The price of winning one more vote

Throughout history, Turkish politics has been an arena for calculations that do not fit on ballot papers, for deep-seated fears of the ballot box, and, most of all, for regime reflexes that cannot reconcile with the will of the people. Today, a similar performance is being staged on the same stage. Different faces, but the same unchanging script…

The fact that the Republican People's Party (CHP) is approaching the 40% vote threshold, and that the public is once again choosing the opposition in centers like Istanbul and Ankara, has clearly been coded in the government's mind not merely as an election result, but as a threat.

Because in this geography, the understanding that "power is taken once and never relinquished" still maintains its dominance.

That is why an increasingly organized attack plan is being put into action. A wave of pressure that has been prepared for a long time, with details crafted with the precision of a jeweler...

A process that began with party convention debates, continued with videos leaked through secret recordings, and is now being shaped by the judiciary. Just like the tactics of FETÖ from times past:

'Create a cause, build a perception, make them believe'... And then come out and talk about "the law"...

The CHP is currently in a clear vice.

And the tragic part is that what makes it easiest for the regime to tighten this vice are the power struggles, endless settling of scores, and insincere factions within the party itself.

Those who try to eliminate one another are, whether knowingly or unknowingly, carrying water to the mill of the Erdoğan regime.

The perception Erdoğan is trying to create of "incompetent, ambitious people who are of no use to each other" is growing on exactly this ground.

On the other hand, the vice, the conspiracy, the lawlessness, the pressure... Whatever you call it: The picture at hand is not unique to the CHP or İmamoğlu.

For one of the new thresholds of Turkish politics is exactly this: As your vote share increases, you move into the category of a threat. Or, even if your vote share does not increase, if your voice turns into an influence, you become a target again.

What Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayors, Ümit Özdağ, and in the past, Selahattin Demirtaş have experienced are current examples of this thesis.

Demirtaş had carried the HDP—which has now become almost a partner of the People's Alliance and with whom they are making plans for constitutional amendments—above the electoral threshold. He was calling out to Erdoğan in the squares, saying, "We will not let you be president."

Ümit Özdağ's "fault" was keeping the migration issue, which angers even Erdoğan's biggest fans at times, on the agenda. It was having the potential to cross the threshold. It was creating a sharp, understandable, and unique political language and sphere of influence.

İmamoğlu's "sin," however, is bringing the CHP close to 40 percent.

That is why there is now a desire for İmamoğlu to be slowly erased, blurred, and to lose his influence.

Rather than what İmamoğlu has achieved or will achieve, I am interested in the regime's reflex not to relinquish power and its restructuring of the game accordingly.

I am interested in democracy, law, justice, and the desire to live in a civilized country in a reliable environment.

Scenarios of trustees for the CHP, cancellation of conventions, disintegration, inability to govern, searches for new parties… Events are taking place beyond what Erdoğan, who is physically and mentally losing his strength, and Bahçeli, whose health problems are known to everyone, could plan.

Imperialism-backed, Western-backed political Islam has become addicted to power, governance, wealth, and splendor. And it has been this way for a very long time.

There are tens of thousands who do not want to give this up. And these tens of thousands know that they can only exist with Erdoğan. Because there are also major power struggles among themselves. The regime survives precisely through the efforts of these people.

This dark force seeks new ways to punish the people's will whenever they turn to the ballot box.

And the lack of sincerity within the opposition may be even more dangerous than the authoritarianism of the government in this process.

Because the government is playing its own game. Its goal, its method, and who it has surrendered to are all out in the open.

The real issue is not whether the opposition can see this game; it is whether it can establish a new political ground outside of it...

If this society still has faith in democracy, this faith will be determined and sustained not only by the government's pressures but also by the credibility of the opposition.