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A constitution cannot be drafted in this environment

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Seeing the gravity of the situation in the last local elections, the AKP and its circle, in order to avoid being dragged from state protection into a hellish realm, see the only way to save face as changing the presidential system, and thus imagine a new constitution—naturally, a new political structure that can be shaped in the direction they personally desire. The path to drafting a new constitution is also planned as creating a false atmosphere of "softening" with the main opposition party, which emerged onto the political stage as the leading party by leaving the AKP behind in the last local elections. Given this situation, AKP politicians are trying to persuade the opposition, which they previously adorned with a thousand negative expressions, to cooperate on the new constitution by lulling them with the ointment of "softening." Thankfully, the CHP's initial stance against this covertly aggressive initiative has been negative.

Now let us come to the issue of drafting a new constitution. Since no formation emerges in an instant and is instead the result of a long history, we must first make a brief extension to the transition. For one thing, Turkey is currently not being governed by a coup constitution, but by an understanding of one-man politics. The fact that the ruling coalition, and the AKP within that coalition, is dominant at the state level, and that the bureaucracy, judiciary, military, and police echelons are practically partitioned and instrumentalized, has effectively rendered the 1982 constitution—which has undergone a thousand changes—and its subsequent amendments null and void.

In the face of this situation, is it not necessary to ask the ruling wing, which claims today that the country needs a constitution: are you not the ones who, based on claims of a coup constitution, are trying to rise from the government level to state supremacy through a coup in political management? Could the adventure of a new constitution be aimed at structuring the legal basis of being a state and securing a suitable position there, so as not to drown in the hell of political crimes committed during this march? Yet it is known that a constitution is not made for the survival of a political party, but for the legalization—that is, the codification—of the consensus between social strata. While defending their claims, the enthusiasts of a new constitution say that the goal is not for the party, but to serve the purpose of society. It is useful to remind these people of the famous story of the renowned psychologist Sigmund Freud. The incident is as follows: At the opening of a session of the Austrian parliament, the president said "I am closing the session" instead of "I am opening the session." Freud's interpretation of this slip of the tongue was that the president had little hope for the session anyway. In our example, there is no slip of the tongue; there is a declaration of will. If Freud were alive, he would probably shift his interpretation from Austria to France this time, saying that leaders see themselves like Louis XIV. The Louis XIV era is characterized in state theory as the chrematistic period. Interestingly, it is seen that some features of the chrematistic period have unfortunately reflected down to the present day. Well, when we look at what the basic features of the chrematistic period are, the view that the wealth of the kings or leaders of that period represented the wealth of the nation—reminiscent of the wealth and obsession with prestige of today's leaders—immediately comes to mind.

The formation of nation-states is the result of the transformation of the chrematistic view of state finance into the cameralist view, whereby the right to the budget passed from presidents to the parliament, which is accepted as the representative of the people. It is naturally expected that the representative quality of the parliament should at least be in accordance with the bourgeois understanding of democracy. With these crumbs of information, let us review the passion for drafting a new constitution not by its reasons, but by its format of execution. The reason I do not go into the causes of the passion for drafting a constitution is that the AKP spokesperson's statement that the new constitution is "not for us, but for the nation" has clearly revealed what the real view is; this proposal has nothing to do with the happiness of the people and is nothing more than an effort by politicians to create escape routes from a non-state hell. Our people must now understand and interpret these issues with a calmer mind.

Now, let us turn to the question of whether this parliament—or rather, a political cadre that is dominant over the parliament and all state institutions—has the authority to draft such a constitution. Firstly, a constitution cannot be made by an established parliament, but by a "constituent assembly" that is formed for this purpose and will be dissolved after the constitution is drafted. The players who will play on the field themselves, especially if they are quite powerful on the field, cannot and should not have the power to determine the rules of the game for the second period.

Secondly, in the system we are going through, a political cadre that is dominant over all high-level state institutions, primarily the judicial system, including the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation, etc., cannot and should not be the regulator of an environment in which it will also take part in the future.

The attitude of the current political cadre, which is dominant in politics, regarding the budget and the Wealth Fund application is also not in line with today's understanding of democracy.

To sum up, any political structure that supports the effort directed toward drafting a new constitution under the conditions of a parliament dominated by a political cadre that has made it its motto to govern the country with a system contrary to basic legal/constitutional rules, such as omnibus staffing and, where appropriate, decrees having the force of law, will be held responsible in the presence of history.