Trump's foreign policy and Turkey

A few days ago in the US, National Security Strategy titled document was published. We can briefly call this document Trump's international relations. For now, this strategy document, which is highly appreciated by Russia and criticized by Democrats in the US as well as the EU, has already started to be interpreted as a new Monroe Doctrine.In facIndeed, the US's policyof focusing on the "Western Hemisphere" and its intention towithdraw its resources or armedpower from regions such as Europe or the MiddleEast makes thiscomparison asignificant one. to a certain extentis becoming vulgarized. The fundamental difference is that while the Monroe Doctrine did not originallyaim for armament, the Trump Corollary underlines a policy of"peace through strength" and states that it will increasearmament. In this context, perhaps we can evaluate the Trump strategy in the coming months/years as the US'sincreasing its powerand legitimizing armedintervention in Latin Americathrough the Roosevelt Corollary would be more reasonable to compare.

Investment in militarypowerI think it will be important to touch upon a fewpoints regarding making investments.First,itisan important question whether potential investments will serve deterrence or militarism in the international system. Secondly, the impact of these investments on regional stability remains a critical factor to consider. Finally, the long-term strategic implications must be evaluated.sign. If we look at the balanced and predictable system of the Cold War, it is possible to say that deterrence brought a certain stability to the system, even if not peace. But the system and the elements of the systemhave becomemuch more unpredictablein this multi-layeredIt isnecessary to take into account that instead of "peace through strength" in the world, it could bring an unstable militarism, and therefore an unexpected explosion.Secondly, it is very clear that NATO, or at least the Europe-US dynamic within NATO, will not be the same as it used to be.

It is very clear that NATO, or at least the Europe-US dynamic within NATO, will not be the same as it used to be.It is very clear that NATO, or at least the Europe-US dynamic within NATO, will not be the same as it used to be.It is very clear that NATO, or at least the Europe-US dynamic within NATO, will not be the same as it used to be. It is very clear that the security expenditures of NATO member countriesby 2035the necessity of raising it to 5 percentis not only unrealistic, but alsofraught with economic and social crises.This is because for NATO member European countries,theratio of security expendituresto gross national product is, on average,corresponds to 2.6 percent.In other words, countries like Poland or the Baltic states that spend approximately 4 percent of their budgets on defense/security are spending setting aside those countries, many nations need to double their defensespending, arequirement thatseems likely to trigger significant public debateand unrest. On the other hand, it is aburden that fragile economies will not be able to handle.country ipoints to.

Speaking of fragile economies, the third point is my commentary on Turkey. Many analysts suggest that Turkey's obligationstoexpendituresto5 percentthe goal of increasing, the development of the defense industryinterms of creating a positive situation. This is a correct but incomplete interpretation. Because the economic/financial conditions under which this will be done have not beenaddressed much. Turkey is a country with a strengthening defense industry; in the future, it can both produce more and export more in this field. However, under current conditions, the Turkish publicwith a severe austerity policy and akind of inflation that does not fall to a“normal and predictable” level.Inshort, we are also facing inflation. In short, we have a poverty problem that we need to solve or at leastkeep in mind.

On the other hand, TAnother question mark for Turkey is theoptions that the US focusing on the American continent will create forTurkishforeignpolicy.Manypeoplebelieve that the US position is athe possibility of creating a power vacuum,suggesting that the role of regional actors like Turkey will increase, and that in the case of Turkey specifically, a sense of balance, or to use thefashionable term, an understanding of "strategic autonomy"could develop.

I would like to conclude these comments by asking the following question:

To us, wplaying a greater role in the regionwhy more "autonomous" policies might automatically bring alongthinking about, what exactly is it? Are they confusing concepts or is the agenda, especially the current state of Turkey-US relationships, being viewed from different pcould we be following it with personal biases? It seems a bit like that to me.