses. For example, Karpathos is part of the Dodecanese group. This month, citing possible attacks on Cyprus, Greece deployed a Patriot air defense system to the island. According to the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, the island has a non-military status. In response to reactions from Turkey, the Greek Foreign Ministry spokesperson replied by saying that Turkey was not even a signatory to the 1947 treaty. This is actually similar to the statements Athens generally makes regarding the armament of the Dodecanese. However, the treaty establishes a status even without Turkey's signature and binds Greece. Moreover, since the issue of demilitarization was discussed in almost all diplomatic meetings and correspondence regarding the islands during and after the Second World War with the aim of ensuring 'Turkey's security,' the argument of not being a signatory remains, frankly, a very weak one. 

On the other hand, a few days ago, Greece also made several statements regarding Lemnos and Samothrace. It stated that it has a program to deploy Patriots to Samothrace and, furthermore, that it will shift F-16s to Lemnos. It based the justification for these on the regional conjuncture and also on the security of Bulgaria, which is a NATO member. Turkey also issued statements reacting to this issue. In truth, the status of Lemnos and Samothrace is the subject of a broad-ranging debate between Turkey and Greece that dates back to the 1930s. These two islands of the Northern Aegean group were transferred to Greece by Article 12 of the Treaty of Lausanne. This article contains references to the agreements and memoranda made in 1913 and 1914. For example, in the memorandum sent by the great powers to Greece and the Ottoman Empire in February 1914, the islands other than Gökçeada, Bozcaada, and Kastellorizo were transferred to Greece, but a condition of non-fortification was imposed for the transferred islands.

On the other hand, setting this reference aside, while Article 13 regulates the demilitarization of Lesbos, Chios, Ikaria, and Samos, the status of the islands at the entrance of the Straits was originally contained within the Lausanne Straits Convention. The fundamental debate here is whether the re-militarization of the Straits, resulting from the replacement of the Lausanne Straits Convention with the Montreux Convention in 1936, includes the islands at the entrance of the Straits. Greece claims that Montreux abolished the non-military status, including the islands. Turkey, however, argues that the issue of militarization only covers the Straits. At this point, Greek sources often cite a speech by the then-Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras, who gave the green light to the militarization of the islands during a period when Turkish-Greek friendship was at its peak. In my own press review, I also encountered voices from Turkey stating that the Straits were related to the security of the entire region and the country, but that the fortification of an island like Lemnos could only be directed against Turkey. In short, this issue has corresponded to a state of disagreement between Turkey and Greece for exactly 90 years. However, this state of disagreement also led to the birth of a 'Lemnos Crisis' that would later include NATO. Because it was an 'open secret' that Greece had militarized these islands, each of which has a different status, especially after bilateral relations were strained by the Cyprus issue. In the early 1980s, Greece's attempt to integrate Lemnos into NATO plans also plunged the two countries into a crisis within the NATO framework. Although that crisis subsided, Greece's effort to include this island in exercises did not end. This actually exemplifies Greece's effort to make Turkey accept its open secrets within an international framework. Today, although the situation surrounding the Iran war revolves around a different conjuncture, it exemplifies a similar effort. 

At this time, the last thing Turkey wants - and rightly so -  is another crisis situation emerging from the current war environment. But in truth, I am as curious about how long the situations and events we have declared 'null and void' will continue to remain 'null and void' as I am about the future of the security and buildup situation around Cyprus.