Turkey, BRICS, and Beyond

On September 2, 2024, Bloomberg reported that Turkey had made a formal application to join BRICS. Many of us were skeptical about the accuracy of this report and awaited a statement from official sources within Turkey. However, the expected statement did not come from Ankara, but from Moscow. Russia confirmed Turkey's application and stated that it would be evaluated. Later, we read in various news sources that Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov highlighted the Ukraine issue for membership, or more explicitly, suggested that there should be similar views on the Ukraine issue. I will leave aside the question of why there has still been no official statement from Turkey. It is clear that there are differing opinions in Ankara, and furthermore, there is currently no desire to negotiate this issue. In this article, I would like to focus on the answer to the question of how to make sense of this development from an academic perspective.

However, before doing so, it is undoubtedly essential to discuss what we understand or should understand by BRICS. First of all, the foundations of BRICS were laid in 2006 when Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) made contact to establish economic and financial cooperation. The group held its first official summit in 2009 and became BRICS in 2010 with the inclusion of South Africa. In short, the emergence of BRICS was more of a grouping than the establishment of an international organization. The group consisted of "rising powers" that make up a significant part of the world's population and economy. Despite this, their say in the Western-centric economic system and in the economic institutions of this system, such as the IMF and the World Bank, was not proportional to their economic power. The group emerged in a sense by criticizing this and demanding change. But on the other hand, BRICS was also establishing alternative institutions. The New Development Bank, which became operational in 2015, was one such example. The bank began providing loans and funds for infrastructure and sustainable development initiatives in emerging and developing countries. Although it was emphasized that such initiatives were not established as an alternative to the Western system, it was certain that they were a challenge to the Western order. For example, Russia had at one point spoken of a new reserve currency. Without belaboring the point, it must be said that although the most prominent feature of the expanded BRICS (or BRICS+) in 2023 is economic and financial cooperation, it is not possible to understand the formation solely in this way. For it must be emphasized that some of these countries challenge the Western world order both economically and politically. Today, Russia and China are two symbolic countries for the "post-Western world order" and the rhetoric of multipolarity that is assumed to be emerging... In short, Turkey's participation in BRICS does not mean joining an alternative international security organization, nor is it a simple matter to be understood solely through economic and financial benefits.

I believe we can understand this issue if we analyze it as a multi-layered matter. Three elements seem important here. The first is the systemic effects on Turkish foreign policy. Although it is not known where it will lead or exactly where it will settle into balance, it is now accepted by many people/institutions that the liberal international order (or the Western-centric international order) is changing, and that the system, which turned from bipolarity to unipolarity after the end of the Cold War, is heading back toward multipolarity. As a medium-sized country, Turkey has been affected by such global changes throughout its republican history and has restructured its foreign policy accordingly. One—and the most important—reason for Turkey joining the Western camp in 1945 was that the system had become bipolar and Turkey had problematic relations with the Soviet Union within this system. Conversely, in the world of the 1930s, Turkey was able to pursue more independent policies, and even from the 1960s, when the Cold War "thawed," it had moved away somewhat from the completely Western-guided policies of the 1950s. It is no coincidence that the national and regional issues that caused crises with the West in the 1960s and 1970s coincided with this era of "détente." In short, Turkey's search for autonomy, which makes itself felt when the system supports it as a medium-sized country, does not reflect a new situation. Turkey's closer engagement with groups that exemplify the "post-West," as in the BRICS issue, can be understood in this vein. However, the issue that needs to be discussed more today is what Turkey understands by this autonomy—or as it is often said—the concept of strategic autonomy. That is, does this mean establishing closer relations with another group as relations with the West deteriorate, does it correspond to a state of detached autonomy from both groups, or does it simply correspond to a need to create a bargaining chip in relations with the West? I think we use some concepts somewhat carelessly without having a clear answer to these questions. It is also certain that this situation creates some confusion for Turkey, both domestically and abroad.

Another factor influencing foreign policy orientations is undoubtedly economic motives. Since this topic was discussed at length last week, I will not dwell on it too much. However, I must state that the political economy of foreign policy is one of the most neglected areas in studies in our country. Yet, it is one of the important dynamics that has influenced foreign policy throughout the republican era. Let me continue with the example I gave above. In addition to systemic changes and security, Turkey's need for economic aid played an important role in its integration into the Western camp after World War II. Or, the economic basis of the foreign policy of the Özal era was Turkey's export-oriented growth, and this formed an important aspect of relations with the Middle East. Likewise, trade and economic relations held an important place in the concept of "soft power" that we frequently discussed in the 21st century. In the BRICS issue we are discussing this week, Turkey's desire to establish closer—economic—relations with these countries, which have a significant share in the world economy, seems important. Turkey also aims to attract more investment. It is obvious that if it can achieve this, it will provide an economic benefit. Time will tell how the returns of BRICS might affect Turkey's relations with its primary "economic" hinterland, Europe.

Let us come to a third element that I care about quite a bit: the overlap of the general transformation in Turkish foreign policy with the internal political system. One element in Turkey's relations with the West throughout the republican era also included certain normative values. This was sometimes modernity, sometimes democracy. I do not accept that it is the sole determinant in the establishment of the internal regime. But I can definitely say that it acted as a catalyst. The most important and recent example that can be given for this normative form of relationship was the negotiations between Turkey and the EU after the 1990s. However, since the second decade of the 21st century, both Turkey's relations with the West have lost their normative character to some extent and become more functional, and the world has begun to experience a period in which authoritarian regimes are on the rise. Academia continues to examine these regimes sometimes within the framework of the concepts of rising far-right, sometimes authoritarian populism, and sometimes—in my opinion, oxymoronically—illiberal democracy.

The bottom line is that Turkey has also become an important part of this authoritarian wave. The fact that the countries that first come to mind when talking about a post-Western international order are also from this group explains Turkey's proximity to this possible order. This is undoubtedly a subject that goes beyond the BRICS issue. But while examining the transformation in Turkey's foreign policy, in addition to the elements I have listed above, we must definitely focus on the similarity of the regimes of these countries that are aligning together. In short, these countries continue the rhetoric that a small group determines the future of larger masses, that is, in a sense, the populism of "us" and "them," at the systemic level as well. From these perspectives, the government in Turkey feels more comfortable ideologically with the representatives of the "post-West." Because their stance and rhetoric are more compatible. It is essential to make sense of Turkey's possible future steps from this perspective as well.

As a result, we can predict that the transformation or fluctuation in Turkish foreign policy will continue in parallel with that in the system. The BRICS issue is just a part of this... What exactly will the transformation in the system produce? What will be its effect on Turkish foreign policy? And how will national politics in Turkey affect foreign policy and how will it be affected by it? It is clear that we will discuss and write more in the coming years to be able to answer these questions...